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BETWEEN EAST AND WEST:
ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC DIMENSIONS
OF CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The Thirteenth Annual
Political Studies Students' Conference
January 30 - February 1, 1997
University of Manitoba

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

Edited by Robert Dick and Kari Jobin

Proceedings of the Annual Conference held January 30 - February 1, 1997
Centre for Defence and Security Studies
University of Manitoba

Between East and West: Atlantic and Pacific Dimensions of Canadian Foreign Policy

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Foreword

Since 1985 when it was initiated by Professor Paul Buteux of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, The Political Studies Students' Conference has pursued its mandate of encouraging students to organise and coordinate academic seminars dealing with current issues of interest and relevance in the field of international relations.

With increasing confidence and success, the Conference has covered a wide variety of contemporary issues in the thirteen years since its inception. The 1991 Conference, for example was entitled, "In Defence of Canada: Constitutional, Economic and Security Dimensions." The 1995 Conference examined "Order and Disorder: Domestic Sources of Regional Instability," while the 1996 Conference was entitled "International Intervention: A Challenge to World Order."

The Conference is open to everyone free of charge, and usually attracts over four hundred people. To receive additional copies of these conference proceedings or any other, or for information about future conferences, please contact:

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Introduction

Robert Dick
Kari Jobin

Robert Dick and Kari Jobin

Robert Dick and Kari Jobin are graduate students in the Department of Political Studies at the University of Manitoba. They were the co-chairs of the 1997 Political Studies Students' Conference.

In recent years we have witnessed many changes in the international system and the global community. These changes, many of them quite dramatic, have necessitated a reassessment of Canadian foreign and security policy. For Canada, 1997 is an important year for maintaining traditional security relationships, most notably in Europe, and for forging new economic, political, and security relations in all parts of the world, but especially with the Asia Pacific.

This year's Conference theme, "Between East and West: Atlantic and Pacific Dimensions of Canadian Foreign Policy" seeks to examine the debate surrounding where Canada should direct its increasingly strained resources in establishing a new foreign policy orientation. In 1997, Canada's "Year of Asia Pacific," Canada has sought to establish new political and economic links with Asia Pacific. Throughout the year, Canadian businesses and the federal and provincial governments have participated in "Team Canada" missions to Asia. In November, Canada hosted the leaders of the APEC countries in Vancouver. By taking an active role in APEC, Canada aims to promote trade, investment and economic and technical co-operation among the 18 Pacific Rim member countries.

While the establishment of new relations with Asia Pacific captures the imagination and is the subject of extensive debate, Europe continues to play an important role in Canada's foreign and security policy. In 1997 Canada's participation in NATO came under scrutiny, as NATO faced a crucial period in its existence and dealt with such issues as the expansion of its membership and mandate.

Participants in the this year's Conference were invited to address various aspects of Canada's new foreign and security policy orientations. Although broad topic areas were outlined by the Organising Committee in the form of panel themes, speakers were given the freedom to emphasise what they felt was of greatest importance with respect to foreign policy. Similarly, attendees at the Conference were encouraged to form their own opinions based on the information presented, as are readers of these Proceedings.

In his keynote address, Lloyd Axworthy described Canada's current foreign policy commitments, and discussed areas in which Canada faces or may soon face challenges. While he acknowledged the importance of Canada's North Atlantic links, he stressed the importance of Canada's becoming a "Pacific nation." Minister Axworthy noted that the best way to accomplish these foreign policy objectives, aside from the "Team Canada" missions, is to raise the awareness of the Canadian public and especially Canadian youth about Asia Pacific. Other strategies suggested by the Minister include increasing the dialogue among the general public, academic, and Foreign Affairs communities through fora such as this conference.

Dr. Nossal opened the first panel, "The Atlanticist Tradition" with a reminder that Canada is and always has been considered a European nation. The origins of Canada's relations with Asia Pacific are entirely different from those with Europe with respect to institutionalised security arrangements, and the idea of Canada's becoming a "Pacific nation" is of "recent vintage." Though new relations with Asia Pacific are exciting, Dr. Nossal reminds us of the importance with our historical links with Europe.

Like Kim Nossal, Richard Kirby focuses his presentation on the importance of close links with Europe. In particular, Mr. Kirby asserts that while Canada's ties with Europe have become increasingly diverse in recent years, NATO remains the "principal, tangible expression of the trans-Atlantic link." According to Mr. Kirby, continued Canadian participation NATO is the only way to ensure a voice for Canada in European affairs.

Offering a different perspective, Dr. Andrew Latham puts forward the view that Canada's Atlantic vocation in fact constrains policy-makers as they pursue Canada's foreign and security policy objectives. NATO membership further constrains Canada's ability to pursue its goal of replacing nuclear deterrence with disarmament. Nevertheless, Dr. Latham recognises that the best way of accomplishing this goal may well be to work within NATO for a non-nuclear strategic posture.

On panel two, "The New Pacific," High Commissioner Kausikan offers an external perspective on Canada's foreign policy. In the Asia Pacific, Canada's strength is its positive image, but it is felt that Canada lacks definition it its Asia Pacific role, and that this is a significant weakness.

Dr. Jim Boutilier, agreeing with High Commissioner Kausikan, asserts that Canadian foreign policy decision-makers tend to be too conservative, and that their lack of vision has "dramatically undercut our [Canada's] performance in Asia." Dr. Boutilier calls for a more consistent and more dynamic foreign policy towards the Asia Pacific.

Jeremy Paltiel takes a different approach with respect to Canada's relations with the Asia Pacific. He asserts that the issue of human rights has constituted perhaps the most important feature of cross-cultural relations with the Asia Pacific in the past one hundred and fifty years. It is the emergence of the Asia Pacific on the world stage that has brought issues of human rights to the forefront. While these issues are of great importance, Canada and other nations must tread carefully and remain sensitive to non-western traditions. Common European tradition has been to westernize at all costs, and Paltiel cautions against this approach in the future.

On the third panel, "Implications of Immigration and Multiculturalism on Canada's Foreign Policy," both Gerald Dirks and Yasmeen Abu-Laban make the case that the changing ethnic composition has had an impact on Canada's relations abroad. According to Abu-Laban, foreign policy decision-makers are not adequately taking into account the possibilities presented by the presence of various cultures in society. Gerald Dirks traces the history of Canada's policies on immigration and multiculturalism. In doing so, he suggests that while on the one hand it appears that various immigrant groups in Canada have been able to exert some influence over foreign policy direction in certain instances, on the other hand it seems that more recently economic constraints necessitate the allocation of resources to foreign policy areas that do not always coincide with the niche interests of immigrant groups.

Ernie Keenes began discussions on the subject of, "Economic Dimensions of Canada's Pacific and European Relations," by suggesting that there are many good reasons for Canada to be "building and maintaining bridges across the Pacific." Sounding a note of caution, Keenes warns that Canada must avoid allowing itself to be placed in a position where policy towards the Pacific evolves and is dictated by the forces of capitalism, rather than being planned, structured and implemented to serve a broader range of Canadian interests.

From a different vantage point, Karen Minden focuses on the role which Canada's business community plays and could play in Asia. Asian economies are the most rapidly growing and dynamic economies in the world, and Canada's aversion to risk, among other factors, has slowed its response and hindered its progress in the Asia Pacific economic arena. Contributing to Canada's slow penetration of the Asia Pacific markets is its seeming refusal to re-focus attention away from traditional US and European areas. Dr. Minden is quick to reiterate Lloyd Axworthy's position one Canada's primary goals should be to ensure its recognition as a significant player among Asia Pacific Nations.

Hector Mackenzie, of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, traces the evolution of Canada's official relations and attitude towards the Asia Pacific. From the end of the Second World War, Canadian relations and ties with Asia Pacific grew slowly in the areas of diplomacy, immigration, trade, lagging significantly behind the expansion of those interests with other regions.

Trudeau's 1968 pledge to take a "new interest in Pacific affairs generally," changes in Canada's immigration policies, the plight of the boat people, and tremendous growth in trade with Asia has forced dramatic changes in the importance placed on official relations with the Asia Pacific and increases in the official presence to the region.

Speaking on the concluding panel, "Canada's Expanded Security Agenda," Francis Furtado of the Department of National Defence articulates Canada's defence policy as it is outlined in the 1994 Defence White Paper. He points out the intentionally unstructured nature of the document, stating that it "reflects an unstructured agenda for an unstructured world." He notes that the defence agenda is defined not by regions but rather by problems. The deployment of Canadian forces abroad, much like Canada's foreign policy, is determined not so much by interest as it is by values. Furtado applauds the ability of the Canadian Forces to adapt to this trend in its ability to respond to missions in the short-term and to preserve combat capabilities for the years ahead.

Offering a pessimistic outlook on the future of security the Asia Pacific, Doug Ross criticises the Canada's apparent decision to opt-out of any effective contributions to collective defence, collective security and international development. He suggests that his may have grave regional consequences as it may serve to validate Huntington's exclusionary approach to foreign policy and to "accentuate the tendency in the United States toward unilateral decision-making and *de facto* isolationism. Ross understands that while isolation is comfortable, interdependence is unavoidable in the coming century. He predicts that the road ahead is troubled, and we must focus our attention on forging new, broader standards of behaviour.

Concluding the panel, Denis Stairs takes a hard look at Canada's foreign and security policies and concludes that we are attempting too much with too little. Like Francis Furtado, Denis Stairs states that Canada has no specific foreign policy priorities. Further, he argues that Canada is imperialistic in the advocacy of its values abroad, but lacks the credibility associated with the resources of a greater power to promote them. As Stairs concludes, "Canada's modest Caesar should not seek to join the imperial parade unless adequately dressed."

Throughout the Conference, the views expressed were varied and diverse, but there was general agreement that Canada must continue to look to both the Atlantic and the Pacific in its relations abroad. Specifically, it seems that in the area of security Canada looks to the Atlantic and, indeed, Canada's primary security commitment remains NATO. In its relations with the Asia Pacific, Canada focuses on trade and economic relations.

In all of its relations - political, economic and security - most speakers agreed that Canada must become more focused, must set clear priorities and allocate resources accordingly, and must respect the constraints that limited resources impose. Only by doing so will Canada be able to preserve and promote its interests and values at home and abroad, in the east and in the west.

Keynote Address

Honourable Lloyd Axworthy

Lloyd Axworthy

The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy was appointed Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs in January 1996, and has previously held a variety of other important Cabinet posts. Prior to his political career, Minister Axworthy completed his M.A. and his PhD in political science from Princeton University, and was a professor at the University of Winnipeg.

The city of Winnipeg, in the middle of Canada, strikes me as the perfect place to discuss your theme for today, "Between East and West: Atlantic and Pacific Dimensions of Canadian Foreign Policy." The theme is an interesting one, given the opportunities we have to define our foreign policy in the aftermath of the Cold War. No longer are we part of the rigid, bipolar system, which regarded NATO as the prime element in assuring our security, the Soviet bloc as potential enemies, and the third world as an ideological (and sometimes a literal) battleground. We are free to develop a more rounded approach to international affairs, to pursue a policy more distinctively Canadian.

I am sure that you will be too wise in your discussions today to assume that Canada has to make any crude choice between concentrating on Europe and our old partnerships such as NATO, or becoming an Asia-Pacific nation, focused on the emerging counties of East and South-East Asia and their important markets for trade and investment. This would imply a zero-sum game in our relations with Europe and Asia. It also ignores partnerships that Canada has forged and continues to promote at other points of the compass. Canada looks north and south, as much as it does east and west. We are truly a global nation.

What do I mean by a global nation? I mean a nation that pursues issues and interests around the world. A nation that makes the best of all the opportunities at our disposal, wherever in the world those opportunities are. While we must remain sensitive to geographic realities, Canadian foreign policy is increasingly structured around issues. The pursuit of rules-based international trade, of increased human security, and of fundamental Canadian values are basic themes around which our relations with different regions are structured. So-called "coalitions of the willing" around specific issues, from banning land-mines to protecting the Arctic environment, are now as important to the conduct of foreign policy as traditional formal coalitions and alliances.

This is not to say that we cannot think, as you are doing today, in terms of relations with specific regions. But we should recognise the key issues of Canadian foreign policy that cut across regional boundaries. Although it may sound like hubris to say this in the middle of a Manitoba winter, we should consider the possibility that, in the new international landscape, geography is no longer destiny.

In light of this, I would like to speak first to some of the broad trends and changes that define our foreign policy regardless of region. And I would like to look at how Canadian foreign policy is being implemented not only to our east and west, but also to the north and south.

A Changing World

Any student of international relations (and I guess there are a few here) must be struck by the rapidity of change in our world as we approach the new millennium. The factors for change are multiplying and accelerating at an almost alarming rate.

In the last ten years we have seen the collapse of communism, the end of the Cold War, the prevalence of economic reform around the Washington consensus, the emergence of the Asian tiger economies, the resurgence of the Latin American economies after the debt crisis of the 80's, the completion of the Uruguay Round and the establishment of the WTO. It would be difficult to predict what the world will look like in ten years' time with any great assurance of accuracy. Yet we must look beyond events as they happen and understand the forces at work in international affairs - those that will play a large part in shaping the next decade. Let me mention a few:

- We can see increased democratisation - not only in greater political rights in formerly undemocratic societies, but in democracies like ours, greater involvement of ordinary citizens in the decisions that affect their lives. Just recently here in Winnipeg, I attended the 1996 National Forum on Foreign Policy. This was the culmination of a process that took place all over Canada and involved hundreds of Canadians having an opportunity to discuss and make recommendations regarding major issues of foreign policy.
- In a wider sense we see a multiplication of international actors. The increasing importance of NGO's, including youth groups, and business fora, serve as examples. Their growing role means that we must adapt the old structures and ways of working to achieve goals internationally.
- The blurring of borders and dividing lines brought about by globalization and the information technology revolution raises new questions about the concept of the nation state itself and its power to control events. We also have to acknowledge the ever-closer linkage between domestic policy and foreign policy. We cannot pursue either in isolation.
- Sadly, while the end of the Cold War has seen the disappearance of the old conflicts between the super-powers and the blocs of West and East, we are now experiencing new types of conflict that threaten human security. The intra-state fighting in Bosnia and the Great Lakes region of Africa are

examples of how inter-group violence can spill over and threaten the peace and security of whole regions of the world.

Dealing With Change: New Relationships, New Tools

These powerful trends require new approaches to deal with their impacts. We have to build stronger bilateral relationships with new partners while maintaining established links of old friendship and common interest. Globalization means greater inter-dependence between nations and the need to act regionally and internationally. So we devote a considerable portion of our energies to organisations such as APEC, the OAS and the FTAA to address regional questions, and work with other nations to fix global problems in the UN, the WTO and other bodies. Canada has long been committed to multi-lateralism, but regional and multilateral bodies are becoming more and more important as we grapple with problems that cannot be solved within our borders alone.

In the face of these powerful new forces, we must also seek new tools - new ways of dealing with international problems:

- forming "coalitions of the willing," sometimes to deal with a single important issue;
- involving non-state actors, such as NGO's and the private sector, on issues where they can work as or more effectively than governments;
- using new technology to achieve foreign policy goals more rapidly, more effectively, and at lower cost;
- developing initiatives to put new foreign policy concepts, such as peace-building, to work to meet new needs.

Canadian Assets in the New International Landscape

Canada's success depends on our ability to meet the challenge of change, to innovate, but also to play to our own unique strengths. Canada is a modern, progressive, technologically advanced, democratically and economically successful nation. None should underestimate the influence that these assets and values bring us on the international stage. We are also a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural nation. On my recent visit to India, when I opened the new Canadian office in Chandigarh, it was a real pleasure to see so many Canadians of Indian origin present.

Canada is above all a country with a strong sense of values, which we aim to promote internationally. Of course talking a good game is not enough, and Canada has shown its readiness to act in support of its values. We earn great respect abroad by our actions and contributions. Our support for peacekeeping in Bosnia and our initiative to tackle the crisis in eastern Zaire are just two examples of this. Our ability to take a leadership role in the Zaire crisis was greatly facilitated by another Canadian asset - we have no colonial (or neo-colonial) baggage which could alienate states around the globe, be it in foreign policy initiatives in our own hemisphere, in Europe or in the Asia-Pacific region.

Looking North, Looking South

To our south, of course, the USA remains overwhelmingly our largest and closest partner across the spectrum. But the nature of our relationship, while still exceptionally close, has changed somewhat in nature in the aftermath of the Cold War. We can now afford to differ from the US and other close allies when it matters to us. It is perfectly normal that close friends should occasionally disagree - as we have done with the US, for example, over the best way of encouraging positive political, economic and social change in Cuba. We are together on what matters, which is our mutual desire to see democratic and economic reform in Cuba. But, as I stated during my recent visit to Cuba, Canada believes this is best achieved through contact and dialogue, not isolation.

Canada is also looking further south, and developing its relationship with the entire hemisphere. Mexico is now a NAFTA partner, we have free trade with Chile, and we are working with other trade partners on a Free Trade of the Americas. At the same time we are intensifying political relationships and supporting democratisation and human rights, be it in Cuba, Guatemala or Haiti.

If there is one compass point that we have tended to overlook in our international relations, it is the north. We see ourselves - Canada - as the north, and we forget that we have close circumpolar neighbours. It is partly to redress this neglect that we worked to set up the Arctic Council last year. This provides an invaluable forum where we meet with the other Arctic nations and representatives of the indigenous peoples of the Arctic regions, to examine common problems.

Transforming the Trans-Atlantic Relationship

Turning eastward, we have another new foreign policy tool in the recently signed *Canada-EU political declaration and action plan*. This agreement took a lot of effort from both sides. It meant we had to resolve some disputes with the EU and its member states, notably Spain, before we could proceed. At one stage it looked as though the negotiations might fail, but we succeeded - without compromising Canadian interests. I like to think that my personal discussions with Spanish Foreign Minister Matutes, played a part in reaching final agreement. The Action Plan provides a basis to move our relationship with the EU ahead, as the EU itself evolves. It also counters suggestions that we have allowed this relationship to drift in recent years, with the emergence of a plethora of new international partners.

In terms of multi-lateral bodies, no project symbolises more clearly the great changes that the Atlantic region has undergone than the expansion and reform of NATO. This is a key component of our approach, not only to western Europe, but also to the countries of eastern Europe. We look forward to new relationships both with those countries that will soon join NATO and those remaining outside, including Russia and Ukraine, with whom , we hope, we will forge new and creative security partnerships.

To Canadians of any origin, the nations of Europe, and western Europe in particular, remain linked to us by more than history. Their values are like our own. We will continue to join with them in coalitions of the like-minded on a range of issues from children's rights to opposition to the Helms-Burton Act.

Building Ties Across the Pacific

In the Asia-Pacific region, perhaps the most visible expression of Canadian interest is the series of Team Canada visits that the Prime Minister has led. All evidence demonstrates that Team Canada is contributing significantly to Canadian jobs and growth. The provincial Premiers clearly agree with me on this - they would not continue to take part enthusiastically unless they felt the visits were worthwhile.

Team Canada is not specifically about promoting democracy, human rights and other Canadian values. But the fact is that in Asia, the bigger the player Canada is economically, the more government and business there will listen to our concerns on these issues. Canada rarely misses an opportunity to raise subjects like human rights and democratic development with countries in Asia, but this is not always done with a megaphone.

Team Canada visits can have a lasting impact on our relations with other countries, improving the scope for dialogue on a number of issues. On my recent visit to India, for example, I found new scope for co-operation on child labour, the environment and other matters of concern to Canadians. The Team Canada visit of last year to India was instrumental in convincing the government of India of Canada's interest in India, in highlighting the benefits of a constructive relationship, and in making our concerns, especially about child labour, clear to them.

If anyone doubted Canada's interest in the Asia-Pacific, they can hardly do so now, in 1997, the year we host the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) process. The November meetings of APEC leaders, and Trade and Foreign Ministers in Vancouver will be the culmination of Canada's Year of Asia Pacific, a celebration of our ties with the region. In addition, over 100 ministers with a wide range of responsibilities will participate in meetings in different parts of Canada throughout the year. Business delegations will come to Canada as part of these high-level meetings, and activities to engage young people are also being organised. This is also an occasion for Canada to provide focus and direction to the work of APEC. We have a unique opportunity to contribute to APEC's key goal of free trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region by 2010 for developed countries and 2020 for developing countries.

To complement our role as host, we have designated 1997 as Canada's Year of Asia Pacific. As part of the year we plan to raise Canadians' awareness of the Asia Pacific region by hosting a major, year-long cultural programme with performers and exhibitors from Asia visiting locations across Canada and linking into local community events. We will also be organising events to assist business people, especially those involved in SME's and first-time exporters, in seizing opportunities to export to Asia. The extensive communities of Canadians of Asian origin are one of Canada's greatest assets as we work in 1997 and beyond to strengthen our ties with the region across all spheres, from the cultural to the economic.

Let me give just one example of an event in Canada's Year of Asia Pacific which may be of particular interest to many of you. Later this year Winnipeg will be the site of a national conference of Canadian and Asian young people entitled, "Asia Connects/ Cherchons L'Asie." Up to twelve other sites in Canada will be linked electronically to the Winnipeg conference, creating "virtual communities" of young people across the country. The conference will involve young Canadians directly in developing our contacts with Asia Pacific, and in using information technology in innovative ways to reach out beyond Canada.

A Foreign Policy for Youth

In talking of the challenges of the new and changing international environment before a university audience, it would be wrong to conclude without referring to the role of young Canadians - for this will be your future. The changed world will make new demands of you. You will need new skills - languages, information technology skills, and cultural adaptability - to be able to function in an increasingly globalized, internationally linked environment. But it will also present opportunities to you, opportunities to play an increasingly important role in the development of our foreign policy, and to communicate and work with people of other countries and cultures.

Canada's youth, well educated and with the necessary skills, will be a major asset and source of competitive advantage for the country. That is why the Government has made youth issues, particularly youth employment, a top priority. As Foreign Minister, I have made a youth focus my priority also. We are increasingly drawing youth into active participation in Canada's international relations, and making youth issues central to our work.

This concern for the young extends most urgently to children around the world who suffer. We have targeted in particular two evils which blight the lives of millions of children - child labour, especially child prostitution, and the use of anti-personnel land-mines.

We have also taken a series of initiatives aimed at young Canadians, including youth internships and exchanges. I have already cited one example of how we are involving young Canadians in Canada's Year of Asia Pacific. Young Canadians are also involved in the debate on transatlantic issues. The recent Youth Perspectives fiftieth anniversary conference in England, jointly sponsored by my Department, debated "Canada and Europe."

There will be more to come. And we will continue to reach out to young people in the context of Canada's foreign policy. I would urge you all to consult the Department of Foreign Affairs' website, and to reply to our youth survey that you will find there.

Conclusion

In summing up, I want to reiterate the point that the world is changing more rapidly than ever - this is particularly true for international affairs. To students of politics and international relations, this should make the world a more interesting place - and should certainly do your future employment prospects no harm. Canada has many advantages, both natural and cultural - it is well placed to withstand the shock of changes that may come and to develop the tools needed in the new world environment. But it will need leaders, analysts, business people and workers in other professions with appropriate skills and the flexible outlook necessary for success. Above all it will need Canadians committed to a vision of what Canada is and what Canada stands for, committed to maintain and develop Canada's resources and values and secure its place in the world. The government can at best provide the framework and the opportunities - the rest is up to you.

The Atlanticist Tradition

Kim Richard Nossal
Richard Kirby
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Kim Richard Nossal

THE ATLANTICIST TRADITION IN CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY: REFLECTIONS ON THE RISE AND DECLINE OF A POLICY IDEA

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The idea that Canada is a 'European' nation has been an integral part of the way in which Canadians have identified themselves since Confederation. In historical perspective, the two European nations, Britain and France, were frequently described in Canadian political discourse in essentially maternal terms; and Canadians' attachment to, and identification with, one or other (or both) of the 'mother countries' was no less umbilical. The identification had been deeply rooted in Canadian self-perception and Canadian political practice from initial settlement and the defining decision of the 1770s not to follow the United States into independence. The vast majority of those living in British North America had always felt the transatlantic ties of birth, family, national origin, politico-cultural inspiration, commercial intercourse, or even, it has been argued, psychological dependence. Moreover, the majority of Canadians believed that Canada's vital interests were closely connected to the transatlantic triangle linking Canada, the United States, and Britain. Not only was Canadian security intertwined with the security of the United Kingdom, but with virtually all of Canada's trade concentrated in these two markets, Canadian wealth, and the country's economic well-being, were dependent on the maintenance of an essential harmony between Britain and the United States.[1]

By contrast, the idea that Canada is an 'Atlantic' nation is of more recent vintage. To be sure, the origins of the 'Atlantic idea' itself are somewhat obscure. Hinsley reminds us that the idea of an Atlantic community of interests involving the Anglo-American democracies was embraced in the early nineteenth centuries by the Peace Movements that were seeking to overcome the rivalries of contending nationalisms on both sides of the Atlantic.[2] Robert Wolfe suggests that in the context of Canadian political discourse, Atlanticism can be traced back to the Washington Treaty of 1871, and the emerging common outlook on world politics of the United States and Britain.[3]

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[1] John W. Holmes, Canada: A Middle-Aged Power (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), 126.

[2] See the discussion in F.H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), chap. 6.

However, when used in the context of the middle of the twentieth century, there is little doubt that the notion of Atlanticism was defined more narrowly. 'Atlanticism' was an idea, embraced by the leaders of Britain, the United States, Canada, and European countries occupied by the Nazis, that had its roots in the early days of the Second World War. The idea was to bind the United States and Britain in common cause, and this idea was expressed in numerous speeches and joint declarations of the British prime minister, Winston Churchill, and the United States president, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, both before and after the United States declared war on Germany. The Atlantic Charter of August 1941 setting out both the wartime and the post-war goals of the Anglo-American allies stands as the exemplar of the Atlantic sentiment at work.

Post-war Atlanticism expanded on the original Anglo-American focus of the Atlantic idea to include all western European countries. It manifested itself in the institutions that were created in the 1940s -- the North Atlantic Treaty and the other multilateral economic institutions designed to manage the growth of interdependence in the Atlantic area.[4]

There were good reasons why Canadians were so enamoured with the Atlantic idea after the end of the Second World War. Institutionalised security arrangements such as NATO would continue to involve the United States in world politics and prevent a return to the withdrawal and isolation that had marked the American response to the League of Nations in 1920 -- something that Canadian officials worried would happen again in the 1940s.

Second, Atlanticism gave Canadians a security architecture that would not work to Canada's disadvantage. A major concern in Canada was that American involvement in post-war European security would mean the resurgence of the wartime Anglo-American alliance. Even worse was the prospect that the alliance would take the form of 'two pillars,' or a 'dumbbell,' with a 'European' bell or pillar at one end and a 'North American' unit at the other. Officials in Ottawa were concerned that Canada's position, role, and voice in North Atlantic matters would be considerably diminished by architecture that was twin-pillared.[5]

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3. Robert Wolfe, 'Atlanticism without the wall: transatlantic cooperation and the transformation of Europe,' International Journal 46 (Winter 1990-1), 147.

4. Gene M. Lyons, 'More than allies: the Atlantic Community,' in Lauren McKinsey and Kim Richard Nossal, eds., America's Alliances and Canadian-American Relations (Toronto: Summerhill Press, 1988), 52-72.

5. John W. Holmes, 'The dumbbell won't do,' Foreign Policy 50 (Spring 1983), 3-4; Joseph T. Jockel, 'Canada in a twin-pillared alliance: the dumbbell may just have to do,' International Journal 46 (Winter 1990-1).

Canadians also wanted to broaden the military notion of the Atlantic idea to include economic, political, and socio-cultural relations. Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 -- the so-called `Canadian article' -- was an attempt to intertwine as tightly as possible NATO with what Lester B. Pearson called the `Atlantic vision.' That vision, in its essence, saw the possibility of political integration following military and economic integration, fusing the countries of the North Atlantic area into a larger political unit. With such integration, the hallmarks of the European age -- peoples separated by symbolic borders, ancient enmities, and the pettiness of rival nationalisms, and engaging in periodic gruesome wars to settle their differences -- would no longer hold sway. As he put it in October 1948, `The North Atlantic community is today a real commonwealth of nations which share the same democratic and cultural traditions. If a movement towards its political and economic unification can be started this year, no one can forecast the extent of the unity which may exist five, ten, or fifteen years from now.'[6]

But there was a considerable gap between Pearson's Atlantic vision and government policy, particularly after the Liberals were defeated in the 1957 elections. During the 1960s, Canadian attachment to the Atlantic idea underwent a slow, but quite steady, erosion. By the late 1960s, a growing disenchantment with the Atlantic idea was evident in Ottawa, most particularly among Pierre Elliott Trudeau and some other junior ministers in the Pearson government that had been elected in 1963. Indeed, with Pearson's retirement in 1968, there were few champions of the kind of Atlanticism that had inspired an earlier generation. And while the Trudeau government eventually decided in 1969 to remain in NATO, it was hardly out of the same kinds of convictions about transatlantic ties that had moved Canadians in the 1940s. By 1974, John Holmes could write that `The notion of a triangular Atlantic community is nearing the end of a long death.'[7]

Despite this, there was a brief resuscitation of the Atlantic idea in the early 1970s. The impetus for the attempt to `rediscover' the European link was the announcement by President Richard Nixon on 15 August 1971 that he was unilaterally authorising a series of economic measures designed to protect the economic interests of the United States. Because these measures had the potential to do considerable damage to the Canadian economy, the `Nixon shocks' had a catalysing effect on Canadian foreign policy makers, forcing them to rethink the structure of Canada's dependent relationship.[8] The result was the so-called `options paper' of 1972, which laid out three options for Canada's general

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6. Quoted in John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957, vol 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), 111.

7. Holmes, Canada: A Middle-Aged Power, 131.

8. Peter C. Dobell, Canada in World Affairs, vol. 17: 1971-1973 (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1985), chaps. 1, 3.

approach to the United States.[9] The first two options -- the status quo or closer integration with the United States -- were rejected. The third option envisaged `a comprehensive long-term strategy to develop and strengthen the Canadian economy and other aspects of its national life and in the process to reduce the present Canadian vulnerability.' Part of this involved reducing Canada's dependence on a single market, and, by extension, expanding Canadian trade with other markets -- Europe was a natural focus of attention.

The Third Option prompted the Trudeau government to rediscover the importance of the transatlantic ideal. In a trade-off that no one sought to disguise, the Trudeau government purchased 128 Leopard tanks for service on the central front merely two months before a commercial co-operation agreement was signed that was intended to put some meat on the Third Option bone.[10] But in the end, as Granatstein and Bothwell argue, there was little accomplished. They suggest that the Third Option was a valiant attempt by Ottawa to triumph over geography; `geography won out in the end.'[11]

If the idea of forging a new Article-2-like economic relationship with Europe was on life-support by the early 1980s, the victory of the Progressive Conservatives under Brian Mulroney in the September 1984 elections ensured that the plug would be pulled. Not only did the Mulroney government pursue a free trade agreement with the United States over the course of the 1980s, but it also was manifestly less enthusiastic about spending money on maintaining Canadian troops in Europe. As a result, the Mulroney government's *rhetorical* commitment to the European/Atlanticist ideal remain solid; like its Liberal predecessor, it dutifully signed yet another Canada-European agreement pledging closer relations -- the Transatlantic Declaration of 1990. But its actual behaviour simply did not mirror the rhetoric. A desire to trim government expenditures eventually led the Mulroney government to reduce, and then eliminate, the Canadian contingent in Europe. That process began in the fall of 1985, when Canadian officials approached its NATO allies with a proposal to `restructure' Canadian force commitments to the European theatre, essentially withdrawing from Germany but enhancing the commitment to Norway.[12] It ended on 17 September 1991, the seventh anniversary of the swearing in of Mulroney's first cabinet: the minister of national defence announced that Canada would close its two bases at Lahr and Baden-Soellingen in Germany, and reduce its personnel stationed in Europe from 6600 to a token force of 1100.[13]

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[9] Mitchell Sharp, `Canada-U.S. relations: options for the future,' International Perspectives (special issue: autumn 1972).

[10] On the Trudeau government's `rediscovery' of NATO, see Michael Tucker, Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980), 126-33.

[11] J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 177.

[12] Joel J. Sokolsky, `Canadian defence policy: coping with the gap,' in Brian W. Tomlin and Maureen Appel Molot, eds., Canada Among Nations, 1986: Talking Trade (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1987), 60-62.

It is against this background of what can be described as a persistent slide in the importance of the Atlantic idea in Canada that we have to see the approach to Europe taken by the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien which took office in October 1993. There is little doubt that the Chrétien government did not bring to office a cohesive idea about where to take Canadian relations with Europe. Rather, the Liberals came to power at a time of considerable flux. NATO was undergoing a fundamental transformation in its focus and purpose; a bitter civil war was being fought in the former Yugoslavia; and Canadian peacekeeping resources were being considerably stretched by the proliferation of UN-authorised missions in the post-Cold War era.

Certainly the Liberal government did not bring to office the kind of appreciation of the Atlantic idea that had moved previous Canadian governments. Although it engaged in the same kind of agreement-signing that its predecessors had -- a Canada-EU 'Political Declaration and Joint Action Plan' was signed on 17 December 1996 -- it would appear that overall the Liberal government had little enthusiasm for European linkages. This can be seen in a number of ways.

First, its engagement in, and enthusiasm for, the Bosnian conflict was distinctly unenthusiastic. The Liberals found themselves caught: they had inherited an activist policy from the Progressive Conservatives -- Brian Mulroney himself had publicly urged using force against the Bosnian Serbs in May 1992, for example -- but they did not share much of the concern for this conflict. For example, Ottawa resisted when other NATO allies suggested a more muscular policy in Yugoslavia in 1994. And it showed indifference when Canada, despite its large contributions to the UN Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), was not invited to a meeting of the foreign ministers of the United States, Russia, and five European states in May 1994 to deal with this conflict. And while Ottawa did join the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia that was established by the Paris peace agreement of December 1995, it did so with considerable reluctance, and with 1000 troops, many fewer than its other NATO partners had hoped for.[14]

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[13] See Kim Richard Nossal, 'Succumbing to the dumbbell: Canadian perspectives on NATO in the 1990s,' in Barbara McDougall, Kim Richard Nossal, Alex Morrison and Joseph T. Jockel, Canada and NATO: The Forgotten Ally? (Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1992), 17-32.

[14] See Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 3rd ed. (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada, 1997), 160.

Likewise, Ottawa's apparent indifference to relations with Europe can be seen in the so-called `turbot war' of 1995.[15] While the decision to use force to arrest a Spanish fishing vessel in international waters and forcibly cut the nets of another in March 1995 has to be seen in the context of great Canadian frustration at the unilateral actions of the European Union over fishing quotas, there can be little doubt that the Canadian ministers who supported Brian Tobin's assertion of Canadian authority beyond Canada's exclusive economic zone were not tempering their desire to protect the fishery with any concern about the broader Canada-EU relationship. And while the fisheries dispute may have been glossed over in the short term, there can be no denying that the ill-will created -- on both sides -- reflects a growing distance across the Atlantic.

But it is Ottawa's policy on NATO expansion that reveals most fully the shift in strategic thinking about the Atlantic idea under the Chrétien Liberals. Although there appears to have been considerable hesitation and reservation at the bureaucratic level, the ministers in cabinet appeared not at all concerned about the strategic implications of extending alliance protection to the states and peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. But strategy was clearly not on their minds. For example, Chrétien's eager personal embrace of a variety of candidates for expansion in 1997 seemed to have more to do with either nuclear reactor sales (as in the Canadian push for Romania) or domestic politics (as in the case for the push for the Slovak Republic). If Chrétien and his foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy were concerned about being perceived by their other NATO partners as shills at what David Haglund of Queen's University has sneeringly called the NATO `expansion bazaar,' they surely did not show it. Likewise, the uncritical embrace by Canadian ministers of the notion that anyone who wants into NATO should be admitted revealed the degree to which understanding of alliances and their purposes has shifted from the 1940s.

In conclusion, we can see in Canadian policy towards Europe a persistent and systematic abandonment of the Atlantic idea over the last fifty years. To be sure, the meaning of Atlanticism varied greatly. For some, like Lester Pearson, it was essentially what Samuel Huntington would call a civilisational project -- the idea that the countries that rimmed the North Atlantic were joined by common moral, political, and ethical values. For others, by contrast, it was a more pragmatic project: a means of drawing the United States into the struggle for European security.

However, for Canadians Atlanticism was a policy idea that always seemed more attractive in the telling than the doing. Every Canadian government from 1942 to the present espoused some form of the Atlantic idea, but the willingness to act on the idea has been lacking. Thus, no government between 1942 and 1992 was ever willing to do much more than commit itself to more than the military manifestations of Atlanticism -- contributing Canadian troops to the European theatre during the Second World War, and then stationing troops in Europe during the Cold War as part of Canada's NATO commitments. And with the end of the Cold War, the Canadian government's attachment to Atlanticism became even more tenuous, with the Mulroney government's withdrawal and the Chrétien government's relative lack of interest in Europe.

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[15] The best survey of this dispute is to be found in Andrew F. Cooper, Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions (Scarborough, ON: Prentice Hall Allyn and Bacon Canada, 1997), chap. 4.

As importantly, this long secular shift has not been met by any sustained opposition in Canada. None of the opposition parties has expressed any concern about the European policy pursued by the Liberal government since 1993; the public is no less indifferent, even if that public is still overwhelmingly `European' itself. In short, by 1997, it can be argued that although Canada is still very much a European nation, neither Canadians nor their government are much attached to the ideal of Atlanticism.

Richard Kirby

THE ATLANTICIST TRADITION

Richard Kirby currently serves as the Deputy Head of the Partnership and Cooperation section of the Political Affairs Directorate of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation where he is responsible for the political aspects of NATO's cooperation with central and eastern European countries.

Good afternoon. I am particularly pleased to be here in Winnipeg to address such a large audience of students. I speak to a lot of groups in my current occupation and I almost always find student groups among the most interesting and stimulating. For one thing, you are the future and you tend to ask very pertinent, searching questions. The other thing I am pleased about today is the presence of a couple of students from Russia. We are in quite a new world in the 1990's and their presence here and the kind of dialogue and interaction that you will have is particularly important to the future of Europe and perhaps even the future of the world.

I am originally from Southern Ontario, from a small place called Ajax, but I have had a lifelong interest in international affairs, in travel and particularly in the area of Central and Eastern Europe and Russia. No one is able to explain that unless there is the possibility that reincarnation has played some kind of role.

This morning when I was looking at the theme that I was to address today, The Atlanticist Tradition, it was probably a good thing I re-read the program because when I originally came here I thought I was supposed to speak of a mysterious, long-disappeared, legendary, sunken continent.

I have spent my career in the practice of diplomacy so that is perhaps a bit different from the direction of the other two panellists this morning. I will not try to give you a well developed concept of Atlanticism, but I want to speak to you as a Canadian and as a member of the international staff of NATO, where I have spent the past five years. I do not represent Canada; I am an official of the Alliance, so you can take one of two views: I either speak for sixteen governments or I speak for absolutely no one.

The founding of Canada as a country is of course a result of trans-Atlantic migration. Thus the trans-Atlantic is fundamental to Canada's coming into existence. At the time of World War I, we had essentially an automatic involvement in that conflict because of the British/Commonwealth connection. By the time of World War II, it was an independent decision to take part. In both cases, we were involved for the United States.

The fact that the programme for this weekend includes an entire panel focused on the Atlanticist tradition demonstrates successfully that such a tradition exists. The centre of gravity of Canadian interests has been shifting westward for some time now, as again is demonstrated in the theme of this conference. Indeed it is a bit telling for me that when this conference refers to east and west, it is quite a different notion than the east/west that I am used to in my career, which referred to the communist world and the democratic world. There are obvious differences in Canada's role in the world today however NATO is the principal, tangible expression of the trans-Atlantic link. Not perhaps in terms of the Atlanticist tradition as Professor Nossal described it, but in terms of a rather broad notion of Canadian links with Europe.

What I want to do this afternoon is to focus my comments on two questions. The first is that in today's world, with the end of the Cold War, why do we still have NATO? Secondly, if we still have NATO, why should Canada be a part of it?

The security challenges in Europe have drastically changed, but the reasons for having an organisation like NATO have not disappeared. Although there is no specific threat country-wise, or in terms of a type of threat, the developments in the former Yugoslavia show that serious risks to security in Europe remain. NATO is, as Minister Axworthy referred to, the only successful, functioning, multilateral defence organisation in the world.

I would like to quote former Secretary General Manfred Worner, who, when asked in the early post- Cold War period whether or not NATO should remain in existence, ostensibly replied, "because it has stopped raining, you do not necessarily throw away your umbrella." I think this is a reasonable description of why NATO continues to be useful. European allies want to retain NATO as an organisation. This is the key difference from the old Warsaw Pact. That organisation was dissolved by the will of its members. This is not something that is occurring in NATO. European allies want the organisation to remain. One of the reasons is that collective defence is cheaper and surer and prevents the renationalisation of defence and military policies. If you are dealing with a continent which is divided by national approaches to security, then your risk of conflicts is a lot greater than if you are dealing with an organisation which approaches defence and security in a collective way.

Article V, which is the article that states that an attack on one member of NATO is an attack on all members of NATO, remains at the core of NATO as an organisation. In fact, one could regard it as a collective insurance policy. In theory, if matters could evolve so quickly and so positively in Europe over the past several years, matters could go equally quickly in the other direction. I think this is highly unlikely, and I do not predict that. But then, you do not buy accident or life insurance either because you expect a serious illness or because you expect to die suddenly or accidentally. So the notion of NATO as a collective, inexpensive insurance policy is a solid reason for keeping the Alliance. In addition, there are those who ask how you can have an Alliance of the kind that NATO is if you do not have an enemy. I think that is a thesis that is open to question. I think you can successfully have a collective organisation which does a lot of useful things in terms of defence and security even though you do not have a specific enemy. In that regard, the focus of NATO has changed pretty radically in the last several years. I have been there five years and because of my long standing interest in Central and Eastern Europe it has been, for me, a very satisfying time to be there. So much has been happening, ninety-nine percent of which has been highly positive.

As I mentioned already, we have no perception of a threat of attack from anyone. NATO recognised that the disappearance of the USSR and the Soviet bloc had made a fundamental difference in the European security environment and NATO recognised this as early as 1990. The notion of a changed European security environment is reflected in and provides the basis for the strategic concept that the Alliance adopted in 1991. Since that time, NATO's focus has been on promoting co-operative approaches to security that are comprehensive, inclusive and multifaceted.

In my view, the overall thrust of NATO policy in the five years that I have been there, has been to that kind of architecture: a co-operative, comprehensive and inclusive one. This means no balance of power, no spheres of influence, no competing alliances, no buffer zones. I often say to groups that I speak to when I use that particular line, that the above kinds of approaches have been tried repeatedly in European history and have basically always ended up in a major disaster. I often say to European audiences that this view may reflect a Canadian trans-Atlantic bias. However I like to think that the terms *Canadian* and *bias* are mutually exclusive.

The means that NATO has used to try and promote this co-operative approach to security have been the foundation of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) in 1991, the Partnership for Peace initiative(PFP) in 1994, a steady, gradual and transparent move toward the opening of the Alliance to new members from 1994 to the present, efforts today, as we move toward a summit in Madrid, to develop a strengthened Partnership for Peace, and a concept that has been described as an Atlantic Partnership Council which would be a single co-operative structure to develop and strengthen co-operation between the Alliance and all of the non-NATO partners we have. Another part of the current NATO agenda is to develop a stable, enduring and strong security partnership with Russia. We are also working to strengthen dialogue on security matters between the Alliance and various Mediterranean countries. Another important aspect of the Alliance's transformation has been its acceptance of rules under the auspices of the United Nations or the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in

Europe, to support peacekeeping operations. The work we have been doing in Bosnia has been tremendously important as we have worked with eighteen non-NATO member countries, including four from outside of Europe.

When I speak to groups, I usually spend a lot of time covering the current NATO agenda. I would be happy to do this, however I do not think this is the right occasion to do so, given the theme of the Conference. Perhaps sometime I will have the chance to come back here to speak to you about NATO's agenda.

Now, why should Canada remain in NATO? A simple answer would be for the same reasons that the trans-Atlantic connection exists. However there are some who might question whether or not that rationale remains valid or is even good enough today. I am often asked by European groups, why does Canada care and why are they in Europe? My first answer is always that there are a lot of Canadians buried in Europe. Many Canadians have family members of an earlier generation who were buried there. I believe that if another major crisis erupted in Europe, we would probably be unable to stand apart. The United States has tried twice to do this, in both World Wars, and could not. Our participation in NATO helps to shape important security decisions that could deter, prevent or help to manage crises without a major conflict. I would use our operations in Bosnia as an example of that kind of approach. I think participation in NATO for Canada is an integral part of our foreign policy tradition of multi-lateralism and internationalism. NATO participation is one important part of the institutional framework and international engagement that provides diplomatic influence. In other words, our participation in NATO is an important string in our diplomatic bow.

As I mentioned earlier, European allies and the United States want to preserve the Alliance. The questions that I get about why we need an Alliance now that there is no more Cold War, almost always come from people who are citizens of countries that are members of the Alliance. I always explain that there must be something useful about an organisation which has a queue of eleven Central and Eastern European countries standing at the door clamouring to join. One of the simplest, yet most effective explanations of the rationale for NATO that I have heard came from a senior official of a Central European country that is seeking NATO membership. He said "we want to become members of NATO for the same reason existing members want to remain members." I think this is a pretty good summary of the rationale for the Alliance.

The European NATO allies and all possible new members states all want Canada to stay in NATO and remain involved in Europe. There has been real disappointment that Canada has terminated its military presence in Europe. I think it is fair to say that in recent years, Canada has gained a certain reputation for being serious penny-pinchers within the Alliance. On the other hand, Canada's unparalleled contribution to international peacekeeping efforts, our pragmatism and diplomatic skills as promoters of compromise and fosterers of consensus, as well as our democratic and technological credentials are all highly appreciated by European allies. Yes, they want our membership because our disengagement from NATO would encourage similar trends in the United States, whose withdrawal from Europe would likely be regarded by most allies as a disaster for European security.

The argument for our NATO membership is similar to that for other facets of our international engagement and involvement in other multi-lateral institutions. International engagement is, in my view, good and perhaps crucial for Canada. This is, in effect, the argument for the place at the table. If you are not there, you cannot influence decisions that will effect you. It can be argued that Canada's involvement with NATO helps with our relationships with the European Union and with the United States. If we were not in NATO, would we have as much sympathy in the European Union with respect to important Canadian interests, such as fishing or trade?

At the end of 1994, a joint Canadian-Parliamentary Commission looked at our foreign policy in broad ways, including our engagement in NATO and they came down firmly in favour of continuing Canada's active engagement in the Alliance.

Andrew Latham
THE ATLANTICIST TRADITION

Andrew Latham is presently a member of the faculty at Macalester College in Minnesota. Previously, he was Assistant Director of the Centre for International and Security Studies at York University.

I would just like to thank the organisers for inviting me to participate in this conference. As many of you know, Winnipeg was my home for a number of years and I am always happy to be back. I recognise many of you and it is nice to be back among old friends.

I would like to change gears a bit from the other presentations on this panel and focus not on Atlanticism as an abstract concept which informs Canadian policy, but rather to look at the way in which Canada's Atlantic vocation, and especially its enduring commitment to the Atlantic Alliance shapes, forms and constrains policy makers as they pursue Canada's foreign and international security objectives in real, practical terms. Here I am tempted to fold up shop because my definition of Atlanticism is not the same as Kim Nossal's and if I were to accept his definition, there would be little left to say.

Let me start by defining Atlanticism as I have used it in this paper, as a commitment to Atlantic institutions, as an Atlantic vocation. I wanted to look at the way in which Canada's NATO obligations are likely to constrain the Canadian government as it begins to re-examine Canada's policy toward nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament. I had hoped, in vain, as I drafted this paper, that the Minister would be here to listen to my ideas. I will share them with you because I think there is still some merit to the argument.

My presentation will proceed in five parts. First of all, I would like to look at some of the pressures for nuclear disarmament, for abolishing nuclear weapons, that have developed both internationally and domestically and which are beginning to exert a great deal of pressure on our government to revisit Canada's posture toward nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament. Then I would like to move very quickly to examine some of the countervailing pressures, especially those rooted in concerns about security in a post-nuclear world. I will argue, although only briefly, that many of these can be dismissed as inconsistent or incoherent. I realise that people with great experience and authority remain unconvinced about the strategic wisdom of eliminating or abolishing nuclear weapons. In any case, I do not think that these grand strategic concerns about security in a post-nuclear world are really going to shape the debate in Canada if, in fact, the debate ever gets underway in a realistic and credible sense. I think far more important will be the political arguments that get made for and against nuclear weapons or rather arguments about the political wisdom of moving toward a nuclear free world or accepting the nuclear status quo.

This brings me to the one consideration that I think will constrain Canadian policy makers in a significant way. Alliance considerations and especially our obligation to support the agreed NATO nuclear policy, which is nuclear deterrence with the possibility of first use, will continue to constrain policy makers as they rethink what Canada's position should be regarding the various proposals for global nuclear disarmament that are on the table at the moment.

Fourth, I will attempt to briefly outline or describe some of the skating room left even as we consider the Alliance obligations that constrain us as we begin to rethink our nuclear policy. Finally, and this is what I would have liked the Minister to have heard, I will propose some practical and constructive measures that I believe Canada could and should take to advance the agenda of global nuclear disarmament. I am not overly optimistic that we will, but I think we should.

Before I begin to address these points directly, let me state for the record two assumptions to really define the parameters of this paper and my thinking on the topic. The first of these is that I am personally committed to something called an Atlantic Community. I think anytime one has a community where members have forsaken the use of violence to solve disputes among themselves, this is a good thing. I think there is perhaps a negative moment to this with respect to the way the Alliance conducts itself with others, but in and of itself I think that the Atlantic Alliance is a good thing and I remain, on a personal level, committed to it. Second of all, I remain committed to security at the lowest level of armaments and in this particular context, I think we can realise, as a global community, security in the context of global nuclear disarmament or the abolition of nuclear weapons, which does not mean dis-inventing these things, it simply means managing them in a different way.

The first part of the argument deals with pressures for nuclear disarmament. Where are these coming from? As I alluded to earlier, they are coming from international developments and domestic political sources. I will now turn briefly to some of the international developments that have put this item on the agenda in an incredible way. It was not an item on the international agenda, in any meaningful sense, three or four years ago. Things are beginning to happen.

Many of you will be familiar with the World Court Advisory Opinion, which rendered the use of nuclear weapons in all but the most extreme cases, illegal. This is the same law that underpins Canada's global commitment to a ban on land mines. More importantly, given the soft nature of international law, the Advisory Opinion stated that states in the international community had a legal obligation to enter into a constructive, good faith negotiation, the end result of which was to be the abolition of nuclear weapons. The second international development, highly publicised in the press in the past couple of years, is the NPT and CTBT negotiations which I think, for many people, threw into stark relief both the studied hypocrisy of the nuclear weapons states and the limits to regional non-proliferation initiatives in the Middle East and in South Asia in the absence of real, constructive and meaningful progress toward global nuclear disarmament. The two issues are connected and I think those negotiations threw that fact into stark relief.

Third, some of you will be familiar with the Canberra Commission Report which was an Australian sponsored blue ribbon panel including many military people including Field Marshall Carver, who was the former CDS of the British Armed Forces. This panel argued that the time was ripe, in the aftermath of the Cold War, for real progress to be made toward global nuclear disarmament. I must say it was a very Canadian document and I am sure there were a number of people in Ottawa who were embarrassed by the fact that we did not write it. But the Australians did, it is out there and although this present Australian government has backed off the Canberra Commission Report, for partisan political reasons, I think that it nevertheless remains a lightening rod or a focus for discussion among reasonable people and informed people about the ability to realise this goal of global nuclear disarmament in a realistic time frame.

Other sources of international pressure have come from a number of non-governmental organisation reports, a number of which are foolish nonsense, but many of which are quite credible, including Abolition 2000 which is an umbrella group of left liberal organisations; the Stimpson Plan, an American think tank which can by no means be tarred with the label "leftist or unformed;" and an organisation consisting of generals and admirals for nuclear disarmament, including senior military people including the former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Andrew Goodpaster, who has come out in favour of the goal of global nuclear disarmament and a practical realistic plan to get us from here to there in the not too distant future. There is also the G21 or non-aligned movement plan of action and there is, finally, a United Nations General Assembly resolution which calls for a nuclear weapons convention along the lines of the conventional weapons convention to move us quickly along the road to a weapons-free world.

One can put a plus or minus against any of those reports and developments, but I think one has to concede that they represent a consensus developing across a broad political spectrum. It is not simply the "loony left" that advocates this position anymore, but also incredibly experienced military people who are advocating a move in this direction.

In addition to these very substantial pressures that are being generated by international developments at the international level, there are also some things going on within Canada that are pushing the government to revisit and rethink our posture toward nuclear weapons. These are, first of all, Canadian NGO's, such as Project Ploughshares, who have been instrumental in pushing this particular agenda although I think the Department of Foreign Affairs and the government in general is probably quite well insulated from the preferences of groups like Project Ploughshares. There have also been developments within the Department of Foreign Affairs and I think Minister Axworthy has it in mind that this is an important issue, and that Canada can play a leadership role, although I would never pretend to speak for him.

I think the bottom line of all these developments has been that the Government of Canada has decided to revisit Canada's nuclear weapons policy and its posture toward nuclear disarmament with an eye to identifying the scope for re-balancing Canada's traditional nuclear policy. As I am sure you are all aware, Canada has always had a constructively ambiguous nuclear policy whereby on the one hand, we signed on to the NPT, which legally obliged us to move toward a weapons-free world, but on the other hand, we have supported NATO policy in that we have housed American nuclear weapons. I will be charitable and say that we struck a good, but Cold War balance, because until the end of the Cold War, it was clear that Canadian policy in this regard was not disarmament, but deterrence.

Now the end of the Cold War saw the common thread argument running through all of these reports that believed that the end of the Cold War has created a window of opportunity for a shift in emphasis to disarmament and away from deterrence and dependence on nuclear weapons. Indeed some would argue that with the end of the Cold War, Canada can pursue what is sometimes considered by Canadians to be a more natural Canadian vocation with respect to nuclear weapons, and that is the pursuit of international peace and security through multilateral processes of disarmament as opposed to a reliance on military alliances. These are the forces that are actually pushing the government to begin to rethink its policies with respect to nuclear weapons. But there are of course countervailing pressures, and I am sure some of them will be brought to bear on me as I finish this presentation.

I think it is fair to say at this point that not everyone shares this view and that people of considerable experience, political and military, have advanced a number of arguments within Canada, but beyond Canada as well, for not pursuing this goal, for paying lip service to our NPT obligations, and not being earnest about pursuing the goal of global nuclear disarmament. Now in Canada, the arguments most frequently heard for us not shifting our posture to disarmament fall under three broad categories. The first argument that gets made is that nuclear weapons states are not likely to support global nuclear disarmament, and therefore, Canada is in effect bashing its head against a wall; it is a futile exercise and a waste of scarce resources. The Minister alluded to this, and this gave me cause for some concern. He argued that we could do something with respect to land mines, which I fully applaud, but that we lack similar scope to advance the disarmament agenda when it comes to nuclear weapons because we do not have any. The best we can do, to use his words, is kibbutz from the margins.

A second set of arguments that one hears all too frequently in the Canadian context is that a post-nuclear world would be fraught with dangers and perils. There are the so-called rogue states who would not sign on to any such agreement, and if they did sign on, they simply could not be trusted to live up to their obligations. These states possess not only nuclear weapons, but also chemical and biological weapons which are the cause of shivers up and down the spines of many westerners.

The third set of arguments that one hears is that Canada has Alliance commitments and Alliance obligations that preclude us from endorsing a constructive and determined effort to move toward this goal of global nuclear disarmament. There are debates going on within all of the existing nuclear weapons states. While I am not under the illusion that all of these weapons states are likely to come to agree with me tomorrow, I think that we, as Canadians and as members of the international community should be prepared to seize on the opportunities that present themselves if and when the debate in the United States gets resolved and that America's national interests are secured most effectively through an agreed movement toward nuclear disarmament. I do not find that argument persuasive, although I am agnostic and people can at least attempt to persuade me.

With respect to the second set of arguments that the post-nuclear world will be a dangerous place, more dangerous than the one which currently exists, I am not going to get into the strategic pros and cons of nuclear disarmament although we could take that up in the question and answer portion of this panel discussion. Here I will simply flag two points. All of the international and domestic reports that deal with global nuclear disarmament explicitly address the strategic arguments and the above mentioned Canberra Commission being the most well thought out example. All of these reports address this issue and for me, do so in a persuasive fashion.

Secondly, and I alluded to this earlier, there is a considerable body of military opinion that is weighed into this debate on the side of global nuclear disarmament on both sides of the former iron curtain and on both sides of the north/south divide as well. The thrust of their arguments is that nuclear weapons are unsuited to dealing with the types of threats that the west is likely to face. Whatever marginal utility these weapons might have is outweighed by the threats posed by proliferation, accidental detonation, theft etc.

I do not find the first two arguments terribly persuasive, but I do find the third argument persuasive because, being a committed Atlanticist, I believe that Canada's membership in NATO and the Atlantic Alliance really does place constraints upon Canadian policy makers. It is simply not good enough in a multilateral context to unilaterally attempt to disengage even though engagement means that we do have to sign up to nuclear deterrence and the possibility of first use.

In a recent NATO communiqué, Canada's obligations as a member of NATO were put quite succinctly,

> We, the Atlantic Alliance, reaffirm that the nuclear forces of the Allies continue to play a unique and essential role in the Alliance's strategy of war prevention. New members who will be full members of the Alliance in all respects will be expected to support the concept of deterrence and the essential role nuclear weapons play in the Alliance's strategy.

It goes on to say that nuclear weapons probably will not be deployed to Central and Eastern Europe but I think this captures in very clear terms what Alliance policy is regarding nuclear weapons and therefore what Canada's policy is regarding nuclear weapons as well.

I think it is fair to say that membership in NATO imposes serious constraints on Canada's freedom to manoeuvre with respect to nuclear weapons and that Canada's reluctance to divert significantly from NATO policy is based on a widely shared belief among Canadian officials that to do so would reduce Canada's influence in NATO councils. Once again, I sometimes wonder if anyone could actually point to what influence that has achieved for us, but I remain on that issue as well, really quite agnostic.

This means that Alliance policy defines the parameters of Canadian nuclear policy. There appears to be no contradiction between full participation in NATO and a vigorous commitment to global disarmament. In practical terms, NATO's strategy of nuclear deterrence limits Canada's ability to promote the goal of global nuclear disarmament, which I am sure, for many of you, strikes you as Canada's natural vocation with respect to nuclear weapons. This does not mean that Canada is prevented from pursuing the goal of global disarmament in various multi-lateral fora. Membership in NATO, to take but one example, did not prevent any member state, including Canada, from signing and ratifying the non-proliferation treaty or working toward its indefinite extension in 1995, even though that treaty calls for "systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons. "

Membership however, as with American Express, has some obligations. It does determine when and in which fora nuclear disarmament can be pursued. Canada was able to work vigorously toward an indefinite extension of the non-proliferation treaty largely because this was seen in NATO circles primarily as a non-proliferation treaty. As a result there was broad agreement within NATO that indefinite extension of the NPT would be desirable and that all NATO members were free to campaign in a determined fashion to achieve that end. Canada in fact did so, and if you listen to Canadian diplomats, we played the crucial role in extending the non-proliferation treaty. I am sure others claim that they had a similar impact.

In contrast to the NPT experience, it is far less likely that Canada could have supported the December 1996 UN resolution calling for a nuclear weapons convention. This convention would have advocated the prohibition of the developing, testing, stockpiling, transfer, threat or deployment of nuclear weapons. Most NATO countries voted against this resolution with Iceland, Denmark and Norway abstaining. This indicates, at least to me, that there was agreement within NATO circles that a UN nuclear weapons convention was incompatible with NATO nuclear strategy and NATO's interests at the moment. This being the case, even though states that have demonstrated a history of supporting global multi-lateral disarmament initiatives were not able to vote for the resolution. Some abstained and some, like Canada, voted against.

Given Canada's reluctance to divert significantly from NATO's position regarding nuclear weapons, this strongly suggests to me that Canada is unlikely to support calls for a nuclear weapons convention or a similar international instrument unless and until NATO strategy evolves in ways that make it less dependent on nuclear deterrence and nuclear weapons. Should the Government of Canada decide to pursue in a more determined fashion the goal of nuclear disarmament, the constraints imposed by current NATO doctrine necessitate choosing between one of three options or strategies. First of all, Canada could opt to remain in NATO but pursue a more independent nuclear policy. While there is little public literature that addresses this issue directly, it is likely that such a policy would antagonise our Alliance partners and jeopardise a valuable relationship which continues to be one of the cornerstones of Canada's international security policy. Second, Canada could withdraw from NATO in order to pursue an international security policy unconstrained by Alliance obligations. I think there is no support in either the informed public or the general public for such a strategy and I think that is a non-starter right off the bat. Third and finally, the Government of Canada could opt to work within NATO councils to mobilise support for a non-nuclear NATO strategic posture. Maybe we could actually cash in some of those chips and have some influence in some of those councils which our troops being in Europe for forty-five years was supposed to have bought us.

Given Canada's continued commitment to NATO's strategy of working together with like-minded states, to use a phrase that the Department of Foreign Affairs likes very much, such as the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark, to build broad support within the Alliance for global nuclear disarmament would seem to be the most practical, realistic and constructive of these three options. The fact that there is little publicly available evidence to suggest that Canadian officials have been pressing for a non-nuclear strategic posture appears to have more to do with the continuing belief in the utility and legitimacy of nuclear weapons than by any constraints imposed by Alliance membership per se.

In short, I would conclude in any case, that while NATO membership places real constraints on Canada's latitude in pursuing more vigorously this goal of global nuclear disarmament, it does not mean that Canada is prevented from re-balancing its nuclear policy in favour of disarmament and away from deterrence. Rather, it means that Canada cannot do so precipitously or unilaterally without due regard to Alliance opinion. In other words, it means that for Canada, the first constructive step toward global nuclear disarmament is to begin building support within NATO for non-nuclear strategic posture. Believe me when I say that I have no illusions about Canada's ability to change the world or to change Alliance posture with respect to nuclear weapons. I do think however that practical, realistic and constructive efforts in conjunction with like-minded allies can have an effect. Here, I draw your attention to, for those of you who need proof, the role Canada played and is playing today with respect to the anti-personnel land mine issue. Initially, Canada was hesitant to get out ahead of its NATO partners precisely for the same reasons that it is reluctant to get out ahead of its NATO partners with respect to nuclear weapons. However when this particular Foreign Affairs Minister actually cracked a few heads together and told the Department that the time was now ripe to move forward on this particular file, things began to happen and Canada got out ahead and others quickly followed.

So, if I were in a position to advise the Government of Canada and the Foreign Affairs Minister on the issue of global nuclear disarmament what would I recommend? This is what I wanted the Minister to hear, but perhaps we can send him a copy. It is perhaps useful at this time to consider drafting a comprehensive programme or framework document establishing clearly defined goals and principles to guide Canadian nuclear weapons policy. Right now, I think policy makers are without a political compass to guide them in their current efforts. I think the current step-by-step approach to disarmament is basically sound, but I think it lacks clear, meaningful direction. I think it also lacks milestones against which progress can be measured. Such a set of goals and principles should include a clear reference to Canada's fundamental commitment to the goal of global and comprehensive nuclear disarmament within the shortest possible time frame consistent with the requirements of international peace and security. I have written far too many reports for the Department of Foreign Affairs as you can tell by the way this language appears on the page.

It should also make reference to the clear necessity of working with like-minded nations in NATO and other global and regional security fora to build broad support for a realistic, practical and constructive programme of global nuclear disarmament. Canada might consider undertaking to work in a more determined fashion within NATO to promote a non-nuclear strategy. Canada should work with like-minded states at the upcoming NPT Review Conference to build support among both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states for the goal of global nuclear disarmament.

The New Pacific

Bilahari Kausikan
Jim Boutilier

Bilahari Kausikan

CANADA AND THE NEW ASIA-PACIFIC

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What is the new Asia-Pacific?

It is defined by :

- The vast and growing opportunities generated by rapid economic growth; and
- The resulting challenges, strategic and political, also generated by rapid growth.

How does Canada related to the new Asia-Pacific?

Canada's strength is its generally positive image. Most Asia-Pacific countries are comfortable with Canada and do not feel threatened by Canada. There is no historical baggage. We want to engage Canada, and want Canada to be engaged in the region.

Canada's weakness is a lack of definition in its Asia-Pacific role. There is a lack of specificity in the region's understanding of what Canada can contribute and also in the average Canadian's understanding of the region.

- Efforts are underway to maximise the strengths and redress weaknesses. I want to explore the implications of these efforts. Given time limitations, this is no more than a broad brush sketch, hopefully a basis for discussion. First let me describe the major changes.

Rapid Economic Growth

- That the Asia-Pacific is economically dynamic is well known. The dimensions and implications of this fact need, however, to be fully understood.

- The Asia-Pacific, especially East Asia, will grow faster than all other regions well into the 21st century.

- The World Bank has forecast that by 2025, East Asia's GDP will be twice that of North America or about equal to the GDP of North America and Europe combined.

- This is the most rapid and far-reaching economic transformation that the world has ever witnessed. No country can afford to ignore this development, certainly no country where economic growth depends on exports, i.e., every country. East Asia will be the next dynamo of world growth. Rising incomes and a new middle class has increased demands for consumer goods and services and infrastructure that only North America and Europe can satisfy. Estimated spending on infrastructure will be approximately US$1.5 to US$2.5 trillion over the next 10 years. If you are not plugged in, you will be left behind. Conversely, a slow down in East Asia will increasingly affect the rest of the world.

- To be sure, growth is never in a straight line. Growth will be sometimes faster, sometimes slower. There will be cyclical ups and downs. But the trend is set and, barring a total systemic collapse, perhaps brought about by a major war, is irreversible. Herein lies the challenges.

Strategic Consequences of Rapid Growth

- Growth requires stability, but can also be destabilising. The key question is how to preserve optimal conditions for growth in East Asia into the next century. For reasons I have already stated, this is not just a regional concern.

- Historically, in the crucial half century since World War II, the US played the seminal role in maintaining peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific.

- But the US can no longer play such a role.

- It is neither willing nor able to bear the main burdens alone. It is a different US, in a different mood.

- Rapid growth has also provoked a reordering of relationships across the region as the configuration of relative power positions shifts. The rise of China is the main example of this process.

- Henceforth, stability in the Asia-Pacific for the 21st Century must rest on the triangular relationship between the US, China and Japan. There is no alternative. But the dynamics of each side of this new triangular structure are also more complex.

- The evolution of this new strategic triangle is not only subject to a host of complex economic, functional and political issues, it is also bedevilled by history and geography. Their management will be undertaken without the benefit of a common strategic vision as had been provided by the Soviet threat during the Cold War.
- In underscoring the complexities, I am not being alarmist. I am not pessimistic. But a realistic and accurate definition of the challenges is essential if they are to be met. False definitions that focus on peripherals rather than essentials are at best an unnecessary complication. At worst, it could be counterproductive. This is particularly true when dealing with China.

- I do not have the time to go into details in my presentation. To do so, I would require at least twice as much time. But I certainly hope that it will be raised during Question & Answer time as a clear understanding of the strategic picture is key not only to managing the political challenges but also to seizing the economic opportunities.

Domestic Political Consequences Of Rapid Growth

- Rapid growth is also changing the internal equilibriums in countries that, especially in Southeast Asia, are still imperfectly integrated. There are profound cleavages of ethnicity, language and religion; important differences between urban and rural areas; capital cities and provinces.

- In almost every Asia-Pacific country, political successions are underway. This is not merely the replacement of individuals, but the changing of political generations shaped by different experiences. An effort is underway across the region to integrate and accommodate new elites and interest groups that have emerged as a result of rapid growth.

- This is a difficult and delicate process. It is sometimes described as a struggle between authoritarianism and nascent democratic forces. This is a simplistic characterisation.

- The real issue is to shape political structures that can accommodate changing internal equilibriums, while maintain social and political stability, cohesion and the ability of governments to deal with urgent problems created by growth and to maintain growth by adapting to rapidly changing conditions created by a globalised world economy.

- This is not a process that is unidirectional or which can be reduced to a single model. The emergence of more pluralistic structures has been accompanied by less desirable features that could well undermine pluralism: political corruption - "money politics" - and governmental paralysis: failure to deal with urgent problems, for example, of environmental degradation and urban congestion. Government has played a crucial role in East Asian growth. Slow down could encourage centrifugal forces always present in imperfectly integrated societies if the ability of governments to deal with change is degraded. Governments must deliver. Governments that do not deliver do not last. This is more important than the form of government or its political ideology.

Canada's Economic Record in the Asia-Pacific

- Since the early 1980s, successive Canadian governments have recognised the economic potential of the Asia-Pacific and have taken various initiatives to try and plug in. The most recent example are Team Canada visits to promote trade and investments.

- Canadian trade with the Asia-Pacific has in fact grown rapidly. As of early 1996, Canadian trade with the Asia-Pacific, minus the US, accounted for about 10 percent of total Canadian trade. By contrast the EU accounts for only about 5 percent of Canada's total trade.

- But North America - the NAFTA countries, mainly the US - is 77 percent of total Canadian world trade. Viewed from the other side of the Pacific, Asia-Pacific's trade with Canada is only 1.5 percent of the region's total trade. The percentage has in fact fallen slightly over time. In 1991, Canada had accounted for about 1.8 percent of the region's total trade.

- The point is even clearer if stated in a different way. Less the US, Canada's largest export market in the Asia-Pacific is Japan. You sell about $4.8 billion to Japan. The second largest Asia-Pacific export market is China. You sell about $1.4 billion to China.
- But just Singapore - a tiny country of 3 million people and less than 650 square kilometres - was the US' 8th largest export market. In 1995 our total world imports was $176 billion. We bought $176 billion from the rest of the world, 16 percent of which, about $28 billion, came from the US. Canada's total exports to the Asia Pacific in 1996 (minus the US) was only about $25 billion. You only sold about $280 million to Singapore. Clearly, there is a lot of room for expansion.

- Let me state the point in yet another way. Asia Pacific investments into Canada (again minus the US) is about $12 billion in 1995. The largest Asia-Pacific investors in Canada are Japan, Hong Kong, Australia, Singapore and South Korea. But in 1996, Singapore alone invested about $11 billion in other Asia-Pacific economies, minus the US. Again, clearly there is much room for expansion.

What Can Canada Do About This Situation?

- What are the causes of this situation and what more can Canada do to tap the economic opportunities in the Asia Pacific?

- First, Causes. At the risk of over-simplification, I believe that there are two main reasons why Canada has not moved more rapidly to tap the potential. The two reasons correspond to conditions on different shores of the Pacific.

- Canada has the simultaneous good fortune and misfortune to be located next to and be intimately bound up with the largest and most prosperous economy in the world. The US inevitably exerts a strong magnetic attraction that is difficult to break away from. The US is not only rich, it is also familiar. Asia Pacific markets are not only different but also often difficult and confusing, requiring patience and long time-horizons to realise investments. Canada is of course a North

American country and its economic destiny is naturally with NAFTA. But NAFTA's economic future is not separate from that of the Asia Pacific. Four of the eight largest US export markets are in Asia: Japan (No. 2); South Korea (No. 4); Taiwan (No. 7) and Singapore (No. 8). China is not there yet, but surely will soon be. The US is enlarging its share of Asia's emerging markets. Canadians must consider whether a separate economic identity in Asia is in your interests.

- The second reason for Canada's relatively slow progress in the Asia Pacific relates to a point I made at the beginning of any presentation. This is the lack of definition in Canada's role in the Asia-Pacific. It is a reality that there is a general tendency in the Asia-Pacific to think of North America simply in terms of America. There is tendency to think, for example, of Canada merely as a source of raw materials or agricultural products. Canada's role in high technology is not widely appreciated. Further, the economic dynamism of neighbouring countries in East Asia exerts a strong attraction compared to a Canada that is - mistakenly - perceived as distant. Intra-East Asia trade is increasing rapidly - mainly in intermediate goods - a fact that may account for the relative decrease in Canada's percentage of Asia-Pacific trade that I drew attention to earlier. I had also mentioned Singapore's $11 billion investments in the Asia Pacific. They are to Indonesia (No. 3); Thailand (No. 4); Malaysia (No. 1); Philippines (No. 6); China (No. 5); Vietnam (No. 2); Myanmar (No. 1) and India (No. 12). The US, Japan and the EU are still the major destinations for East Asian exports.

How To Overcome The Obstacles?

- I have three suggestions. First, APEC, an organisation whose importance cannot be underestimated. APEC is steadily creating greater liberalisation in trade, more transparency and common rules of the same and will eventually raise the comfort level of those unfamiliar with conditions in the energy Asia Pacific markets. Canada's chairmanship of APEC this year provides an important opportunity to move the process forward. But a word of caution may be in order. Trade liberalisation and common rules are important. But it cannot be just transposing Canadian or North American rules on the Asia Pacific. It is a vast and diverse place with different levels of economic development. Patience, finesse and compromise are needed.

- Further, although APEC is an organisation of economies, not states, in which businesses are playing an increasing role, it is still primarily a government-led organisation. There is a limit to what governments can do. They can point the way and clear some of the obstacles. But the crucial decisions are business decisions made by the private sector for profit. The private sector cannot always wait for all the obstacles and rough spots to be smoothed away. In a dynamic environment like the Asia Pacific, waiting may only mean competitors stealing a march.

- Hence my second suggestion, which is to more aggressively forge private sector partnerships between Canadian businesses and Asia Pacific businesses. Conditions will naturally vary from country to country. But as an example, let me use Singapore as an indication of what may be possible.

- Singapore already has the largest concentration of Canadian banks and corporations in Southeast Asia. Singapore businesses can work with Canada in the important NAFTA market. Similarly, partnerships with Singapore companies will enable Canadian firms to use Singapore as a spring board into Asia Pacific markets.

- We know Asia. We have long-established political, economic, social and even family ties to most of the major expanding Asian markets. Partnerships between Singapore and Canadian firms can help both of us grasp the opportunities and realise the potential in at least four different ways.

- First, Canadian firms can use Singapore as their operational Headquarters, leveraging on Singapore as a communications, information and transportation hub. In Singapore there are North American living standards, facilities and predictability and transparency in a politically and economically stable environment.

- Second, Canadian companies can form joint ventures with us to invest in the region. This will be an effective way of marrying the North American expertise of Canadian companies with the regional network of Singapore companies. For example, Canadian companies can invest in Singapore's flagship project in Suzhou in China; in Information Technology related investments in Bangalore IT Park in India; in industrial parks in Indonesia's Riau province and in Vietnam.

- Third, Canada can plug into the region's growth by using Singapore as a financial base Asia's need for long-term funds for infrastructure development has led to a growing demand for financial services of all kinds. We are well placed to service this demand. We are one of the very few centres in the Asian time zone combining a highly liquid foreign exchange and financial futures market. All your banks are already in Singapore, but they could be more aggressive.

- The Fourth area is R&D collaboration. Canada is strong in basic research capabilities. It can collaborate with us to strengthen the commercialisation and marketing of its technological expertise to Asia (environmental technologies, telecommunications, software application, medical technology products and educational technologies).

- My final suggestion as to how to overcome the obstacles is to leverage on Canada's strategic position as a member of NAFTA. The US is the most important market for all Asia-Pacific countries. By selectively concluding free trade agreements with selected Asia-Pacific countries, Canada can maximise this important asset. The educative and demonstration effect of free trade agreements with Asia-Pacific countries can have a dramatic effect in overcoming the lack of definition in Canada's Asia-Pacific role that I had earlier identified as a major obstacle. Of course, it will not be easy. But I believe it is doable. In any case, I offer it as a suggestion.

Canada and the Strategic and Political Challenges

- I can be brief because Canada's strategic and political role in the Asia Pacific is limited. I do not mean this as a criticism. A limited role is not necessarily an unimportant role. Indeed, the ability to play an effective role of any magnitude must be premised on a realistic appreciation of limits.

- Lack of strategic weight and a minimal, largely symbolic military presence in the Asia Pacific - periodic ship visits, limited defence exchanges with some Asia Pacific countries - means that Canada will not be able to influence the US-PRC-Japan dynamic of the new strategic triangle. This is no disgrace. This is a different league from which most countries, including most Asia Pacific countries, are excluded. There is a criticism that Canada only spends less than 1% on security in the Asia-Pacific of what it spends in UN peacekeeping and in Europe through institutions like NATO and the OSCE. But it does not follow that increased expenditure will enhance Canada's role.

This is clearly one instance where I doubt more resources will translate into more influence.

- Canada is already playing a useful role in such institutions as the ARF and Track II activities in a number of problem areas including the South China Sea These are important experiments intended as confidence building measures to encourage a more predictable and constructive pattern of relations in the region that will maintain stability for growth. These are important experiments but still only experiments whose outcome cannot yet be determined. We should value them just as that. It would not be helpful either to exaggerate their importance or to dismiss their importance.

- The ability of Canada and most other countries, to influence internal dynamics is even more limited. Minister Axworthy has already described the Canadian approach to such issues as human rights and democracy yesterday. I believe that this is what can realistically be done. A more ambitious approach will not only certainly fail, but risks eroding the high comfort level that is an important Canadian asset, thus risking Canada's position in the Asia Pacific not enhancing it.

- Reference was made to trade sanctions yesterday by representatives of NGOs during question-and-answer with Minister Axworthy. Trade is not a favour one country does another. Countries trade because it is in their self-interest to do so: because trade creates growth and jobs. To forgo trade therefore entails sacrifice; sacrifice of jobs and growth. It may be that enough Canadians will conclude that this is a sacrifice worth making. If so, we cannot but respect your choice. But understand that the chief purpose of the sacrifice will be to make some Canadians feel good with themselves. It will make not one whit of substantive difference because it is more than likely that Canada will act alone or, at best, with one or two others. I do not see many Asia Pacific countries going along with sanctions against China or Indonesia or even Myanmar. Therefore, any vacuum left by the withdrawal of Canadian trade will immediately be filled by others. The impact on the target country will be minimal.

- The problems are complex. And because they are complex I want to conclude by introducing a concept that is all too often absent when issues that concern attempts to influence internal dynamics are discussed in the West. The concept is responsibility. Suppose you are wrong and your actions lead to collapse in East Timor, or Myanmar or more horrendously China. What then? Are you prepared to then take responsibility, be engaged, pour in resources, run the country in a kind of trusteeship system, perhaps for decades. If not, a more modest and prudent approach - the approach the Canadian Government has in fact adopted - may be in order.

Jim Boutilier

THE NEW PACIFIC

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First let me say one or two things by way of prelude. I would like to commend Professor Buteux and all of his colleagues for this undertaking. I must say that I am increasingly depressed by the calibre or lack of calibre of debate within Canada as to our foreign policy and more specifically, in this instance, with respect to Asia. I would suggest that there is no other time when it is more important that academics, analysts, interested members of the community, and students in the making come to grips with these issues. It is imperative for us, as Canadians, to do so and I think you are all to be applauded for this undertaking.

It is an interesting time in which to hold a conference. I was thinking yesterday as I flew across the Atlantic that the nearest analogue in western experience perhaps is the end of the eighteenth century in the sense that between 1789, with the onset of the French Revolution and 1799, with the beginning of the Napoleanic era, we have a situation vaguely comparable or analogous to the one that we are in today, at the end of one great era, the Cold War, and in a *fin de siecle*, a period in approach to a new century. It is, I think, particularly appropriate that you hold a conference of this sort for some stock taking and some view into the future.

Having said that, I think it is very important to realise how extraordinary, and even how limited our predictive capabilities are. When you think back a little more than a decade ago there were relatively few people that calculated, with any precision, the speed, the scope and the characteristic of the abject collapse of the Soviet Empire. Similarly, even at the beginning of this decade there were relatively few who fully appreciated Haiti, Somalia, Afghanistan, Bosnia and a host of other issues. So one of the things that quite clearly constitutes a challenge for us is not to simply look into the future, but to look into the future with any sort of precision at all.

I would suggest that our view into the future is rendered even more complicated by virtue of the fact that in this particular instance, the Asia Pacific region with which we are dealing, is dynamic in and of itself. It is not only economically dynamic, as we have seen in His Excellency's elegant presentation, but the very definition of what constitutes the Asia Pacific is dynamic. Increasingly, Pacific Latin America, for example, is now a part of the Asia Pacific arena. To what degree do we as Canadians come to grips with this new challenge at a time when our foreign policy is a mile wide and a quarter inch deep? How do we come to grips with new demands of Chile, Peru, Equador, Mexico and so forth? Perhaps buried on page forty-two of the local newspaper are articles about the fact that the Prime Minister from Japan is making a tour of Latin America. A new dynamic is afoot in the Asia Pacific region that we need to monitor closely.

Similarly, there is a fundamental, perceptual blank spot in our world radar scope and that, I would suggest to you, is South Asia. Curiously enough we look at the world and our vision swings around to the Persian Gulf and then somehow recommences in Singapore and beyond. The whole dynamic of India, which by 2020 will probably be equal in size in terms of population to China, we tend to lose sight of. Yet I would also suggest to you that the great game of the Victorian era is now being played out again North of the Himalayas with very high stakes in terms of energy, geo-strategic positioning and so forth. The dynamic between South Asia, Pakistan, and India, areas of the world which Canadians have abjectly ignored, and the rest of Asia that we know, of China, of Southeast Asia, is an extremely important dynamic, one that we are going to have to come to terms with.

Let me over the space of the next fifteen or twenty minutes begin by making some broad, general observations about what has been happening in the region, and then turn more specifically to economics, and then to the more geo-strategic issues, and finally conclude with one or two broad-brush, emotional and perhaps provocative comments about Canada.

First, at the macro level, what is happening as we look into the twenty-first century as we look at the Asia Pacific arena? First of all, it is the dominance, or predominance, of economics as the main issue captured by APEC, captured by our national fascination with Asia by virtue of Team Canada and other initiatives. Global trade liberalisation will be a fundamental feature of the Asia Pacific region and the degree to which the economies of the region will be able to adapt to the new demands and the dialectical tension between trade liberalisation and protectionism.

Secondly, what will be the future role of the United States? Despite declaratory policy from the Pentagon, the State Department and the White House, most observers in Asia see a slow and steady decline in US capability in and commitment to the Asia Pacific region. There has been a structural disarmament and a hollowing out of the degree to which the Americans are prepared to participate. This has profound implications in the chancelleries and ministries of defence throughout the region.

Thirdly, trans-Pacific trade has increasingly given way to intra-Asian trade. The Asian world is becoming increasingly self-sustaining, driven hitherto by the great dynamo of Japan. This process will continue and it will have implications for Canada as we have seen. If I may use a rather in-eloquent metaphor, the faster we run up the down escalator, we are losing ground in Asia. The figures from 1981 and 1996 tell the story.

We have also to come to terms with China. How curious it is that throughout the 1970's and 1980's China was just always there and then suddenly, it appeared at the centre of our world when we look into Asia. It dominates so much of our thinking, not only in North America, but in Asia itself about how the future will unfold. Paul Krugman, the American micro-economic theorist had the temerity recently to suggest that the Asia Pacific economic miracle was not very miraculous at all and certainly not very sustainable, despite the fact that at no other time in human history has there been economic growth so great and so sustained as in the Asia Pacific region. Singapore is a brilliant illustration of this achievement. Despite that fact, Krugman would argue that, in fact, what the Asians have done is to marry centrally controlled oppressive regimes and large, hard working, skilled, self-denying citizens into a Stacanovite undertaking which, over the space of the past thirty years, has achieved absolute prodigies in economic performance.

What Krugman is arguing however, is that we are now at the brink of a major change, that in fact, to put it in more formal terms, the accumulation of inputs was based on long hours and hard labour, rather than on increased productive efficiency. Almost as if on cue, when Krugman's thesis emerged and was the subject of a great deal of controversy, Korea and Japan have run into difficulty in their economies. The Japanese situation is not only short term, but long term as well. We can see in many cases in the Japanese instance that dramatic fluctuations in the yen/dollar relationship drive the Japanese economic agenda. Japanese big business has been aggressive in terms of its relocation offshore which has insulated it to a considerable degree in these currency fluctuations. We can see that the great dynamo of Asia Pacific economic growth is itself in major trouble.

I would suggest to you that at its simplest, Japan is at a cross-roads. Its first cross-road is political. The Cold War in effect freeze dried the political landscape in Japan. Once the Cold War came to an end, the liberal democratic party monopoly in power came to an end as well. To what degree will some sort of more predictable political landscape develop or will Japan into the future be partially paralysed by weak and ineffective coalitions? Will the old, futile and factional LDP reassert itself sufficiently to come to grips with some major structural problems that face Japan? I would suggest parenthetically that its structural adjustment will be one of the great late motifs of the twenty-first century in Asia. Across the whole of the region all of the economies will be obliged to adjust to a host of really major challenges.

In the Japanese context I would suggest to you that in the very moment when the Japanese most need predictability and courage and the capacity for radical reform, it is not present in the political landscape. There are fundamental problems facing the Japanese economy and they are not unique to the economy, they are endemic throughout many of the Asian economies, either now or in the short term. Increasingly, it will be a question of the degree to which radical reform, and the deregulation of highly protected domestic sectors can be affected. I personally am not terribly optimistic about the capacity of the Japanese, despite their amazing adaptability, to pull off this radical reformulation of their economy. This could have very profound impacts not only in the economic, but in the security realm in the Asia Pacific region.

So, Japan is at a cross-roads in terms of its economy, with an ageing population, with an increasing labour problem, not only in terms of wages but in terms of availability. We can see that Japan will in the future become an increasingly powerful but far from spectacular economy, one of the great economies of the world, but not a leader in the way that it has been in the past.

The same sort of cultural inhibitions are beginning to creep in Korea, a major economy. Yet if we look at the labour unrest, if we look at the difficulties which are besetting the great corporation of Chebul, I would suggest that they also are a reflection of a shift from an era of high labour input to one in which there will be an increased desperation in South Korea to add efficiency. The South Korean dedication to globalization, not only in the sense of the relocation of manufacturing and sales activities around the world, but to the production of a more lateral thinking world of CEOs and presidents is an illustration of the degree to which the South Koreans are trying to come to grips with what is a major economic change, which is largely coincidental with the end of the Cold War and the end of the great age of double digit growth of the region. Having said that, I entirely concur with His Excellency's comments that all the evidence suggests that despite a downturn, economic growth in the Asia Pacific region will still be mouth watering by western standards.

We can see a curious and bizarre or even perverse situation on the Korean Peninsula where after decades of trying to topple the regime in the North, the South is now desperate to prop up the regime in the North for fear of a catastrophic implosion. No one knows with any certainty what will happen. I would suggest to you now that we know far more about what was going on inside the Kremlin in 1952 than we do in terms of what is going on in Korea. At its simplest, I would suggest that probably what is happening is a lethal competition between hard-liners and ultra-hard-liners as to whether to go the Chinese route or not. In this case, structural adjustment is not simply an imperative, it is a matter of state survival. I have nothing more than a gut sensation about this, but I would suggest to you that the unification of the Koreas will occur, quite when or how I have no idea. But this will dramatically alter the dynamic of Northeast Asia because suddenly we will have a new player with seventy million people, set back dramatically by the deficit of reunification, but fundamentally altering the way in which Northeast Asia functions. Which way will a united Korea lean? To China? To Japan? Almost certainly, I would suggest, to China.

One thing which we do need to bear very much in mind is that Russia will be back. Some time ago I was talking to a senior foreign ministry official in Tokyo and he observed, quite candidly, that the Sea of Japan had become wider since the end of the Cold War. From the Japanese perspective, while North Korea constitutes a major challenge, it is the Russians that they worry about as well. From Japan's perspective, imagine how the world looks from Tokyo as you gaze out at a Russia with whom you fought repeatedly in the twentieth century, a Korea that hates you and a China with whom you have a long legacy of historical bitterness. For Japan, the future can indeed be increasingly sombre if America is less to be relied upon. The implications for the larger economy and strategy of Asia are very profound indeed. But the Russians will be back, though muddled back, in the next ten to fifteen years and this will change the dynamic.

The current rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing is nothing more than a tactical concession. The Chinese have benefited from the sort of $1.49 day arms sales from Russia, but in point of fact, the two powers look at one another very wearily indeed. Increasingly intolerant nationalism and Russian concerns about the near abroad and Chinese penetration into the former Soviet Republics, are in many cases driven by concerns about Russian minorities or by China's energy deficit. This will mean as we move into the twentieth century that the Russia - China dynamic will re-emerge. And thus I would suggest that I do not entirely concur with the great strategic triangle of Washington, Tokyo and Beijing, that there is another part, a dotted line that leads off to a quadrilateral point in Moscow. Increasingly, we will have to deal with the dynamic between these four powers when we reach the year 2010 or 2015.

In China itself I would suggest that the succession issue is increasingly irrelevant. If Deng is not already dead, he will die on the second of July, certain that in fact Hong Kong has been carefully incorporated into a greater China. What really is at the heart of the China dilemma is structural adjustment, the capacity of the Chinese to address the new demands of the international marketplace of trade liberalisation, of performance driven foreign policies, in many cases inappropriate from western capitals.

I would agree with what His Excellency had suggested in terms of the disconnect between domestic performance and our trade and foreign policy activities. I think in many cases we act in an inappropriate and counterproductive way by linking the two. This is not to suggest for a moment that in many cases we cannot pursue parallel tracks, but the inextricable linking of internal activities and our own trade performance can in fact be a significant problem for us in the future.

All of the economies of Asia are going to have to face another form of structural adjustment, that which relates to demography, which relates to the environment, which relates to infrastructure. In the Chinese case it is not relative growth, but absolute growth that matters. Every eighteen months China adds a population equivalent to the whole of Canada. Unemployment, or underemployment is a fundamental social and economic challenge and it also imperils the internal stability of China. There is nothing more important to the ancient leadership in Beijing than the maintenance of internal cohesion at a time when there are tremendous centrifugal forces at work at the provincial level throughout China.

Look at the energy shortfall which China is beginning to face and which India also is facing. Currently, for example, the shortfall between energy requirement and availability in India is 18-20 percent and likely to continue growing. Energy, I would suggest to you, will be one of the great issues as we move into the twenty-first century and we face a whole array of oil-fired economies, all scrambling for an extremely limited resource. Indeed resource competition when we move into the twenty-first century in Asia will become more and more acute. We can see this in terms of the inadequacy of infrastructure, we can see this in terms of the degradation of agricultural land as a result of the huge environmental overhang. So structural adjustment of a different sort, not simply from labour intensive to more highly productive economies, but to address these new realities will be a feature of the new Asia which we will look upon in the twenty-first century. These will not be simply western conceits of environmentalism, these will in fact be indigenously driven and they will be on a massive scale. They will begin to constrain economic growth as economic growth and energy intersect. What this will mean in terms of internal stability is hard to say. For the past forty years we have lived in a world which has been almost unique in world economic history where economic performance has exceeded expectations. This, I would suggest, is likely to begin drawing to an end in many quarters of Asia as we move into the next century, if only by virtue of the relentless character of demography and the way in which the demographic pyramids are being distorted. By 2025, Japan will probably have the oldest population of any country in Asia and the impact, in terms of social welfare, in terms of social spending, will be absolutely and utterly profound.

Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, I would suggest to you that one of the great challenges, as we move into the future is the membership of ASEAN. To a very large degree, that has been determined, partly on the basis of emotion, partly on the basis of logic. Incorporation of the remaining states in Southeast Asia, Laos, Cambodia and Burma, makes good sense, logically. It provides a certain elegant coherence to the Southeast Asian community. To what degree the year 2000 need necessarily be the threshold is more debatable. Will in fact the character of ASEAN be fundamentally altered? For many years the ASEAN community grew slowly and high levels of confidence were developed despite some very real, and not publicly acknowledged tensions between the various members. We are now seeing a difference, not only in kind, but of degree, with the sudden acquisition of a series of economies far less developed than those for example of Malaysia, Indonesia or even the Philippines. Laos, Cambodia and Burma are lamentably poor and there will be huge structural adjustment problems for them. We will continue to see a great deal of static on the international radar screen from Europe and elsewhere in terms of human rights issues and so forth with respect to these states.

Acquisition of states into ASEAN will create a huge common border with China. The China issue remains central to the Southeast Asian agenda and yet there is increasing criticism of the way in which the dialogue culture of Southeast Asia functions. Is this simply impatience on the part of westerners, eager for legalistic and predictable frameworks or is this in fact a failure of Asian states to come to grips with China? Is there any way to come to grips with China? The energy issue and Southeast Asia's future of course intersect in the South China Seas. How this will play out remains to be seen, but that is in many ways a metaphor, structurally, for the larger adjustment which is going to face Asia as we move into the future.

So we are at a cross-roads in terms of the whole Asia Pacific experience. The region is changing in terms of its character, in terms of its composition, in terms of the states involved. Economies are entering a new phase. I would suggest to you that resource competition will become more and more acute. There will be more likelihood for geo-strategic instability in the region despite the fact that there has been a good deal of peace over the past fifty years.

Lastly, let me turn fleetingly to Canada. I would like to simply underscore what His Excellency has already said. My appreciation looking on over the past twenty-five years in terms of Canada in Asia is that in fact we have been trapped by our terminal fastidiousness with respect to the way in which many Asian states conduct their domestic affairs. We have been trapped by a sweet reasonableness which is our great strength, but is also our greatest weakness. Our conservatism and lack of vision have in many cases dramatically undercut our performance in Asia. We must, I think, become much more dynamic, much more revisionary and much more consistent. All too often our foreign policy is driven by the personality of the Foreign Minister. All too often there is a lack of coherence at the federal level in terms of where our priorities lie. We are just beginning to scratch the surface at the eleventh hour. Throughout Asia, Asians are unfailingly polite and generous to us when we arrive. On the margins, they have real doubts as to our credibility as an Asia Pacific power. Hitherto, we have arrived and disappeared. We have lacked staying power, coherence and consistency. We are now, despite

Team Canada, despite activities or organisations like the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, just scratching the surface.

Jeremy Paltiel

RIGHTS IN THE RIGGING: NAVIGATING HUMAN RIGHTS IN ASIA PACIFIC DIPLOMACY

Jeremy Paltiel is an associate professor of Political Science at Carleton University, where he specializes in the politics of east Asia.

This is Canada's year of Asia Pacific. The Asia Pacific, is neither a coherent geographic concept - its boundaries are variously disputed and according to some interpretations includes everything from the tip of Tierra Del Fuego to the tip of Sri-Lanka thereby including 3/4 of the world's population and almost the same proportion of the world's landmass, and it is an entirely incoherent cultural concept. The Asia Pacific is an inherently cross-cultural concept.

I was asked to speak of the historical development of human rights in Asia Pacific diplomacy, and I think it fair to state that the issue of human rights constitutes perhaps the most critical feature of cross-cultural relations in the Asia Pacific of the past 150 years. Today, we hear talk of "Asian values" as opposed to or in contrast to western conceptions of human rights. It is fair to say, however, that Asia, as a monolithic entity is a purely western construction, which dates back to Ancient Greeks and their contrast of their own polis-centred Hellenic culture of the Aegean littoral, with the empires of the continental middle-East (another European cultural construction of a later period). The vast land mass of the Eurasian continent contains no monolithic culture and cannot be reduced to a simple dichotomous cultural construct. That dichotomy is itself the product of the technological, military and economic dominance achieved by European Christian culture in the 19 century, following a much longer period of material inferiority to the wealth and learning of the Sino-Confucian civilization of East Asia or the Islamic civilization of the Eastern Mediterranean. The Europeans achieved their self consciousness, like the Greeks to whom they traced their cultural ancestry on the margins of the great empires of the East. The voyages of discovery and conquest in the 15th and 16th century which Christian culture in the 19 century, following a much longer period of material inferiority to the wealth and learning of the Sino-Confucian civilization of East Asia or the Islamic civilization of the Eastern Mediterranean. The Europeans achieved their self consciousness, like the Greeks to whom they traced their cultural ancestry on the margins of the great empires of the East. The voyages of discovery and conquest in the 15th and 16th century which ushered in the modern era of European domination were motivated both by the desire to trade with the advanced material civilizations of South and East Asia, as well as the continued religio-cultural struggles of the crusades and the Iberian reconquista. Asians (and here the term is well chosen as those who were the objects of European domination) may well be forgiven for seeing a line of continuity from those early efforts to assert cultural dominance to the human rights offensives of today.

Of course, there is also a different story behind the evolution of human rights. That story comes from the struggle of Europeans to come to terms with their own history, of the movement from religious warfare to religious toleration; from the slave trade to Emancipation and from the moral abyss of racism and genocide in the holocaust right at the centre of Europe in the middle of this century to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In this story, human rights and international law represent the summit of human political evolution, one where every human individual and every nation and culture may participate without discrimination. Is this the lingua-franca of cross-cultural communication in the Asia Pacific or is this yet another arrogant assertion of cultural superiority?

It is all but impossible to be objective in this discussion because much does depend on where one draws the centre on the world map. This is the year when Hong Kong reverts to Chinese sovereignty. One hundred and fifty-five years ago The United Kingdom established sovereignty over the island of Hong Kong as a result of the Opium War. According to the British diplomats of that time this war was fought to establish the principles of International Law! According to the British government of the day the Chinese Empire had violated international law by seeking to outlaw the opium trade on her own shores by seizing the stocks of opium held in British warehouses on Chinese territory! The principles which Great Britain sought to establish were the right to engage in trade on Chinese territory, as well as the exemption of British nationals from Chinese law, especially criminal law (extraterritorially). Britain demanded compensation for the seized opium as well as an indemnity for the costs of the hostilities. Hong Kong was intended to be a sovereign territory which could supply the British Navy in its patrols of the Chinese ports in support of British trade and as a warehousing centre for British goods. The opium trade with China supplied between 10-15% of the revenues of British India![1] To be sure, Chinese criminal law did not contain the safeguards of the British Common Law, such as habeas corpus and in particular, for non degree holders, Chinese criminal procedure allowed torture as a means of gathering evidence. Again, the protection of extraterritoriality was conferred not only on merchants engaging in trade but also on missionaries, and eventually on missions and converts as well. The treaty of Nanking granted these concessions in 1842 and was regarded by Chinese as the first in a series of "unequal treaties" which infringed on Chinese sovereignty and privileged Europeans down to the Second World War.

From this it is easy to see that international law was an instrument of European privilege rather than a means of insuring equality of treatment among sovereign nations. To contemporary Europeans, the desire of Chinese to control their own borders and regulate the activities of foreigners was seen as an arrogant expression of Chinese superiority which deserved a come-uppance. The "most favored nation" clause inserted in all treaties insures that the privileges granted any European nation would be enjoyed by others. The same system of "unequal treaties" was imposed on Japan, and it is significant that the desire to abolish the abnormal infringement on domestic sovereignty constituted the principal cause for the Japanese reformers of the Meiji period (1868-1912) to adopt a European-style constitution and legal system.

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[1] John King Fairbank, The United States and China.

Human rights played little role in the encounter of Europeans with Asia, except in so far as the Europeans desired to be exempted from the legal regimes in which they found themselves. Rights language itself had no exact equivalent in the Chinese language or vocabulary. When Commissioner Lin seized 20,280 chests of British opium, he dismissed the British objection to the infringement of their "rights." In an admonition to Queen Victoria he stated the following:

> We have read your successive tributary memorials saying in general our countrymen who go to trade in China have always received His Majesty the Emperor's gracious treatment and equal justice," and so on... For this reason the Celestial Court on soothing those from afar has redoubled its polite and kind treatment. The profit from trade has been enjoyed from them continuously for two hundred years. This is the source from which your country has become known for its wealth. But after a long period of commercial intercourse, there appear among the crowd of barbarians both good and bad, unevenly. Consequently there are those who smuggle opium to seduce the Chinese people and so cause the spread of poison to all provinces. Such persons who only care to profit themselves, and disregard the harm to others are not tolerated by the laws of heaven and are unanimously hated by human beings... We find that your country is 20,000 miles from China. Yet there are barbarian ships that strive to come here for the trade for the purpose of making a great profit. The wealth of China is used to profit the barbarians. That is to say, the great profit made by barbarians is taken from the rightful share of China. By what right do they then in return use the poisonous drug to injure the Chinese people? Even though barbarians may not necessarily intend us harm, yet coveting profit to the extreme, they have no regard for injuring others. Let us ask where is your conscience?[2]

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[2] Lin Tse-hsu, Moral Advice to Queen Victoria, 1839, in Ssu-Yu Teng and John K. Fairbank, eds., China's Response to the West: Documentary Survey 1839-1923. (New York: Athenaeum, 1970) pp. 24-25.

In this passage we have the crux of the difference between the Chinese approach to human relations and that implied by rights language. The Chinese approach emphasizes context and relationships. There can be no basis to a moral claim at the expense of another person. Rights, and in particular human rights are inherent and personal. The Japanese translators of the word "right" initially had great difficulty with the term. At first the temptation was to translate it bun or fen, the Confucian term which means acting in accordance with one's social station or role. In translating Wheaton's Principles of International Law for the purposes of acquainting the Chinese government with the practices of international diplomacy on the European model, the term "right" was translated as quan, a term roughly equivalent to "power" in English. Subsequently,, in translating "rights," the Japanese translator, educator and publicist Fukuzawa Yukichi used he term tsugi or tongyi a Confucian term corresponding to a notion of something thoroughly in accord with the principles of righteousness. Subsequently, right became associated once again with "power" in the term kenri or quanli, the term still used today in China and Japan, here there are two readings of li or ri: the first meaning is "principle" the second means "profit or advantage" sometimes loosely translated technically as "ego advantage." We can see here that rights are seen as things which are powerful principles attached to the ego, and as an antonym to obligations.

An interesting problem arises with regard to this translation. The late nineteenth century was permeated by the influence of Social Darwinism and the ideas of Herbert Spencer were widely known in China and Japan. The survival of the fittest became one of the tocsin of national revival in Japan and China. In western philosophy, however, might and right are seen as opposing principles, yet, in the context of late 19th Century imperialism, these two become closely associated. Nevertheless, Jiyuminken , "liberty and people's rights (or power)" became a major movement in Japan of the 1870's and 80's demanding the extension of suffrage and democracy. Still, when the Chinese revolutionary Sun Yatsen reviewed the ideas of J.J. Rousseau, in particular the idea of natural or inborn rights, he rejected this as "unscientific."

The liberal impetus in the Chinese revolution was undermined by the need to create a new state which would be capable of protecting the Chinese culture and society from foreign invasion and occupation as well as internal turmoil. In the first half of the twentieth century there was widespread acceptance of the notion that the central political problem was not to limit the power of the Chinese state, but to increase it.[3] The failure of the republican revolution in China, and the failure of the Western powers to support the cause of China's liberal reformers in 1913, deepened the sense of the national crisis in China. As a result, national power took precedence over individual liberty for most Chinese in the first half of this century.

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[3] " It is hardly surprising that the Chinese bourgeoisie and part of the May Fourth intelligentsia arrived at the conclusion that it was necessary to restore government authority and that despite the fact that it meant giving up the autonomy they had acquired thanks to the economic expansion and the decline of the bureaucratic apparatus over the preceding years they

Again we need to look at the map which is not centered on Europe. The very century which saw the advance of the principle of universal suffrage in Europe and North America, corresponded with the progressive colonization of the rest of the world in Asia and Africa. Imperialism certainly acquainted the rest of the world with the ideas of western civilization, but those who were colonized were denied those liberties which European citizens had gained by the very Europeans who proclaimed them. The emergence of the Indian National Congress is a classic case of an educated colonial elite utilizing the ideas of the colonizer to challenge colonial power, as Surendra Nath Banerjea, who presided over the Indian National Congress in 1905 put it,

> We are the citizens of a great and free Empire and we live under the protecting shadow of one of the noblest constitutions the world has ever seen. The rights of Englishmen are ours, their privileges are ours, their constitution is ours. But we are excluded from them.[4]

We should look again to the aftermath of he First World War, a war which the US President Woodrow Wilson had proclaimed to be a war which would make the world "safe for democracy" and which would establish the principle of the "self-determination of nations." At the Versailles conference, where Japan participated as an ally of Great Britain which had occupied Germany's Pacific colonies, the Japanese government sought to enshrine the principle of racial equality in the treaty which established the League of Nations. The victorious European Allies, themselves colonial powers, denied this request. Instead, they rewarded Japan with Germany's concessions in China, and denied a hearing to Korean patriots wishing to participate, thereby obviating the principle of self-determination in so far as it applied to the people of East Asia. Canada, alarmed at Japan's demands, prevailed upon Great Britain not to renew the treaty of alliance with Japan in 1920, fearing that the Canadian policies of "oriental exclusion" might be influenced by Japan's status as an ally of the British Empire.

It would not be fair to dismiss all European efforts, and especially the efforts of the missionaries in Asia in the 19th and 20th centuries. Certainly many individuals and organizations were associated with the improvement of education

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worked toward that end." Tu Weiming, "Intellectual Effervescence in China." Daedalus Vol.121 No.2 (Spring 1992) p. 279.

[4] from Pattabhi Sittaramarya, A short History of the Indian National Congress I P. 101. Cited in D. Mackenzie Brown, The Nationalist Movement: Indian Political Thought from Ranade to Bhave. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950) p. 15.

and public health and contributed materially to establishment of modern institutions which could form the basis for sovereign institutions of self-government. But while saving our souls may be closely associated with universal human rights in some eyes, they can hardly be viewed as identical and are arguably even incompatible. From this perspective, a human rights crusade is best viewed as an oxymoron.

The achievement of the post world war two period came in decolonization. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was at least potentially realizable when political rights were no longer systematically denied to non-Europeans. However, any realistic institutionalization of international human rights was effectively undermined by the exigencies of the Cold War. Human rights became a hostage to the ideological debates of the era, and the policy of containment effectively overrode the encouragement of human rights in any front-line or divided state. The notion of an "iron-curtain" which divided "the free world" from "communist totalitarianism" was applied uncritically to Asia, where the only democracy to function continuously in he post-war era was the country whose constitution had been written by the American occupiers - Japan. India in particular, and the Philippines maintained democratic governance throughout most of the their independence, but in the continent in which the majority of the world's population was and is concentrated, democracy was a rare flower regardless of which superpower the state attached itself to. Thus, in the divided states of China and Korea, the so-called "free" parts, in South Korea and Taiwan were both under martial law until the 1980's. One of the worst human rights abuses of the entire post-war period occurred during the so-called "abortive communist coup" in Indonesia of 1965, which brought President Suharto to power, where he still sits. 500,000 or more suspected communists were slaughtered in that "year of living dangerously" and millions were imprisoned.

Superpower rivalry was of such overriding importance that the US sought to deny China its rightful seat at the UN for twenty years following the establishment of the People's Republic. By any measure the worst abuses of human rights by the Chinese government occurred during the period when the US refused to have any dealing with Beijing, refusing even to call China's capital by its proper name. Leaving out the millions who were executed during the years of revolutionary violence, as many as 30 million peasants may have died as a result of the man-made famine of the Great Leap Forward in 1959-61. The Diefenbaker government's decision to sell wheat to China in the face of US opposition was a commercial rather than a humanitarian gesture - but its effects may well have saved some Chinese lives. This same even precipitated break between China and the Soviet Union, after which human rights in China may have descended to the hellish violence of the Cultural Revolution. Then, the effort to extricate the US from a disastrous engagement in Vietnam became an overriding priority in Washington which then took advantage of the Sino-Soviet rift to forge her own axis with Beijing. This occurred at the very moment when human rights in China had reached the very nadir of observance during the Cultural Revolution. Until the very end of the Cold War, the US along with nearly all the western allies exercised a double standard in relation to China and the Soviet Union. The shocking coincidence of the Tianamen repressions with the fall of the Berlin Wall focused attention on Chinese human rights practices which until that time had barely merited mention.

China's official position, according to President Jiang Zemin, is that human rights "is a problem which in the final analysis belongs in the sphere of affairs of a country's sovereignty."[5]

By agreeing (at a very low level and to a limited extent) to engage in a "dialogue" on human rights, China reiterated the posture it adopted together with other Asian countries in the "Bangkok Declaration" just prior to the 1993 United Nations Conference on Human Rights. While acknowledging the "universality" of human rights, "they must be considered in the context of... national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds."[6] From this perspective it becomes almost impossible to pursue human rights as claims across national boundaries.

One of the assumptions behind the current debate concerning Asian exceptionalism is that arbitrary power in the hands of the state may be necessary to promote economic development. The obverse of this, a point of view most vociferously repeated by the authorities in Beijing, most recently in a book called "The China that Can Say No" is that human rights diplomacy is calculated to undermine Asian states in order to keep them weak and subservient to Western power. As He Xin argues, if China were to pursue the political system recommended by the United States, "China would only become a 'soft state' fragmented and lacking in national cohesion." Such a state, he argues, "would lose its last opportunity and hops to catch up to the developed countries."[7] In other words Asian authoritarianism is part of a policy of economic development which is itself a strategy of counterdependency.

Chinese observers argued: "some western personages raise their own human rights notions to be common standard based on considerations of political privilege and cultural self-centeredness, and moreover use this to judge and make demands on peoples and states with different cultural traditions and different actual circumstances who have chosen different social systems and different developmental paths."[8]

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[5] Jiang Zemin, " Jiakuai gaige kaifang yu xiandaihua jianshe bufa duoqu you zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi shiye de gengda shengli" (Speech to the 14th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party) October 12, 1992 Qiushi 21, 1992, p. 17.

[6] Sussumu Awanohara, "Vienna Showdown." Far Eastern Economic Review. 17, June 1993, p. 17.

[7] "Guanyu Zhongguo de Minzhu yu Weilai" (on China's Democracy and Future) Beijing Ribao. June 22, 1990.

The Chinese go further, and prioritize the "right to development" as a basic human right on the basis of a number of General Assembly resolutions, and argue as well that the most basic human right is economic - the right to subsistence. Official spokespersons for the Chinese government insist on the significance of the "right to development" as a basic human right proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1979 and 1986.[9] This position tends to relativize the importance of individual rights, and also to view rights as programmatic and evolutionary rather than as absolute claims.[10] We should note two factors which alert us to hypocritical positions: capitalist economic development, the pursuit of economic growth as a value in itself, is itself a "western" invention. Furthermore, the evidence of sovereignty as the basic condition for the exercise of human rights is also based on a western norm of international law. There is no doctrine of sovereignty in the Chinese tradition.

Missing from all Chinese discussion is any systematic discussion of the contradiction of these human rights with the basic civil and political rights whose advocacy by dissidents, NGO's and foreign government's they deplore and actively resist. Human rights diplomacy has always been hostage to expediency.[11] Yet it is nonetheless true that the worst abuses of human rights in China, as elsewhere, take place under the cover of isolation. No country is immune from the charge of hypocrisy. The West has come along way since the opium wars, yet the relationship between trade and human rights has not become any clearer. Arguably, an emphasis on human rights is a means to proclaim the hierarchic superiority of Western values at a time when Western power is on the wane.

Today we are faced with two contradictory hypotheses with respect to the states of world affairs. One, uses a Hegelian analysis to argue "the End of History," meaning the definitive victory of Western liberal values on a world historic, global scale. The other, is the hypothesis of a "clash of civilizations" with a world subtended by civilizational boundaries in potential, if not always actual conflict with one another. This hypothesis far from assuming the continued dominance of the Euro-American (or in the language of this conference, the

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[8] Ibid.

[9] See for example, Dong Yunhu and Liu Wuping, Shijie Renquan Yuefa p.182; pp. 209-210. See also "Human Rights in China" (The White Paper) pp. 43-45.

[10] In what is in effect an extended response to the Chinese White Paper, Ann Kent has written a wide-ranging evaluation of Chinese human rights in thought and practice. See Ann Kent, Between Freedom and Subsistence: China and Human Rights. (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1993).

[11] See the author's "Negotiating Human Rights with China" in Maxwell A. Cameron and Maureen Appel Molot eds., Democracy and Foreign Policy: Canada Among Nations 1995. (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995). pp. 165-186.

"Atlanticist") West sees a West increasingly challenged by the economic and military vigor of the Confucian civilization centered on China and the religious dynamism of the Islamic world. To my mind, both outlooks overemphasize the role of values in constructing global political relations - rooted in the ideological confrontation of the Cold War era; and underestimate the significance of diversity in the contemporary world. Competition and challenge thrive on dichotomous concept and binary oppositions. The "West against the rest" is just one such opposition. Yet in any given week I may have Chinese food one day, Italian the next, Middle Eastern food on the day after that, and some days I may have more than three different cultural cuisines in a single day, yet my stomach seems to digest them all with equanimity. I can say the same thing about my ears and musical traditions. When I do have Japanese food I often eat Tempura, a typically Japanese dish of deep fried vegetables and fish in egg batter whose origins date to the arrival of the Portuguese on Japanese shores in the 16th Century. In the course of political struggles, lines may be drawn dichotomously, easy benchmarks to record winning and losing, to mobilize support against perceived humiliations. Yet through a wide angle lens all one can see is difference, and if you speeded up the camera you would find mutual interaction, trade and learning so that the demarcations of difference at any given time will be superseded by others and may even disappear to re-form along distinctive patterns. Trade has existed since the dawn of human culture, and along with trade have come mutual exchanges of values and ideas as well as technology. So while "human rights" are a distinctive Western cultural construction, a particular vocabulary with a distinctive ancestry, the idea of human rights is rooted in a particular concern for what it means to be human. The specific context for rights talk is the confrontation between the power of the states and human beings constituted as private individuals. Human rights are rooted in a notion that individual identities form the bedrock of what it means to be human. Confucianism teaches that human beings are constituted through their relationships and that only through social praxis do we learn how to be fully human. Rights talk deliberately cuts individuals off from their relationships. Looked at from on e perspective then, we have here a dichotomy, a contradiction. A clash of civilizations, if you will. Yet, Confucians will readily acknowledge that the abuse of power to destroy the individual personality by the states is morally wrong. Similarly, most liberals will acknowledge that a solitary life is hardly worth living and that morality is constituted through human interaction not apart from it. The Confucian outlook provides a useful way to think about the relationship between trade and human rights. In so far as trade brings us into relation with each other, trade provides a medium for reconstituting each other through our relationships and for reaffirming and expanding the boundaries of human intersubjectivity. By juxtaposing trade and human rights in dichotomous terms we may be asking the wrong question. Instead, we should ask which values are being exchanged alongside goods?

In short, the current debate concerning Asian values is not really about values at all, though value differences certainly exist. It is about the power of

States. Does anyone seriously believe that American concerns about human rights and democracy are rooted in a deep-seated belief in the moral superiority of the form of social and political organization embodies in the US constitution? Is it not also fair to say that those states which most loudly proclaim the importance of Asian values may be less concerned about the defence of local values than they are concerned about maintaining the prerogatives of state elites to wield power as they see fit without outside interference? The victims of the abuse of power will use whatever ideological tools are available to them. In the past, the language of Chinese dissidence was almost exclusively Marxist utilizing the same vocabulary as those who wielded state power against the organized power of the state. Chinese dissidents only appealed to liberalism and human rights following the adoption of China's policies of reform and the open door. Dissidence in Iran, Egypt and Algeria speaks the language of Islam just as in Poland it spoke the language of the Catholic Church.

In a conference on the challenges of the Asia Pacific to Canada's Atlanticist Tradition, and the lessons of Atlanticism to the Pacific Century, it is worth remembering that the post war resurgence of interest in human rights also came as part and parcel of a post-war European desire to consolidate basic common European values in the face of the recent experience of a horrific European war. The Universal Declaration came out of a context which began with the Atlantic Charter and continued with the formation of the council of Europe. Multiculturalism was hardly even on the horizon, despite the fact that there were some efforts to build in sensitivity to non-western traditions. The point here is that the Atlanticists could and did harken back to a common tradition. This very process may be offensive in the age of the Asia Pacific.

Implications of Immigration and Multiculturalism on Canada's Foreign Policy

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[1] This paper was unavailable for publication.

Yasmeen Abu-Laban

COLLAPSING THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN 'FOREIGN' AND 'DOMESTIC': RE-THINKING MULTICULTURALISM AND IMMIGRATION POLICIES ON THE EVE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

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Question: *Why did the Canadian cross the road?*
Answer: *To get to the middle.*

Throughout the long years of the Cold War, many Canadians, and Canadian policy makers, grew accustomed to thinking of Canada's role in international affairs through the lens of "middle-power internationalism."[1] Like balancing a fine line through the middle of oncoming traffic, being a so-called middle power implied that there was not much room to manoeuvre in a bi-polar world.[2] Notwithstanding the ways in which Canada's self-projected image as a "middle power" may not survive the dramatically changed global landscape of the post Cold War era[3], it is still startling to contemplate a complaint recently levelled at Canada by British political scientist Kenneth Minnogue, a well known conservative thinker. In a speech given in Calgary, Minnogue emphasised that not only is Western civilisation supposedly more 'advanced' than others, but he also railed against multiculturalism, admonishing:

> one of the things Canadians ought to apologize and make reparations to the world for is the idea of multiculturalism. You have helped the spread of modern ideological grievance-mongering.[4]

Without a doubt, criticising Canadian multiculturalism policy is neither novel, nor confined to those on the right. As we head into the twenty-first century, it has become increasingly clear that there are a variety of views on multiculturalism, and indeed, within Canada specifically, over the last few years multiculturalism policy has been attacked by a number of divergent groups and individuals for a variety of reasons.[5] However, Minnogue's argument that the Canadian state has done such damage to the international community that compensation is required is entirely new in the multiculturalism debate. It is an assertion that poignantly highlights the need for some historical and comparative perspective on the policy and the term 'multiculturalism.'

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[1] Laura MacDonald, "Canada and the "New World Order"," in Michael S. Whittington and Glen Williams (eds.), Canadian Politics in the 1990s (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1995), p. 40.

[2] Macdonald, "Canada and the "New World Order", " p. 44.

[3] Macdonald, "Canada and the "New World Order" ," p. 41.

[4] As quoted in Peter Stockland, "Not All Cultures Equally Developed," The Calgary Herald (8 November, 1996)p. A3.

[5] For an overview see Yasmeen Abu-Laban and Daiva Stasiulis, "Multiculturalism Under Siege: Popular and Partisan Opposition to Multiculturalism," Canadian Public Policy 18, 4 (1992): 365-386.

It is true that the term multiculturalism began to gain currency as a result of the Canadian government's policy initiative in 1971.[6] Moreover, it is also true that today, particularly in countries of the industrialised West, the term 'multiculturalism' is widely recognised and used, albeit in different ways, by policy makers, social commentators, academics and even the general public.[7]

Even admitting the widespread usage of the term however, it is exceptionally difficult to find evidence to take Minnogue's view seriously. For one thing, despite the current popularity of criticising multiculturalism not everyone view the term negatively. At the start of 1997, a Canadian entrepreneur targeted the increasingly ethnically and racially diverse population of North America by launching the first glossy magazine devoted to multiculturalism. Entitled Urban Mosaik the magazine has a clear audience aimed at Canadian and American men and women between ages 20 to 45, of the first, second and third generation, living in large cosmopolitan cities.[8]

More broadly, the widespread currency of the term multiculturalism beyond Canada's borders has coincided with real growing international concern about the potential and limitations of policies to adequately address shifting patterns of inter-ethnic relations.[9] In this context, it is interesting to note that a recent report of the UNESCO World Commission on Culture and Development actually cited Canada's approach to multiculturalism as "a model for other countries."[10]

For these reasons, Minnogue's condemnation does not warrant serious contemplation of Canada's global sins. Nevertheless, Minnogue's statement is useful in drawing our attention to a focus that has received little systematic attention: Canada's multiculturalism policy in relation to the international level. While migration specialists have long-observed that the effects and regulation of international migration is both a domestic and a global issue, the ever-burgeoning academic literature on multiculturalism policy in Canada has typically approached the policy from the vantage point of its effects within the Canadian polity.[11] In contrast, the purpose of this paper is to examine Canada's immigration and multiculturalism policies with a view to demonstrating how these policies effect not only domestic politics within Canada, but also how they have had, and may have, wider international implications beyond Canada's borders.

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[6] Christine Inglis, "Multiculturalism: New Policy Responses to Diversity," (MOST Policy Papers 4). (Paris: UNESCO, 1996), p.1 6.

[7] Inglis, "Multiculturalism: New Policy Responses to Diversity," p.1 5.

[8] "Canadian Launches Multiculturalism Mag," The Edmonton Journal (2 January 1997) p. C1.

[9] Inglis, "Multiculturalism: New Policy Responses to Diversity," p.1 5.

[10] Canada, Canadian Heritage, "Backgrounder: What is Multiculturalism?" (1996) Mimeo.

[11] See Abu-Laban and Stasiulis, "Ethnic Pluralism Under Siege: Popular and Partisan Opposition to Multiculturalism."

Specifically, this analysis will consider the evolution and inter-relationships of multiculturalism and immigration in Canada, as well as highlight some of the domestic and broader international effects of these two policies with respect to the sphere of the economy and trade; the sphere of culture and representation; and the sphere of Canada's foreign policy. By focusing on both the domestic and international levels to evaluate the impact of multiculturalism and immigration, a twofold argument is advanced. First, this focus can bring new insights bearing on our understanding of the advantages and limitations of these two policies. Second, by looking at these polices in relation to the national and international levels it becomes clear that there is often an artificiality to rigidly dichotomising between what is "national" (or internal) and what is "international" (or external) because in reality these levels are inter-dependent.

The Evolution and Linkages of Immigration and Multiculturalism Policies

As a settler-colony, immigration has always played a central role in the construction of Canada, and remains important today. It is widely recognised that for most of Canada's history, the Canadian state's immigration policy was explicitly discriminatory and directed toward ensuring that Canada would develop as a "white settler colony."[12] Hence, immigration policy favoured the entry of white, particularly British-origin Protestants. Exceptions to this preference came only in times when there was both insufficient labour within Canada, and from countries viewed as ethno-culturally similar. In this way, ethno-culturally distinct waves of immigrants were key in fuelling territorial, agricultural and industrial expansion in Canada.

The overt racial and ethnic discrimination buttressing Canada's immigration policy only began to change in the 1960s. Particularly, by 1967 Canada's immigration policy became officially non-discriminatory regarding race and ethnicity with the introduction of a point system that numerically measures all applicants on the same criteria related to skills and education. The move to an officially non-discriminatory policy was the result of a multiplicity of factors which will not be detailed here. However, suffice it to say, as Freda Hawkins has demonstrated, in the area of immigration governments are engaged in public relations both nationally and internationally, and by the 1960s it was becoming embarrassing internationally to have to admit to the practice of racial discrimination.[13]

Unlike immigration which defined Canada's experience as a settler-colony, the policy of multiculturalism is more recent. But multiculturalism and immigration are linked in their evolution in that shifting immigration policies and patterns led to changing demographics within Canada, which in turn led to demands for more inclusive policies and symbols of an increasingly diverse population within the Canadian polity.

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[12] Daiva Stasiulis and Radah Jhappan, "The Fractious Politics of a Settler-Society: Canada," in Daiva Stasiulis and Nira Yuval Davis (eds.), Unsettling Settler Societies: Articulations of Gender, Race, Ethnicity and Class (London: Sage, 1995) pp. 97-99.

[13] Freda Hawkins, Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern (Second Edition) (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988), p. 30.

In particular, in 1963, in response to developments in Quebec surrounding the Quiet Revolution, Liberal Prime Minister Lester Pearson established the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (the B and B Commission). The response of the Liberal government fostered a counter-response by what has been termed the "third force" or "multicultural movement": Canadians of non-Aboriginal, non-British and non-French origins who objected to the model of a bicultural and bilingual Canada that the Commission symbolised in its title and mandate. In this context, it was second and third generation minorities in Canada, particularly Ukrainians, that were at the forefront of this opposition. Their pressure eventually resulted in the release in 1970 of Book IV of the Report of the B and B Commission entitled "The Cultural Contribution of Other Ethnic Groups."

In 1971, Liberal Prime Minister Trudeau tabled the government's response to the recommendations of Book IV, and advocated a federal policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework. At this time, multiculturalism was tied to an emphasis on funding ethno-cultural events and the arts.

For analytical purposes, it is worth reflecting on the role of Ukrainian-Canadians in relation to multiculturalism because this group illustrates the permeable boundaries between politics internally in Canada, and externally outside of Canada. The support of Ukrainian-Canadians for multiculturalism was consistent throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and indeed one empirical study in the 1980s found that Ukrainians in the second and third generations had the most positive views about multiculturalism of the ethno-cultural groups surveyed.[14]

Moreover, it is also clear that this group's particular concerns with cultural retention and language maintenance in this period stemmed from a sense among Ukrainians in Canada that they were a Diaspora, and that the protection of the Ukrainian language and culture could only be secured from within Canada because it was under threat in the former Soviet Union:

> Faced with assimilation at home and Russification overseas, our predicament among Canada's minorities is virtually unique. . . .
>
> We believe in Canada as a multicultural nation—a nation to whose social and economic development, cultural identity and linguistic diversity we have contributed much over the years.

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[14] Ukrainian Community Development Committee- Prairie Region, "Multiculturalism: The Limitations of Public Policy," Building the Future: Ukrainian Canadians in the 21st Century (Edmonton: October 1986), p. 22.

> It is because of this reality that we have pushed and will continue to push for governments and public institutions to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the cultural heritage of our community.[15]

Similarly showing the inter-dependence between internal and external developments, shifting immigration policies and patterns led to an expansion of the focus of multiculturalism to explicitly deal with racism. The introduction of a formally non-discriminatory immigration policy in 1967 led to greater immigration from outside "traditional" source countries of Europe. By the early 1980s, without abandoning its emphasis on funding ethno-cultural events and the arts, the federal policy of multiculturalism shifted emphasis towards greater concern with racism with the creation of a race relations unit within Multiculturalism in 1981. A major source for this initiative was pressure from the now more numerous visible minority groups in Canada.[16]

I have argued elsewhere that multiculturalism may be characterised as being in decline in certain ways in the 1990s.[17] Part of this assessment stems from the dismantling of a separate Department of Multiculturalism in 1993, and the amalgamation of the multiculturalism program into Canadian Heritage. As well, it is registered in the declining resources attached to the policy. In the early 1990s, the budget for multiculturalism was about 27 million annually. In contrast, the budget for multiculturalism for 1996-1997 is 18.7 million, and for 1997-1998 it is projected to go down to 18.3 million.[18]

Nonetheless, immigration and ethnic diversity remain of importance in Canada and will likely grow. In fact, one of the hallmarks of globalization is the increased movement not only of goods, services and capital across national boundaries, but also people. Likewise, because diverse migratory movements are part and parcel of economic globalization, despite cutbacks to the federal multiculturalism program, multiculturalism is becoming important in a new way in the economic sphere.

Immigration and Multiculturalism in the Economic Sphere

As mentioned, since 1967 all potential independent immigrants (that is immigrants without family to sponsor them in Canada, and not applying as refugees) have been assessed on their ability to contribute to Canada's labour market needs via a purportedly neutral point system that numerically weights the occupational and educational skills of applicants. So it is clear that immigration policy has been linked first and foremost to enhancing Canada's economy. Two points should be noted in this regard.

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[15] Ukrainian Community Development Committee-Prairie Region, "Statement of Our People," Building the Future: Ukrainian Canadians in the 21st Century (Edmonton: October 1986), pp. 2-3.

[16] Daiva K. Stasiulis, "The Symbolic Mosaic Reaffirmed: Multiculturalism Policy," in Katherine A. Grahan (ed.), How Ottawa Spends: 1988-89 (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1988), p. 90.

[17] See Yasmeen Abu-Laban, "The Politics of Race and Ethnicity: Multiculturalism as a Contested Arena," in James P. Bickerton and Alain-G. Gagon (eds.), Canadian Politics: An Introduction to the Discipline (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1994): 242-263.

[18] "Backgrounder/ The Multiculturalism Program: The Context for Renewel," Mimeo, p. 2.

First, it is difficult to characterise the point system as completely neutral since in practice it tends to favour class-advantaged male applicants from countries with extensive educational opportunities.[19] In so doing, Canada's immigration policy may be seen to contribute to the so-called "brain-drain" — that is the movement of educated and professional people from the developing to developed world.

Second, while historically Canada was characterised by what John Porter called a "vertical mosaic" whereby there was an overlap between marginalized socio-economic status and minority ethnic origin, today the situation is more complex — particularly for recent immigrants. Because the point system favours applicants with relatively high levels of education and professional credentials, post-1967 immigrants are characterised by a variety of socio-economic statuses. Further, since the 1980s the traditionally marginalized class position of incoming immigrants has been further challenged by the emphasis placed on attracting business immigrants. Over the past ten years, Hong Kong has consistently been the top source country of business immigrants to Canada.[20]

Taking the case of Asian immigrants to Canada is instructive to showing how immigration, multiculturalism, anti-racism and trade have become more sharply linked in recent years. In 1994, the Asia Pacific Foundation, with the support of the Department of Canadian Heritage, produced a report entitled "Asian Canadians: Canada's Hidden Advantage." This report is based on a series of roundtable discussions involving both Asian Canadian and non-Asian Canadian business participants from several Canadian cities. It makes the case that the trade links between Canada and Asia have increased as a result of shifting immigration patterns, to now constitute about twice the trade conducted with European countries. This report also stresses the ways that trade can be even further enhanced. It is notable that one of the points the report makes is that "to develop its Asia Pacific linkages, Canada must become a more receptive "host" society to immigrants from the region."[21] As one example, it was reported that a Toronto-based business executive would consider returning to Hong Kong if his children faced continual racial slurs at school and on the street.[22]

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[19] Yasmeen Abu-Laban, "Keeping 'em Out: Gender, Race and Class Biases in Canadian Immigration Policy." Forthcoming in a book to be entitled Painting the Maple: Essays on Race, and Gender in Canada . Joan Anderson, Avigail Eisenberg, Sherrill Grace and Veronica Strong-Boag (eds.) Vancouver: UBC Press, 1998.

[20] Kathryne Mitchell, "Multiculturalism or the United Colors of Capitalism?" Antipode 25, 4 (1993), p. 267.

[21] Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, and the Department of Canadian Heritage Asian Canadians: Canada's Hidden Advantage (Summary of Roundtable Consultation): November 1994, p. 6.

Broadly stated, over the 1980s and 1990s — from the Mulroney Conservatives to the Chrétien Liberals — a new justification for multiculturalism and anti-racism has emerged: such policies are good for business and good for trade. This justification reflects how in an era of globalization, ascendant neo-liberalism, and state retrenchment, the market is emerging as the supreme yardstick of public initiatives.

To illustrate, in a speech given in 1994, then Secretary of State for Multiculturalism Sheila Finestone stated "Today, for more and more Canadians, multiculturalism means business. . . . In facing the challenges of globalization, Canada must make the most of its 'internal globalization' -- the competitive advantage of a multicultural population."[23] Likewise, under the leadership of Hedy Fry, Secretary of State for Multiculturalism, there is an emphasis on the dollars-and cents benefits to diversity in relation to corporate business strategies in marketing and in international business.[24]

Given these trends, we might expect that the linkage of multiculturalism to business and trade will continue, especially in light of the strategic review of the Canadian federal Multiculturalism program started in 1995 where there has been interest in examining Australia's much more explicit emphasis on multiculturalism in relation to "productive diversity." Now it may be the case that emphasising the economic benefits of multiculturalism can deflect criticism of the policy.[25]

However, an explicit linkage of multiculturalism, immigration and trade also raises some pertinent questions. These include whether a heavy emphasis on economics may lead to a decline in attention to anti-racism; whether minority groups whose home countries do not offer trade opportunities will get less attention; and whether immigration policy will start to favour applicants from countries with the best trading potential.[26] In short, there is a real question about whether the multiculturalism of the market is the same thing as the multiculturalism of justice and respect.[27]

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[22] Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, and the Department of Canadian Heritage Asian Canadians: Canada's Hidden Advantage (Summary of Roundtable Consultation), p. 33.

[23] Address by the Honourable Sheila Finestone (March 4, 1994) in Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, and the Department of Canadian Heritage Asian Canadians: Canada's Hidden Advantage (Summary of Roundtable Consultation): November 1994, pp. 76-78.

[24] Canada, Canadian Heritage, Annual Report on the Operation of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act, 1994-1995 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1996), p. 3.

[25] Karim H. Karim, "Australia's Strategy on Productive Diversity," (Hull: Canadian Heritage, Strategic Research and Analysis, September 1995), p. 11.

[26] Karim, "Australia's Strategy on Productive Diversity," p. 11.

[27] See David Reiff, "Multiculturalism's Silent Partner: It's the Newly Globalized Consumer Economy Stupid," Harper's 287, 1719 (August 1993): 62-72.

Unfortunately, despite the ubiquitous use of the term multiculturalism in Canada (and even abroad) the reality in areas ranging from policing, to housing, to employment, and to the judiciary, is that the ideal of a multiculturalism of justice and respect has yet to be achieved in Canada.

Immigration and Multiculturalism in the Sphere of Culture and Representation

Clearly, both immigration and multiculturalism have played a profound role in shaping Canada culturally, and the effects of this are both national and even international. In particular, it has been observed that in supporting the arts multiculturalism provides stimulation for "hybrid products" that counter "the homogenisation that is one of the results of globalization."[28] Government support to minority artists goes beyond simply 'ethnic festivals' and folklore, and has included such artists as Joseph Skvoretsky whose book translation from Czech to English was supported by Multiculturalism and won the Governor General's prize,[29] and Atom Egoyan, an Armenian-origin filmmaker who has represented Canada at the Cannes Film Festival, and who actually got his first grant from the multiculturalism program .[30]

More broadly, a more diverse population from immigration has in turn led to demands for better representation both numerically or statistically, as well as in terms of values and viewpoints in a host of institutions, including political parties and the House of Commons; the constitution and constitutional negotiations; education; the arts and literature; and employment.

The increased sensitivity to government personnel can be seen to serve Canada abroad. It is interesting to note, as highlighted in the most recent report dealing with multiculturalism, that the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade draws on multiculturalism "to train its employees to be conscious of diverse cultures both in Canada and abroad."[31] In this context, there is regular formal and informal consultation with ethno-cultural groups as well as recruitment of drives — including advertising in the 'ethnic' media — for multilingual employees able to represent Canada, and foster trade links.[32]

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[28] Judy Young, "Immigration, Multiculturalism and the Arts: The Canadian Experience," Speech Delivered at the Berlin Institute for Comparative Social Research international conference ("Migration, Flight and Social Change: An international Symposium on Culture and Development") Berlin: June 24, 1994, p. 1.

[29] Young, "Immigration, Multiculturalism and the Arts: The Canadian Experience," pp. 10-12.

[30] Judy Young, "Immigration, Multiculturalism and the Arts: The Canadian Experience," Speech Delivered at the Berlin Institute for Comparative Social Research international conference ("Migration, Flight and Social Change: An international Symposium on Culture and Development") Berlin: June 24, 1994, p. 11.

[31] Canada, Canadian Heritage, Annual Report on the Operation of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act, 1994-1995 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1996), p. 47.

[32] Canada, Canadian Heritage, Annual Report on the Operation of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act, 1994-1995 p. 48.

In 1994-1995, 17.9% of appointments to the Foreign Officer group were members of visible minorities.[33] The diversity of languages and knowledge about different cultures amongst Canadians is clearly seen to be advantageous in terms of Canada's representation to the larger world community.

Immigration and Multiculturalism and the Sphere of Foreign Policy

Generally speaking, with respect to foreign policy and immigration the links are quite explicit. One of the more documented examples of how immigration policy in Canada has been linked to foreign policy is found in the work of Reg Whitaker who highlights how during the Cold War the security component of the Canadian state facilitated the entry of refugees and immigrants escaping from countries characterised by left wing oppression, in contrast to those who were fleeing right wing dictatorships.[34] In part this related to the concern with preventing left leaning people from entering Canada and thereby quelling labour unrest. For many, this is not viewed as a particularly admirable feature of Canadian immigration history.

However, another side of Canada's immigration history has to do with humanitarianism, which is an explicit feature of immigration policy. Canada was the recipient of the Nansen Medal in 1986, which was presented by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to the Canadian people for their generosity towards the world's refugees. This was the first time that the award had been given to an entire people (as opposed to organisation or individual). This award was testimony to how the international reputation of Canada could be enhanced through immigration and refugee policies.

In contrast to immigration, the linkage between multiculturalism and foreign policy is more tenuous. The most frequent international activity undertaken by the Multiculturalism Program relates to receiving visitors -- such as academics and government officials-- with an interest in the Canadian multiculturalism program.[35]. Now of course, this does not mean that multiculturalism and foreign policy might not have greater linkages.

For instance, there is growing interest on the part of many countries in Canada's knowledge and experience with ethnic diversity immigration and multiculturalism. A recent example of this is seen in the fact that in March of 1996 there was a Canadian delegation that went to Germany to discuss with German officials and other interested parties Canada's diverse experiences in the area of multiculturalism. The feedback from the Germans was "overwhelmingly positive" in this case.[36]

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[33] Canada, Canadian Heritage, Annual Report on the Operation of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act, 1994-1995 p. 48.

[34] See Reg Whitaker, Double Standard: The Secret History of Canadian Immigration (Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys, 1987).

[35] "International Interest in the Area of Multiculturalism," (November 1996), mimeo.

This kind of exchange has led to the suggestion that if well-packaged and presented multiculturalism:

> can become an effective foreign policy tool to broaden awareness of Canada and Canadian policies and approaches, and can be a more visible component of academic relations efforts and efforts to export our literature and visual and performing arts. [37]

Given that currently one of the three key objectives of Canadian foreign policy relates to projecting Canadian values and culture abroad,[38] it is worth seriously considering how multiculturalism may be better harnessed to meet this goal.

Conclusion

Within Canada, particularly over the late 1980s and 1990s, there has been more of an overt negative politicisation and criticism of both immigration and multiculturalism. In this context, there have been calls for abandoning multiculturalism and cutting back immigration. For the most part, these critics in Canada have not considered immigration and multiculturalism in relation the international level. However, in many ways both immigration and multiculturalism have and may in future serve in useful ways in relation to Canada's foreign policy, reputation abroad and humanitarian image.

In addition, the focus on multiculturalism and immigration in relation to the national and international levels also shows the permeability between the boundaries of the so-called domestic and the international. In so doing, it underscores something that is increasingly evident to many social scientists and political scientists: that there is a need to transcend this problematic and artificial dichotomy between so-called 'domestic' versus 'international' phenomena in our analyses because these will only become more blurred in an era of globalization.

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[36] Anne-Marie Moneith, and Adriaan de Hoog, Canadian Embassy, Bonn "Report on Seminars on Multiculturalism," (March 26, 1996) Mimeo p. 1.

[37] Anne-Marie Moneith, and Adriaan de Hoog, "Report on Seminars on Multiculturalism," (March 26, 1996) Mimeo p. 2.

[38] For an overview of Canadian foreign policy direction see Canada, Canada in the World: Government Statement, 1995.

Gerald Dirks

THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURALISM UPON CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

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The invitation to participate in this conference has both flattered and alarmed me. I am flattered to be associated with this gathering of students and scholars and to have the opportunity to visit this fine university and to renew acquaintances. But, I am alarmed, or more accurately, a little anxious because of the topic I have been asked to examine.

While it seems quite reasonable to suggest that the changing ethnic composition of Canadian society has had, and continues to have, impact on the content and direction of this country's foreign policy, there is little if any research that one can turn to substantiate this assertion. Still, if one believes that the process of making public policy in Canada is an open one, and that the policy makers are responsive to societal input, than it does admittedly seem sound to presume that the millions of immigrants that have gained entry to Canada during the past half century have at least had the potential to influence segments of Canada's foreign policy. There is, however, a point of view held by some observers that suggests the policy process may not be particularly open to external influence and that the bureaucracy in charge of policy formulation may not be responsive to outside intervention.

The invitation to attend this conference has at least provided me with the chance to think more about the question of what opportunities immigrant may have had to influence foreign policy. To be truthful, I have at times wondered about the matter when carrying out research into Canada's immigration and refugee policy. Here, I must emphasise that the remarks that follow are really quite preliminary, not especially profound and are not the product of new research on my part. In subsequent paragraphs, I shall briefly provide some background with respect to Canadian immigration policy, discuss what structures and organisations have been developed by immigrants that could be used in an effort to wield influence, and identify a few occasions where some influence on foreign policy appears to have been achieved. Finally, I will touch on the matter of the ethnic composition of the public service responsible for policy formulation and speculate if that has hindered or helped immigrant organisations gain influence.

I.

We are all familiar with the cliché about Canada being a country of immigrants. Except for the two or three percent of Canadians who are aboriginal, all the rest of us or our ancestors, have come from some place else in the past five hundred years. Until the mid nineteen sixties, Britain, the European continent and the United States constituted the primary sources for immigrants to Canada. In the period extending from well before Confederation through to the late nineteen fifties, British immigrants comprised that largest ethnic group entering Canada, serving to strengthen the English presence that constituted the elite in Canada and guaranteed close if not always untroubled relations between Ottawa and London. While the British element was numerically dominant and exerted political and economic influence in Canada until beyond mid century, There have been sizeable movements of immigrants at different times since Confederation from Eastern and Southern Europe. As illustrations, Significant numbers of Italians entered Canada during the nineteen twenties and again during the nineteen fifties and sixties: Portuguese and Greek immigrants arrived in large numbers also during the nineteen fifties, sixties and seventies: while German immigrants were in evidence especially in the quarter century subsequent to World War II. The largest immigration year was 1913 when almost 400,000 newcomers were admitted to Canada while 1957 when 280,000 immigrants reached this country, constituted the second largest year for arrivals. The lowest number of immigrant arrivals not surprisingly was during both World War I and II while in peace time, the depression years of the nineteen thirties saw fewer than 50,000 persons annually reaching this country.

With the exception of several thousand Chinese, and fewer Japanese and Indians from the Asian sub-continent, immigration to Canada through the mid nineteen sixties was entirely white, predominantly Christian and comparatively quick to integrate into Canadian society. The non-whites were truly an anomaly, without political influence and the objects of discriminatory laws and practices, especially but certainly not exclusively in British Columbia. For most immigrants, even the British, there were few if any government assistance schemes to help newcomers adjust to life in a new country. These new arrivals had to be self reliant and if they were to receive any assistance, it most likely came from friends and relatives already in Canada and from co-religionists and ethnic brethren to be found in their churches and in their few social clubs. Immigrants in the pre World War II. era for the most part were not organised, and in no position to have influence on any aspect of public policy.

If there were any efforts to shape policy by newcomers, they were aimed at trying to persuade Ottawa to admit more of their ethnic kin and co-religionists. The most significant effort, and compared to current interest group activities it was not really substantial, was initiated by Canada's small but articulate Jewish community during the years leading up to war in 1939. Canada's Jews urged Ottawa to liberalise immigration regulations so as to facilitate the admission of ethnic brethren seeking to escape the already apparent horrors of Nazi Germany. Their best efforts failed.

In the immediate post World War II era, Eastern European ethnic groups in Canada, frequently spearheaded by their churches, made more deliberate efforts to influence aspects of Canadian foreign policy. For example, immigrant groups spoke out against Canada's quiet acceptance of what these organisations saw as forcible repatriation of their ethnic brethren to their former homelands in Eastern Europe from refugee camps in allied occupied Germany and Italy. Furthermore, Poles in these same years endeavoured to have Canada's government not diplomatically recognise the Soviet establish regime in Warsaw and in other East European countries.

Canada's immigration policy underwent major alterations during the early and mid nineteen sixties. The result of these changes in policy was to radically alter the complexion of immigrant and refugee flows to this country. As of 1967, Canadian immigration policy was officially purged of any forms of racial and ethnic discrimination. Immigrants were to be selected and admitted using a sanitised point system. Applicants as of 1967 were evaluated and awarded points for such characteristics as age, education, job skills fluency in one of Canada's official languages and the like. To ensure the application of the modified immigration policy had a better chance of succeeding, immigration posts were opened in those parts of the world where they had never existed in the past such as in India, Philippines, Egypt, Trinidad and elsewhere.

The effect of the changes and new overseas offices could be seen quickly. Europe, already in decline as a major source of immigrants, was easily surpassed by the Asia-Pacific region, and similar major increases in migrants to Canada ware also noticeable from the Middle East, Latin America and the Caribbean regions. By the beginning of this decade, more than half of all immigrants annually admitted to Canada originated in Asia while the Western hemisphere exclusive of the United States and Africa and the Middle East each provided 15% of the annual arrivals. In the thirty years that the universal immigration policy has been in force, annual intake has varied from a low in the early eighties of 85,000 to the current level which since the early nineties has oscillated between 190,000 and 220,000.

Significant numbers of refugees, as defined by the United Nations, have been among the four million newcomers that have gained entry to Canada during the past three decades. Unlike earlier arrivals, most of these genuine refugees have fled from intolerable conditions in parts of the world beyond Europe. Among the refugees were approximately 8000 Ugandan Asians expelled by President Amin in 1972, a similar number of Chileans escaping the military regime in their country after President Alende's murder in 1973, in excess of 100,000 IndoChinese fleeing from Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia in the late seventies and early eighties, and smaller numbers seeking safety from violence and civil unrest in Lebanon, Central America Somalia and the former Yugoslavia.

Paralleling this liberalised immigration policy was a multiculturalism policy, put in place in the early seventies. The objective of the policy was to encourage and enable immigrants to preserve and protect aspects of their particular culture, language and overall folklore. Immigrants wishing to be recipients of federal government grants to help them achieve the multicultural policy goals required them to establish organisations or associations which were the entities that would be awarded the financial resources. Thus, as a by-product, more immigrant associations came into existence and subsequently gained experience dealing with the government, initially to acquire funds but ultimately in terms of lobbying for various purposes. During the past quarter century, immigrant associations have become increasingly more politically aware and sophisticated in their interest group strategies. Today, organisations representing the views and policy aspirations of broad segments of Canada's foreign born population are gaining influence by collaborating with each other in efforts to gain the attention of government through umbrella councils and federations.

II.

Let me now attempt to identify some of the occasions and issues where immigrants' interests have been heard and where policy-makers may have listened. In general, occasions where immigrant influence on matters of "high politics" were noticeable have been few. Rather, immigrant efforts may have focused more concentrated on items not likely to make the evening television news or newspaper headlines. These could include urging Canada to establish airline links to their homelands, facilitating exports to and imports from countries of origin and striving for reciprocal pension portability between Canada and immigrant homelands.

At times, it appears that the Canadian government is aware of particular immigrant clusters on the electoral map and may seek to acquire support by adopting certain policies. It has, for example, been suggested that Canada's efforts earlier this decade to work for the restoration of democracy in Haiti and the return of President Aristed to his office there was partially the response to a sizeable Haitian community resident in Montreal. There was a by-election in the constituency where many Haitians reside and the pro-Aristed actions by Ottawa, it was felt, certainly would not loose the government of the day any votes.

The presence of tens of thousands of other Caribbean immigrants in southern Ontario may also provide some incentive for continued development assistance funds being made available to the small island states of that region.

During the seventies, the Jewish community in Canada had some success in efforts to influence policy on two occasions. First, Canada had agreed to host a United Nations conference focusing upon terrorism and organised crime to take place in Toronto. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation was to attend with the status of an observer, a condition deplored by Canada's organised and well connected Jewish community. As the result of a strong lobbying effort, the invitation to the UN conference organisers was rescinded. The second occasion came about during the 1979 general election campaign when the Progressive Conservatives indicated a willingness to move Canada's embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, an action that the Party hoped would win support from Canada's Jews, frequently known to traditionally vote Liberal. The PCs did form a minority government following the election but when initial exploratory steps were undertaken to investigate the ramifications of moving the embassy, Arab states indicated they would impose economic sanctions on this country if the action occurred. After more study, the matter was dropped.

Immigrants from the same homeland are not always united on how they believe Canada's foreign policy should be pursued. Chinese Canadians adopted contrasting positions when representatives of China visited this country in the years following the 1989 Tianneman Square massacre. Similarly a decade earlier, when the then President of Pakistan visited Canada, immigrants from that country held contrasting views as to how he should be received by Ottawa.

Diplomatically recognising a government in exile or providing support for secessionist movements abroad have from time to time been issues on which immigrant groups have sought to acquire influence. During the years immediately following World War II, Ukrainians in this country urged the Government of Canada to do everything in its power to help their homeland resist Moscow's authority and gain independence from the Soviet Union. While Canada chose to remain quite on this issue at the time, Prime Minister Diefenbaker, a decade later, frequently spoke out, particularly during election campaigns, against Soviet oppression in East and Central Europe. Similarly, for more than thirty years, immigrants from the Baltic states, occupied and absorbed by the Soviet Union during World War II, constantly requested Ottawa to publicly support their efforts to acquire independence once again. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania did at last gain the long sought after autonomy only when the Soviet Union began to disintegrate. Then, Canada did recognise these newly independent countries.

Ottawa has tended to co-operate with immigrant organisations on humanitarian and family reunification matters. The government has made arrangements with immigrant associations with respect to the bringing to Canada of ethnic brethren when homelands were ravaged by civil unrest or natural disasters. On many occasions, these programs are aimed at providing assistance for genuine refugees. In the past ten years alone, agreements have been signed between Ottawa and voluntary associations to care for and maintain varying numbers of refugees from Poland, Somalia, Croatia, and Bosnia.

There will undoubtedly continue to be many occasions when immigrant groups will strive to acquire influence in specific issue areas. Yet, as fiscal constraints within all sectors of government activity intensify, including in the Department of Foreign Affairs, their efforts may be somewhat marginalized. Canada may limit its international involvement and seek out particular niches in which this country may have special capabilities and interests. Some of the concerns in future that immigrants may feel strongly about may not be relevant to or coincide with these particular niches. The need to establish policy priorities, then, may significantly limit or minimise how involved Canada remains in certain issue areas. For example, Canada has taken no stand with respect to events in Chechnya or, some critics would suggest, in East Timor either.

I began by suggesting that assuming immigrant or any other non-governmental organisation could have influence over policy rested on another assumption: namely, that the policy process, itself, was an open one. Some Canadian academics, believe such an assumption is questionable. I, too, share the view that at the very best, societal pressure may set the parameters inside which policy is arrived at and beyond which government actions will not go. I suggest that seldom does interest group activity propel an issue on to Canada's foreign policy agenda that would not have appeared there in any case. Immigrant groups, like other associations, may from time to time strive to influence foreign policy content and initiatives. Their ability to achieve this, however, is really rather limited.

Let me close with a final thought. Could the ethnic composition of senior and middle level public servants in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade have had any possible impact on policy? One might even look at the ethnic origins of the Ministers responsible for foreign policy over the past half century. The question might also relate to the Ministers responsible for Canada's immigration policy over this same period. All the Ministers holding these portfolios since the end of World War II. have been of English or French decent except for Sergio Marchi, who had responsibility for immigration between 1993 when the Chretien government took office and 1996, when he was shuffled into Environment Canada. Similarly, the under-secretaries in the Department of External Affairs, now Foreign Affairs and International Trade, have been almost exclusively of English or French origin. Should any conclusions be drawn from that? Would senior policy-makers with different ethnic origins have pursued different policies? Would political masters and their chief bureaucratic advisors been more sensitive to immigrant interests if they, themselves, had been from that segment of Canada's society? During the past quarter century, the exclusively male bastions of policy-making have given way to a rising number of capable women who now also play a major role in policy formulation. One might be safe in presuming that we are certain to also find more non-English and non-French policy-makers occupying positions of influence in future.

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Economic Dimensions of Canada's Pacific and European Relations

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ON BUILDING A PACIFIC LEAGUE: TEAM CANADA PLAYS A FEW EXHIBITION GAMES

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Introduction

Canadians are not utter idealists, or voluntarists. No one who contemplates the construction of a community or nation in the midst of such space, and in the face of an occasionally (perennially?) hostile nature, could be. Nor, on the other hand, are Canadians content simply to be shaped and driven by forces external to will, consensus, and co-operation. It is in this sense then that we can understand better Donald Smiley's observation that Canada is a specifically political entity, not one which is founded in myths of origin, etc., grounded in ideology, geography, ethnicity or nationalism. It is, in part, an expression of political will against daunting odds. It is, at the same time, sadly ironic, therefore, that the question of Canadian sovereignty is so much in question [Russell 1993].

Canadian political culture can, therefore, be captured between the contending forces of *virtu* and *fortuna*, agency and structure, constraints and the will to overcome them. While there is ample evidence that Canadian political culture is undergoing some substantial change [Nevitte 1996], at the same time certain core elements seem to remain in place, at least among the public, if not among the political elite (such as is revealed in numerous Ekos polls in recent years).

In foreign policy, this shifting accommodation of will and structure produced a middle-power, multilateral, internationalist tradition which was admirable in its dedication to process, compromise, and diplomacy; but a process which seemed aimed at no purpose informed by either interest or higher ideal [Stairs 1973]. Canadian idealism as "higher purpose", and the articulation of Canadian interest, were cut to fit the cloth of practicability.

The post-war construction of a world order grounded in the principles of multilateralism and embedded liberalism suited this pragmatic Canadian political culture very well [on Canada's multilateral tradition see Keating, on embedded liberalism see Ruggie 1982, and Keenes 1992]. Multilateralism and its companion, the strategy of counterweights, offered Canadian diplomats opportunities and reasons to participate in a variety of venues. This was a useful means of affirming the external sovereignty to which the country had slowly acceded [Nossal 1996], bolstered the post-war state-building process, and underpinned the post-war social contract. Multilateralism also served to counterbalance, the tugs of waxing and waning hegemony (British and American). Embedded liberalism too offered a flexible conceptual space to negotiate protection from and accession to the emerging geopolitical and political-economic order after the war. Embedded liberalism was, therefore, also a discursive space convenient for the reconciliation of the interests of the national and international fractions of Canada's capitalist class.

In this paper I propose to defend the contention that there has been significant change in these familiar parameters of Canadian foreign policy. Whereas in the past Canada embraced multilateralism in part because it sought to be a "world power", I shall argue that Canada is weakening its commitment to the comparatively cosmopolitan internationalism which was concomitant to this multilateralism. Canada is acquiring a regional identity, and a more utilitarian foreign policy ethic as a result. This "choice" was undertaken principally by business interests in pursuit of accommodation to changes in the structure of the international political economy. I will argue that whereas under the old familiar parameters of Canadian foreign policy a broadly-based Pacific strategy would have been a reasonably viable strategy in the more ambitious terms that some of its proponents might wish, I will argue that, as a result of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and NAFTA, Canada has been committed as a country of the Americas, and that Atlantic and Pacific strategies will remain of marginal importance, except insofar as they are indirect offshoots of the North American vocation.

I shall endeavour to show why this is the case by drawing upon insights provided by a Coxian analysis of international political economy. In the next part of the paper I will briefly review Robert Cox's Gramscian-based approach, and then provide illustration of how some of Cox's works have been used in analysis of Canadian foreign policy. I will then extend this analysis to consideration of Canada's Pacific economic strategy.

Cox's Gramscian Theory of International Political Economy

The first thing to emphasise about Cox's work, the so-called Italian school (for Cox's use in particular of Gramsci and Vico), is its dialectic. Cox warns on the one hand against the seduction of totality, that "contemplation of undivided totality may lead to profound abstraction or mystical revelations" [Cox 1986, p. 204], whether that totality is of a Hegelian, Crocean, or Marxian type. On the other hand, the fragmentary appropriation of reality expressed in the subdivisions of knowledge is a result of practice and convention, and therefore contingent. "Subdivisions of social knowledge thus may roughly correspond to the way in which human affairs are organised in particular times and places. They may, accordingly, appear to be increasingly arbitrary when practices change" [Cox 1986, p. 204]. Thus, politics, economics, sociology, culture and aesthetics, perhaps even nature itself, are expressions of convenience in appropriating knowledge of a larger whole, of an undivided totality,[1] not ontologically distinct realms, ruled by their distinct laws, expressed in their own distinct theories. The conduct of theorisation and analysis involves relating parts to wholes, the practices which produce that dialectic, and the processes which produce change.

The second thing to emphasise about Cox's work is that it is a critical theory. "Theory is always for someone and for some purpose," Cox notes in one of his best-known phrases. "The world is seen from a standpoint definable in terms of nation or social class, of dominance or subordination, of rising or declining power, of a sense of immobility or of present crisis, of past experience, and of hopes and expectations for the future. ... When any theory so presents itself, it is the more important to examine its ideology, and to lay bare its concealed perspective" [Cox 1986, p. 204]. A central purpose of theorisation then is to examine the effects of power on the mind's confrontation with reality and the production of concepts and theory; that is, ideology and consciousness.

Critical theory is thus contrasted with positivism and problem-solving theory. The latter "takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action [Cox 1986, p. 208]. Here the subdivisions of knowledge remain in their de-contextualized state. "The strength of the problem-solving approach lies in its ability to fix limits or parameters to a problem area and to reduce the statement of a particular problem to a limited number of variables which are amenable to relatively close and precise examination" [Cox 1986, p. 208]. Critical theory on the other hand "stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about" [Cox 1986, p. 208][2]. Cox argues that problem-solving theory is unavoidably conservative, "since it aims to solve the problems arising in various parts of a complex whole", belying its claim to being value-free. Critical theory, which may subsume problem-solving theory, is aimed at fostering self-consciousness about structures of power, about the justice of the stakes which stakeholders bring to the table, and presumes to give aid and comfort to dissent and resistance. "Critical theory allows for a normative choice in favour of a social and political order different from the prevailing order, but it limits the range of choice to alternative orders which are feasible transformations of the existing world" [Cox 1986, p. 210].

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1 Note: Cox is not denying that there is a "reality out there", knowledge of which can be appropriated. This is a difference which divides critical theorists and "post-modernists"; see the useful essays by Steve Smith and Andrew Linklater in Smith [1996].

2 Critical theory has been attacked on this point, posing the difficult question as to how, precisely, critical theorists arrogate to themselves the apparently super-human capacity to stand apart from the world. Some feminists, for example, note that critical theory fails to stand apart from its androcentrism.

A third important contribution of Cox's work is his specifically Gramscian deployment of the concept of hegemony. In this usage, Cox does not mean the simple notion of a capabilities-based deployment of power or domination (the Realist version) or of ideological leadership (a liberal form). Rather, by hegemony Cox means the engineering of the consent of the majority to the unjust rulership of the minority, in the (class) interest of the minority. Gramsci developed the concept of hegemony to analyse the distinctive manner in which the bourgeoisie in Western Europe sustained their rulership through civil society, compared with the more centralised, state-based repression of the East European regimes. He also explored through the concept of hegemony the opportunity for the Italian working class to organise a counter-hegemonic "war of position" within bourgeois civil society, rather than attempt to organise a Bolshevik-style "war of movement" and dictatorship of the proletariat.

Cox writes of hegemony in a global context:

> Hegemony is used here in the Gramscian meaning of a structure of values and understandings about the nature of order that permeates a whole society, in this case a world society composed of states and non-state corporate entities. In a hegemonic order these values and understandings are relatively stable and unquestioned. They appear to most actors as the natural order of things. They are the intersubjective meanings that constitute the order itself. Such a structure of meanings is underpinned by a structure of power, in which most probably one state is dominant but that state's dominance is not sufficient by itself to create hegemony. Hegemony derives from the ways of doing and thinking of the dominant social strata of the dominant state or states insofar as these ways if doing and thinking have inspired emulation or acquired the acquiescence of the dominant strata of other states. These social practices and the ideologies that explain and legitimise them constitute the foundation of the hegemonic order. Hegemony forms thought and thereby circumscribes action [Cox 1992, p.179].

Thus, for Cox, hegemony is one among a number of forms of power, a means by which the ruling class, or fractions of the ruling class, may dominate the majority of workers and other groupings, through means other than direct repression or coercion exercised through the state. Hegemony is exercised through civil society, the economy, culture, and world order. Hegemony, and its associated concept of *trasformismo* "worked to co-opt potential leaders of subaltern social groups. By extension trasformismo can serve as a strategy of assimilating and domesticating potentially dangerous ideas by adjusting them to the policies of the dominant coalition and can thereby obstruct the formation of class-based organised opposition to established social and political power" [Cox

1986, p. 166-7]. It is clear, then, that the purpose of critical theory is to reveal the unjust purposes and effects of a hegemonic order, to raise self-consciousness about this form of domination, and offer the opportunity for (bounded) counter-hegemonic praxis.

For Cox, hegemony in a social formation, be it national or global, means the historically contingent coherence of a structure composed of power or material capabilities (what in classical Marxism we might call the forces of production, technology, resources and capital), ideas (culture, mythology, meanings of justice and the public good), and institutions. This institutional dimension is particularly important for Cox's approach to the study of international relations, as his focus of attention is often on the role of international organisations in mediating and legitimising the hegemony of Britain and America, and as a context for organising counter-hegemonic consensus, such as in the ILO.

Cox's work is a theoretical expression of the more general (or metatheoretical) approach to structuration introduced by Anthony Giddens. History is produced by the friction between groups acting together (agency) against the shaping and constraining effects of structure [on Giddens and his work as applied to international relations, see Wendt 1987]. "In this approach, human institutions are made by people - not by the individual gestures of 'actors' but by collective responses to a collectively perceived problematic that produce certain practices. Institutions and practices are therefore to be understood through the changing mental processes of their makers" [Cox 1986, p. 242].

Sometimes, Cox's work seems somewhat "idealist", emphasising the "superstructural" regions of his theory (the ideas and institutional aspects). However, in other work, his Marxism is rather more orthodox, emphasising material production and production relations. Indeed, for Cox, starting at the beginning means asserting the centrality of production and class [Cox 1987]. He finds two world hegemonic orders, the British and American, grounded in distinctive production systems and class hegemonies, an intervening period between the world wars in which hegemony was absent, and fragmentation and crisis in American hegemony beginning in the early 1970s.

For Cox, production in the economies of dominant countries becomes connected through world systems of production, exchange, investment and finance. The dominant sectors of these countries linked to a world economy comprise a historic bloc, connected through mutual interests, ideology and networks. An incipient world society grows up around the inter-state system, and states themselves become internationalised, in that their principal bureaucracies and policies transmit, interpret and reproduce the rhythms of the world order.[3] In non-hegemonic phases of world order, production, social classes, states and ideologies have been oriented toward protection, insulation, and promotion of national wealth, power and production, grounded in a national bourgeoisie [Cox 1987, p. 7-8].

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[3] It is this process of the internationalization of the post-war Canadian state which has been the focus of my own work [Keenes 1992/93].

Again, in a number of works, Cox has underlined the importance of multilateralism and international organisation in contributing to the legitimisation of the post-war order, centred in the United States. Cox argues that the post-war period, until the collapse of the Bretton Woods arrangements in 1971, was one in which the United States economy became an open, worldly economy, the European economies revived within broadly Keynesian and embedded liberal parameters, and were linked to global networks of multinational corporate production systems, broadly Fordist principles of production, and universal institutions centred on the United Nations. "[E]conomic multilateralism," Cox writes, "meant the structure of world economy most conducive to capital expansion on a world scale; and political multilateralism meant the institutionalised arrangements made at the time and those conditions for inter-state co-operation on common problems; ... political multilateralism had as a primary goal the security and maintenance [the organisation of consent] to economic multilateralism" [Cox 1992, p. 162].

With the accelerating pace of globalization and the internationalisation of production in the 1970s began the erosion of the *pax Americana* and of the order which rested upon it. Multilateralism was replaced by unilateralism on the part of the U.S., or dominance by a directorate of Western and regional powers. States no longer mediate effectively between "inside" and "outside", but act to organise the compliance of inside with the requirements of globalized "hyperliberalism" [Cox 1991]. The erosion of embedded liberalism and the rise of globalization and hyperliberalism have brought in their wake post-modernism, nationalism, religious fundamentalism, tribalisms, populism, ecological threats, social movements of various kinds, social, economic and political polarisation, and vast human migrations, among other expressions of the absence of hegemony and crisis.

How might the dialectical worm turn again? What are the potential new orders which can be identified within the crumbling of the old? Cox arrays a number of possibilities:

1. U.S. revival; unilateralism, not hegemony
2. Plurilateral oligarchy; a concert of powers
3. New hegemony; *pax Nipponica*
4. Regional rivalries
5. Counter-hegemony; perhaps via a revived UNGA
6. No order; neo-medievalist
7. Post-hegemonic; a search for common ground among world civilisations

Notwithstanding the gaps which can be found in Cox's ambitious, voluminous work, it offers great appeal. In place of a wholesale rejection of well-known approaches to analysis, Cox draws on Realism, Liberalism and Marxism and shows how they can be made more fruitful through adopting a critical stance. From Realism he saves the insight into the importance of power from arid positivism and ahistoricism; he appropriates ideas, institutions and culture from Liberalism; and he combines them with a number of Marxian insights, in particular the critical theory and a nuanced expression of hegemony.

Coxian Interpretations of Canadian Foreign Policy

Robert Cox's Gramscian-inspired approach to international political economy directs us to look to the economy (material production, class relations, wealth creation), the state and the institutions of states systems, and ideas and culture, for explaining and understanding foreign policy and world politics. The scope for empirical analysis is therefore very wide. So in this context I shall have to be somewhat brazenly selective in my historical recapitulation.

In that spirit, permit me to summarise the analysis I intend to pursue this way: the key to understanding Canadian middle power diplomacy is the organisation of the Canadian state and of the dominant class. The success of Canadian middle power diplomacy in the 1950s and 1960s, the so-called Golden Age, was the result of a relatively organised and purposeful foreign policy bureaucracy, and a dominant class disorganised among contending factions.[4] The period of intense debate in Canadian foreign policy about the nature of the structural changes in the international political economy in the 1970s and 1980s marked a period of increased disorganisation within the state, and greater organisation in the dominant class. It is this pattern of shifting organisational frameworks, prompted by structural changes "abroad", which "produced" the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and NAFTA, and "produced" the cultural and ideological changes referred to above.

David Black and Claire Sjolander, in their Coxian account of Canadian multilateralism, note that for "Canadian statesmen, there were two proximate disasters to be avoided in the post-war era" [Black and Sjolander 1996, p. 11], the scourge of war and the scourge of depression, which the multilateral fora of NATO, the UN, and other functional agencies were tasked with addressing. There were, however, significant other purposes with which Canadian diplomats freighted the multilateral system. These included:

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[4] For a broader approach to Canadian industrial policy networks which portrays disorganized state and private interest networks see Atkinson and Coleman (1989), and Howlett and Ramesh (1992), ch. 9.

- stifling the still-alive U.S. instincts to isolationism;
- diverting the danger of U.S.-U.K. condominium (the so-called dumbbell theory);
- extinguishing the (few) British voices still calling for a revival of empire;
- bolstering Canadian claims for foreign policy autonomy;
- even, perhaps, of persuading a sceptical world of Canada's status as the greatest of the small powers, if not the smallest of the great;
- confirming Canada's exit from the isolationist instinct of Mackenzie King;
- pressing the case for participatory universalism in the post-war institutions

All of these reasons and purposes for middle power multilateralism are familiar to the liberal internationalist account of Canadian foreign policy in the Golden Age. I wish, however, to add another, one suggested by the Gramscian approach outlined above. The Canadian state (in this case the small and, within limits like-minded officials in the foreign policy bureaucracy) pursued an aggressive middle power policy to ensure Canada participated in, and was not simply part of, what Kies van der Pyl has called the making of the Atlantic ruling class [van der Pyl 1984]. The suggestion here is that the Canadian bourgeoisie, notoriously divided between a nationalist manufacturing and services fraction and an international/continental staples fraction, which was politically unworldly (at best), could not be relied upon to ensure Canada's appropriate participation in the Atlantic-centred world economy under construction after the war. Thus, the Canadian state was somewhat autonomous in negotiating Canada's place in the world, but within the structured parameters of Canada's place in the international division of labour and Canadian class structure.

There was, however, a contradiction at the heart of this arrangement, waiting to come to fruition. The multiple meanings and purposes layered over Canada's multilateral, middle-power, strategy [see Black and Sjolander 1996; Neufeld 1995], and the relative cohesion and autonomy which the Canadian foreign policy bureaucracy enjoyed in the 1950s and 1960s [Keenes 1992/93], left much distance between what Cox identified as the state and economic regions. While the state was pursuing a diplomatic and commercial policy strategy which was consistent with a broadly global international economic strategy for Canada (such as within the GATT), the market, production relations, and the bourgeoisie was deepening Canada's integration into a continental economic system [Black and Sjolander 1996, p. 14]. The multiple meanings with which the myths of Canadian multilateralism was freighted, the technical character of the GATT-centred multilateral system, the flexibility of embedded liberalism, and economic growth, all served to reconcile the divergent paths being taken by the state and its participation in international organisation, and the culture and expectations growing in production relations and in the dominant class.

The strains growing within this structure made themselves visible in the 1970s when the technical-rational discourse of international political economy (so-called low politics), became high politics and strategic. As Black and Sjolander [1996, p. 14] put it:

> ...while the Canadian government continued to work for and within multilateral structures, it was also confronted with an ever-deepening dependence on American trade and investment. As a result it was involved throughout this period in instances of continental bilateralism which ran counter to the discourse of multilateralism. From the wartime Hyde Park Agreement, through secret negotiations for a trade reciprocity agreement in 1947-48, the Defence Production Sharing Agreement in 1958, and the Auto Pact in 1965, Canadian governments married their emphasis on multilateralism to a lower key but growing tendency towards economic bilateralism. The tensions between a notionally open and universal multilateral order and an increasingly selective, indeed exclusive, set of trading arrangements [only just reconciled in GATT Art. 24], heightened with the "collapse" of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s.

More broadly, by the end of the 1960s the basis of a stable American-centred hegemony were eroding. The expectation of continued economic growth and advancing productivity, the monetary and financial basis, came into question. East-West détente robbed the Soviet threat of its mobilising efficiency [Neufeld 1995, p. 14-15], and race riots, Vietnam protests, and the counter-culture more generally raised questions about the cultural and ideological pillars upon which U.S.-centred hegemony rested.

I have detailed elsewhere my account of the strategic, tactical, and organisational "debates" which took place in Canada in the 1970s, as the state responded to these changes [Keenes 1992, 1995]. I won't rehearse them in detail again here. I will only underline the main organisational point. Whereas for most of the post-war period the state was reasonably organised and purposeful as to foreign economic policy, the dominant class was not so well-organised, and was content to let the state exercise it relative autonomy and interest. In the 1970s, however, the tables were turned. The state grew in size and complexity to attempt to address the interdependence agenda, and the bourgeoisie got its act together.

In particular, the failure of the Third Option to exercise the scope intended by its authors, its failure to garner the full authority of the state, the failure of the European Framework Agreement to effect anything other than niche impact, and the defeat of "industrial strategy", marked a major set of reversals for those who would see the state lead Canada's response to global change.[5]

Deeper continental relations of economic integration were matched by growing continental institutional and ideological linkages. The Canadian Manufacturers' Association set aside its historic support for tariff protection and embraced free trade, and the formation of the Business Council on National Issues assured that big capital would speak out purposefully, defending continental integration. The ignominy of the manner of Canada's joining of the G-7 gave further testimony to the new status of Canada as North American second banana, albeit at the top table of the plurilateral directorate [Black and Sjolander 1996, p. 17; see also Ernst 1992; Langille 1987; Williams 1994]. Reports by the Economic Council and the Senate endorsing market-centred strategies were further evidence that the ruling Liberal party was divided.

The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement is seen in this light not as the start of something new, or the cause of Canada's changed role in the world. It is seen rather as the result of changes in production relations, institutional connections, and ideological adjustments which had been taking place somewhat inchoately for ten to twenty years. The agreement, and its NAFTA extension, encodes the hegemonic realignment of production relations, state and ideology which were seen when the IPE shifted in the 1970s. The negotiation, the agreement, and the election legitimised (within the rules of the game governing Canadian electoral democracy) the victory in the struggle over the values which had been "debated" for a decade or more.

Michael Hart, one of the agreement's principal negotiators and proponents has argued that "Over the years, Canadians have made a cult out of a perpetual national identity crisis, seeking to be a European nation, an Atlantic nation, a Pacific nation, and even an Arctic nation - anything but what we are, a nation of the Americas [Hart 1991, p. 83]. This view would seem to have been given some small measure of official endorsement. In a discussion of the waxing of post-Cold War regionalism, the Parliamentary committee reviewing Canadian foreign policy states

> Thus, globalization seems to be accompanied by a trend toward continentalization. Where does Canada fit into this picture? There used to be a time when Canada was called a regional power without a region. No more. With its membership in NAFTA Canada is now part of the evolving North American region, and should realistically be looking forward to the

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[5] I believe close research will reveal that similar debates, and similar reversals, were experienced in many other states. In particular, in Europe, I suspect that such debates may have forged the basis for the revival European economic integration in the 1980s.

prospect of becoming part of a region spanning the Americas [Parliamentary Committee Report, p. 77-8].

The Parliamentarians go on to note that Canada has economic, political and security interests to pursue elsewhere. But the primary vocation, if not the identity of Canada, seems to reside in the Western Hemisphere. The implication of this for foreign policy is that, whereas in the past the state and diplomacy were engaged in the creation and exploitation of counterweights ("agency") against "structures" (such as against the weight of the market pressing towards continentalization, for example), the restructuring of interest and identity suggest a greater willingness to accommodate markets and other structural features of international relations. It is in this context, then, that the prospects for a Pacific strategy can be considered.

On Building Bridges, or a Community, in the Pacific

In the post-World War II era, Canada's participation in the international division of labour, and the regimes regulating the international political economy, did much to shape and alter the parameters of Canada's domestic political economy. In the 1950s and 1960s Canadian capital deepened and broadened its continental relationships under the aegis of an otherwise multilateral framework of norms, principles and rules, to the construction of which the Canadian state was a not insignificant contributor. This multilateral framework did much, in turn, to establish the parameters of the post-war Canadian political economy and social formation. In the 1980s Canada codified the norms, principles and rules of its principal bilateral relationship in the Canada-U.S. FTA. It did so, in some substantial part, for the purpose of altering the parameters of the domestic political economy put in place after the war. As Michael Hart observed, "the most important, if least publicised [objective of the FTA] was to effect domestic economic reform by eliminating, at least for trade with the United States, the last vestiges of Sir John A. Macdonald's National Policy and to restrain the use of more subtle new instruments of protection" [Hart 1991, p. 96-7]. But another hoped-for effect of the FTA was to assist Canadian firms (the ones which survived the cold shower of new competition) to be more globally aggressive and competitive. Furthermore, Canada recently signed trade agreements with Israel and Chile, and concluded an agreement with the European Union, one which presumably updates and replaces the 1970s Framework Agreement. Canada this year takes up the chair of the APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation) forum. In light of the analytical framework used here, how can we assess the prospects for this new multilateralism in general, and the Pacific initiative in particular?

Many good reasons have been put forward for Canada to build bridges across the Pacific, or to contribute to community-building in the region [see Job and Langdon 1993]:

- the advancing of Canadian trade, production, investment, and financial interests through the promotion of open regional economic systems;
- the maintenance of security and stability through the promotion of peaceful means of dispute resolution;
- the advancement of habits of good governance, such as democracy and transparency, the protection and promotion of human rights;
- the promotion of prosperity and economic growth;
- the promotion of environmentally sustainable development practices;
- the promotion of ethnic and cultural diversity, of recognising and celebrating the contribution to Canadian culture of Canada's Pacific identity.

Efforts have been undertaken at many levels to press Canada's case for participation in Asia-Pacific initiatives at bridge-building and the forging of a Pacific community. The most important was that launched by Joe Clark in 1990, the North Pacific Co-operative Security Dialogue [Henderson 1992/93]. This NPCSD was designed to secure for Canada a role in the early stages of regional security community explorations in the flush of post-Cold War enthusiasm. Pacific-related initiatives under the Mulroney government, coming under the rubric of the expanded concept of security reflected a wider range of issues and concerns, such as environment, human rights and good governance.

It is apparent that the Chrétien government, in lowering expectations about what the Canadian government can and will try to do, has forged the Team Canada approach to focus on promoting Canada's national economic interests in the region. The leap of faith here is that in the wake of economic interdependence, all other good things will follow. Indeed, however, far from promoting democratic culture in China via trade and interdependence, some in Canada are concerned that the weight of influence is going the other way. Commenting on the failure of the Chrétien government to protect environmental values in the sale of a CANDU reactor to China, Elizabeth May has commented, "Chrétien always said that trade would make countries like China more democratic. But we are not making China more democratic. China is making us less democratic" [Globe and Mail, Fri. Nov. 8, 1996].

Aside from ongoing state-diplomatic contacts across the Pacific, and the continuing contacts that result from immigration flows, arguably the main bridge-building effort has been undertaken by academics and a small number of business operators. Lawrence Woods has reported useful research into the policy community of liberal economists, business people, and state officials organised since the 1960s in the PAFTAD (Pacific Trade and Development Conference), PBEC (Pacific Basin Economic Council), and the PECC (Pacific Economic Co-operation Council). "This effort [the coordination of meeting schedules of groups such as these] provides further evidence that groups such as PAFTAD, PBEC, and

PECC have a collective importance in the sense that attempts are made to ensure a continuous and regular circulation of elites who frequently participate in more than one of these organisations" [Woods 1993, p. 54]. Furthermore, as Woods also notes, in this policy community "marginalization of the labour, environmental and human rights communities persists" [Woods 1994, p. 442].

Sylvia Ostry has observed, "There is no 'nesting' of economic and security regimes [in the Pacific] as was the case after the Second World War, and no agreed definition of the public good of comprehensive security. In the Asia Pacific, the key agent of integration has been commerce" [Ostry 1996, p. 8].

If Ostry (and the Canadian government, it seems) is right,[6] that is, that they key agent of integration is commerce, how well is Canada equipped to participate in the construction project? Now, it is incontestable that much cheer-leading by the leading lights of the business class points out the opportunities in Asia. But, as Frank Langdon notes, there is good reason to be sceptical. "Canada does face some domestic obstacles to increasing its Pacific presence. One is its comparatively passive role in its Asia trade. The trade has been developed largely at Asians' initiative in their search for resources for manufacturing and markets for their output" [Langdon 1995, p. 394].[7]

The same argument has been made vividly by Charles McMillan. He too wonders whether "Canada's Asian presence is really the reflection of an Asian strategy to build a presence in North America via trade, immigration and investment" [McMillan 1995, p. 103]. He argues further that the vast bulk of the Canadian business class is locked into a regional North American strategy and, moreover, that it is unlikely that continental rationalisation will serve as the basis for a wider Canadian perspective.

> Most Canadian chief executive officers and bankers do not see Japan, or Asia, or China, as a central feature of their corporate strategy. ... Regionalization, not globalization, is the de facto approach of Canadian industry. Canadian big business, for all their rhetoric, has not learned to play the global game.

The argument offered here, then, is this: In the past, the Canadian state (in this case the foreign policy bureaucracy) took the lead in forging a wide range of global (multilateral, if you prefer) contacts, institutionalised in different forms - universal in the UN agencies, the bilateral with Europe, Japan, Israel, or the NICs initiative undertaken by Jean-Luc Pepin and some of his colleagues in the 1970s and early 1980s. But, by and large, Canadian capitalists have been uninterested, and the strategies were of marginal economic importance (although they may have had political or cultural significance). Niche sectors and some agricultural commodities apart, Canada's capitalists suffered under what Mel Watkins once called the staples trap, resting their hopes on the U.S., and now North American markets. As Andrew Griffith very perceptively observed, "Canada is a trading nation. Yet we are not a nation of traders. Seventy per cent of Canadian companies do not export, fewer than 100 firms account for 70 per cent of our export trade. Nearly 100 years of government services and programs to encourage trade has not changed the paradox of a trading nation bereft of a trading culture" [Griffith 1992/93, p. 61]. This is a judgement recently confirmed in a report on the Canadian economy by the WTO, a report which found that "only 50 companies currently account for close to half of merchandise exports. Many of those are the U.S. owned automotive companies that dominate exports from Canada" [Globe and Mail, Wed. Nov. 20, p. B6; see also McMillan 1995]. There is some reason to believe that the effects hoped to result from the FTA are occurring: that more Canadian firms are exporting; that more of these firms are exporting outside of staples industries, in merchandise and services sectors; that more of these firms are small and medium-sized, rather than vertically-integrated multinationals; that more investment and global partnerships are being forged. However, it is not at all clear that the reason this may be starting to happen has anything to do with the logic of the FTA, or that much of it is happening outside of North America. Even in British Columbia, the province which can be expected to have the biggest stake in economic connections to the Pacific Rim, export growth to the United States remains greater than that to the Pacific.

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[6] But note Paul Evans cautionary note in the same publication, "Any state that wishes to be seen as a credible player in the region must have an integrated approach which takes seriously conflict management, shared prosperity, and good governance, as well as economic growth."

[7] For a more detailed analysis making a similar point see Ursaki and Vertinsky (1996).

In short, if the Canada-U.S. FTA and the NAFTA are to have the impact which their proponents hoped for them - not only to secure access to the U.S. market, but to rationalise the Canadian economy and revitalise Canadian participation in a globalizing world economy - we must have competent capitalists. However, Canadian capitalists are only marginally and fitfully interested in bridge-building, much less than community-building, to the Pacific. And, to the extent that they are, the players are large concerns contending for global status, Canada's aspiring multinationals [Chow 1993], unlikely to be diverted by concerns for "security" other than those which secure their property rights and a measure of transparency in governance. If the Canadian government maintains its current stance of apparent diffidence towards broader concepts implied in community-building, little can be expected from the efforts being made by NGOs to promote the broader security agenda.

Conclusion

Just as there are, apparently, significant differences between most Canadians and the economic and political elite on the agenda and expectations of

Canadian politics more generally, there is, apparently, a stark gulf between the hopes and expectations for Canadian foreign policy between the foreign policy elite and those Canadians who take more than a passing interest in the subject. The gulf was clearly inscribed in the recent documents reviewing Canadian foreign policy. Following extensive consultations with Canadians across the country Parliamentarians on the defence and foreign policy committees reported back that they heard from Canadians that they wanted Canadian defence and foreign policy to reflect deep moral concerns.

> A common thread in the testimony we heard ... was that Canada's defence policy, and thus military activities and commitments, must reflect our values as a country. Now there was of course some difference of opinion over what those values are, or should be. But the moral dimension of the military vocation is inescapable, and thus quite unlike many of the functions we take for granted in government. If we are to put our sons and daughters into harm's way, there has to be a reason, a good reason. Like those who appeared as witnesses before us, the Committee believes that the purposes to which we put our military forces speak eloquently about our goals and values [Defence Committee report, p. 20-21].

> Foreign policy matters to Canadians. They have deeply-rooted values that they carry over into the role they want Canada to play. ... Throughout our hearings we were struck by the moral convictions and idealism of the Canadians who testified. ... Canadians' sense of their own self-worth depends on seeing their country playing a role in the world of which they can be proud [Foreign Policy Committee report, p. 1, 6].

However, these deep concerns that Canadian foreign and defence policy promote a cosmopolitan or internationalist ethic was, in the committees' recommendations, and in the foreign policy white paper, submerged within a deeply confused and incoherent discourse of "security", and came out the other end as justification for a policy of economic and cultural nationalism [I have set out this argument in detail in Keenes (1996)].

In this paper I have argued that there are plenty of good reasons for Canada to be building and maintaining bridges across the Pacific, to be contributing to the encouragement of a Pacific community worthy of the label, one in which Canadians' hopes for internationalism can be pursued. There are reasonable doubts that the Pacific region is one where internationalist aspirations for community can be pursued effectively, but the expansive concept of security is broad enough to serve as a goal or guide in this matter. However, there is little reason to expect that the Canadian state in its chairing of APEC in 1997, nor the Canadian capitalists upon whom most of the responsibility for building the bridges lies, have the will or ability to do the job.

The restructuring of world order which took place through the 1970s and 1980s reorganised the relationship between state and capital in Canada, a reorganisation which re-centred the focus of Canadian foreign policy on the Americas, and which left the state less of a counterweight to the interests of business than it once was. The state and the Canadian multinational business class operate on the (faint) hope that capitalism and liberalism walk hand-in-hand, and that they display an historicist trajectory of global convergence [for a useful counterpoint to this hope that the end-of-history thesis operates in the Pacific region, see Stubbs (1995)]. The (dubious) virtue of the Chrétien administration of Canadian foreign policy has been to rein in the (high? vain?) hopes that the government will encourage and promote in the Pacific anything other than the interests of business.

Of the possibilities for new world orders suggested by Cox (p. 5/6 above) it is to be hoped that Canadian foreign policy would be aimed at encouraging the counter- and/or post-hegemonic options, numbers 5 and/or 7. But one fears that Canadian foreign policy has become (disingenuous rhetoric notwithstanding) centrally pre-occupied by numbers 1 and 4, those having to do with U.S. interests and regional rivalry.

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Karen Minden

CANADA AND ASIA PACIFIC: BIG STAKES, SMALL PLAYER[1]

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Canada's trade options: East, West and South

Canada has a population of 30 million people, spread across 8000 kilometres. We have 2.3 million companies, most of them small and medium enterprises. We share a border with the richest nation in the world, and its population of 265 million people. They speak English, and they live within 1500 km. of our major commercial and industrial centres. So it is not surprising that 80% of our trade is with the United States.

Canada also has a long history of transatlantic trade. Canadians are comfortable doing business in Europe and Great Britain, the ancestral home of many Canadians. We are deeply engaged in trade agreements, multilateral institutions and security organisations with the transatlantic community. There is a wealth of Canadian expertise and experience in Canada-Europe relations.

As federal and provincial government resources shrink, so too does the ability to monitor international markets and represent Canadian economic interests abroad. Industry Canada has reduced its staff by as much as one third. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, in yet another reorganisation, has combined the responsibility for sub-Saharan Africa and Asia Pacific under one Assistant Deputy Minister, even as we enter Canada's Year of Asia Pacific. Too few staff, too many meetings, too many market opportunities to monitor and analyse.

Given these conditions -- comfort and success in traditional markets, and restricted resources to take on new challenges -- what's all this talk about Canada as a Pacific nation?

What Asia Pacific means for Canada

The reality is that more than a decade ago, Canadian trade across the Pacific surpassed that across the Atlantic. While real economic growth in the U.S. has averaged around 2 and a half percent over the last ten years, growth in Asia has averaged around 8 percent. The Asian economies are the most rapidly growing economies in the world, with relatively stable political systems, sophisticated cultures, and aggressive development strategies. By the turn of the century they will represent somewhere between half and two thirds of world economic output, 70% of trade, and 40% of the world's population.

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As these economies grow, the World Bank estimates that they will require $1.4 trillion dollars in infrastructure investment - transport, energy and telecommunications systems to keep up with the rapid pace of growth. During the past 10 years, combined imports of all of Asia increased by 280% - - more than a trillion dollars worth -- about twice Canada's annual production.

Canada can hardly afford to ignore the opportunities across the Pacific: we are burdened by crushing national debt; our economy depends on international trade (more than a third of our GDP is derived from exports); and we are excessively dependent on a market to the south which is intricately tied with ours, sharing much the same cycles, and growing at the slow rate of most mature economies.

What is our existing relationship with Asia Pacific?

While Canadian **trade** with the economies of Asia Pacific has grown significantly in the last few years, our market share is steadily declining. In 1985, we supplied 2.4% of Asia's imports; in 1995 the figure was 1.6%. While other countries are aggressively pursuing Asian trade and investment, Canadians continue to gaze comfortably south. Most of our exports are agricultural, forest and mining commodities, with little in the way of value added goods.

Beyond trade in goods however, it is important to look at several other indicators of our commercial relationship with Asia Pacific. Trade in **services** has grown rapidly, as the demands for technical expertise outstrip the supply of skilled workers in countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore. This has implications for employment opportunities for young Canadians, who may not find a market for their skills in Canada, but whose skills are in demand in rapidly developing economies. In particular, Canadian strengths in aerospace, environmental industries, R&D, education, business services, and infrastructure, including telecommunications, energy and transportation systems, are a perfect fit with Asian needs. Many companies in these sectors have benefited from overtures by the Canadian government to Asian governments, specifically on Team Canada missions. While "government-linked company" may have negative connotations in this country, it is the way business is done in many Asian economies, especially in the infrastructure sector.

Direct foreign investment between Canada and Asia has a roughly equal two way flow, with Canadian investment, directed primarily to Japan, Greater China (South China, Hong Kong and Taiwan), and Singapore, valued at $11.9 billion. On the Canadian side, this represents an increase of 142% since 1990. Asian investment in Canada are around $11 billion, representing a 47% increase since the beginning of the decade. Half of this, as one might expect, has come from Hong Kong, dominated by immigrant investors who are seeking a more stable environment than Hong Kong on the cusp of a major transition as it returns to Chinese rule on July 1st, 1997.

The rapid increase in **transportation links** across the Pacific - triple what they were at the beginning of this decade - indicate growing interest from tourists and business people on both sides of the Pacific. There are 101 flights a week from Canada to Asian destinations.

Asian **tourism** to Canada has increased steadily to account for about 30% of non-US tourists to this country. We are all well aware of the impact of Asian immigration, which has changed the demographics of Vancouver and Toronto.

There is much debate about the link between Asian **immigration** and Canadian trade with Asia. Studies vary in their assessment of the impact, which ranges from a 2% to 6% increase in Canadian exports to the region for every 10% increase in Asian immigrants.

An interesting footnote to the Asian immigration story is the perception by many Asian Canadian business people that Canadians are conservative in business, risk averse and slow to recognise and respond to opportunities. The Asia Pacific Foundation issued a report in 1995 called *Canada's Hidden Advantage,* outlining the possibilities for enhancing links with Asian markets through partnerships with Asian Canadians.

With this brief profile of our economic links to Asia - trade in goods and services, investment, transportation, tourism and immigration - let's turn to trade policy issues in the Canada-Pacific relationship.

Canadian trade policy priorities in Asia

As Denis Stairs and others have eloquently explained, Canada depends on multilateralism to achieve its foreign policy goals. As a small player on the international scene, multilateralism provides Canada "safety in numbers," and an opportunity to create and enforce "rules of the game" on an unlevelled playing field. This is certainly true in Asia Pacific trade, where the dominant players, Japan and the United States, are vastly superior in economic power to Canada.......And where the "rules of the game" are often dependent on the whim of a political leader, a cousin of the political leader, or even an individual customs official, in countries like China and Indonesia.

The primary vehicle for instituting rules of international trade is of course the World Trade Organisation. In the Pacific Rim region, the primary venue for negotiating trade relations is APEC - the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation, a forum consisting of 18 member economies (referred to as such so as not to offend the sensibilities of China, which wants it made clear that Taiwan and Hong Kong are not sovereign states). I use the word negotiating here in the generic sense. It is important to note that APEC is not a rules-based organisation, but a forum to work out agreements by consensus. In a sense, it can serve as an "anteroom" to the WTO.

APEC's agenda rests on three "pillars": trade and investment liberalisation, trade and investment facilitation, and economic and technical co-operation, affectionately called "ecotech". APEC is characterised by a series of Senior Officials Meetings on a quarterly basis, punctuated by Ministerial meetings focused on specific sectors, such as environment, small and medium enterprises, and science and technology. Ten Working Groups meet on a regular basis to develop the "plumbing of international trade." They focus on issues such as the simplification and standardisation of customs procedures, business travel visas, trade dispute mediation, coastal zone management, and the myriad bureaucratic underpinnings of a global trading system. At the behest of the leaders of the APEC economies, each member created an APEC Study Centre to promote research and analysis of APEC and the issues which it faces. The annual round of meetings - and there are hundreds of APEC-related meetings each year, culminates in the so-called APEC Summit, the Leaders' meeting, which is hosted each year by the designated chair of APEC for that year. As you know, this year Canada chairs the process, and the Leaders' meeting takes place in Vancouver in November, 1997.

The Canadian government has organised Canada's Year of Asia Pacific to take advantage of this intense Pacific-oriented activity during its year as APEC Chair. Federal government departments -- from Fisheries and Oceans to Human Resource Development -- are actively engaged with their APEC counterparts to develop regional programs, development projects, and rules and regulations for the liberalisation and facilitation of regional trade and investment. An interesting spin-off of all this activity is the inevitable internationalisation of domestic bureaucracies, who are now engaged with their counterparts from 17 other countries.

Provincial and municipal governments, universities, business associations and non-government organisations have all been encouraged to take an active role in local events, and these have been carefully orchestrated to span Canada's diverse regions and sectors. For example, the Senior Officials' meetings over the course of the year move from Victoria, to Quebec City, to St. John's, Newfoundland to Vancouver. Ministerial meetings have been organised with attendant industry forums, to encourage business input to the deliberations of government policy makers. And the Economic Committee will hold a forum on the "soft issues" of the APEC agenda - environment, population, and the issues of civil society.

Winnipeg will host the national Youth Conference on APEC, targeted to senior high school students, at the Universities of Winnipeg and Manitoba in May of this year. The APEC Study Centres consortium annual conference and graduate student forum will take place in Banff at the end of May, and includes researchers from the Study Centres around the region. They will focus on the institutional development of APEC, the promotion of the next generation of Asia Pacific scholars, and analysis of the current issues dominating the APEC forum, such as assessing each members' individual action plans for trade liberalisation by the target dates of 2010 and 2020; and developing the "FEEEP" agenda, which is concerned with the interplay of economic growth, the environment, food, energy and population.

Canada's goals in APEC

There are essentially seven policy goals which Canada pursues in APEC. The first is to ensure recognition of Canada as a Pacific nation. When APEC was first conceived by the Australians, it was not their intention to have Canada at the table. After some assertive negotiation, Canada was a founding member at the first APEC meeting in 1989. The second goal is to strengthen the WTO by developing prior regional consensus on trade and investment issues. The third is to engage the leaders and decision-makers of the Pacific Rim in the region's only governmental forum (there is no OECD of the Pacific, no regional security organisation which includes Northeast Asia, and no organisation which includes all the countries of the region). APEC includes Northeast Asia, North America and the Pacific nations of Latin America, all three China's, Southeast Asia, and Australia and New Zealand. As such, it is the only regional organisation in which politically sensitive issues can be broached, in a relatively non-threatening environment which is based on consensus rather than rules. The modus operandi is discussion, collaboration and peer pressure. The goal is consensus rather than rule enforcement. Fourth, APEC also serves to bolster regional adherence to a broad range of multilateral agreements, from intellectual property, to trade in endangered species. Fifth is the opportunity to pursue bilateral relations by developing working relationships on specific issues with representatives from the 17 other member economies. Sixth, the economic and technical co-operation agenda of APEC builds a stronger, more equitable and stable environment for trade and investment. And finally, particularly during this year, participation in APEC serves the domestic political goals of economic growth, broad-based consultation, and national unity. With the plethora of APEC activities and delegations to Canada, Canadian attention is more focused than ever before on their not-so-distant neighbours across the Pacific, and Asians will have an opportunity to see that we are more than "hewers of wood and drawers of water," and a great place to breathe in fresh air. A common theme among Asian business and government visitors' to Canada is the unexpected realisation that Canada has a world-class infrastructure, high level skills and capability in science and technology, and one of the highest standards of living in the world.

Why is Canada a small player in the region?

It is evident that there are myriad reasons and opportunities to engage in the dynamism of Asian economic growth. Canada has been slow to respond for a number of reasons: there are few large companies with the staying power and government support needed to access Asian markets; government resources to monitor and promote these markets are limited; Canadian expertise on Asia is widely dispersed, and there is no concentration of research capability either in Ottawa or anywhere else; Canadian education remains Eurocentric or focused on the U.S., and like most people, we avoid what we don't understand; Canadian business culture has traditionally been risk averse; and we have easy access to a vast market to the south.

Hector Mackenzie

FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE PACIFIC: THE IMPLICATIONS OF IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURALISM FOR CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1945[1]

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Fifty years ago, as the global ideological, diplomatic, strategic and economic confrontation between "East" and "West" prompted a reconsideration of the assumptions upon which wartime policies and plans for the post-war world had been based, Louis St. Laurent, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, spoke to a university audience about "The Foundations of Canadian Foreign Policy."[2] Yesterday, as part of this conference, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, addressed similar themes in another period of transformation of the context in which Canada determines its approach to international relations.[3] With your indulgence, I would like to use those speeches as bookends for an overview of the increasing attention to Asia and the Pacific in assessments or pronouncements of Canadian policy since the end of the Second World War, with particular reliance on the periodic formal reviews of Canada's international relations.[4] Although other factors undoubtedly have had an impact on this development, my brief account will pay particular attention to the implications for Canada's foreign policy of the patterns of immigration and the emphasis in recent years on the multicultural character of this country.

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[1] Presentation to the Thirteenth Annual Political Studies Students' Conference, University of Manitoba, 31 January 1997. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author, not the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The author would like to thank the organizers of the conference for their hospitality and for their flexibility.

[2] Louis S. St. Laurent, "The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs," an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs inaugurating the Gray Foundation Lectureship at the University of Toronto, 13 January 1947, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, 47/2. The text is reprinted in R.A. Mackay, ed., Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-1954: Selected Speeches and Documents (Toronto, 1970), pp. 388-99.

[3] Notes for an address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the 13th Annual Conference of Political Studies Students, University of Manitoba, 30 January 1997 (podium version).

[4] As is the case with any country, Canada's "international relations" (that is, our varied involvement in international affairs) do not always correspond to the professed objectives or priorities of our "foreign policy" - that distinction must be borne in mind, particularly when considering the various review of foreign policy as inexact measures of Canada's international relations. Moreover, there has always been a relationship between domestic and foreign policy (that was the case even before Canada had something approximating a "foreign policy"). The maintenance of national unity - the reconciliation of diverse interests and points of view - has been an objective in the determination of Canadian foreign policy throughout the post-war era (and, indeed, well before it). In the oral presentation upon which this paper is based, I noted that such

St. Laurent's speech was noteworthy not only for its content but also as a departure from the more cautious and usually silent approach of his predecessor as external affairs minister, W.L. Mackenzie King, whose influence on foreign policy was still felt from the office of prime minister. According to St. Laurent, there were five "basic principles" which governed "the conduct of our relations abroad." These included the maintenance of Canadian unity, support for political liberty, respect for the rule of law in national and international affairs, the influence of "conceptions of good and evil which emerged from Hebrew and Greek civilisation and which have been transformed and transmitted through the Christian traditions of the Western world," and the acceptance of international responsibility. The minister then went on to depict the "practical application" of these tenets in five areas: the Commonwealth, relations with the United States, relations with France, support for agencies and activities associated with "constructive international organisation," and expansion of the foreign service.

Viewed through the prism of the theme of this conference, what is remarkable about St. Laurent's discussion of Canada's international relations is the dearth of references to Asia in the text. Though western Europe was frequently mentioned, and Canada's world-wide interests were stressed,

China was identified only in the context of export credits for reconstruction and India featured simply as the destination for the most recent of Canada's diplomatic appointments.[5] That comparative inattention to Asia would not last, but it would neither have surprised nor disappointed those who heard or read the speech. On the contrary, that aspect was consistent with how Canadians perceived their relationship to the rest of the world in early 1947. Not without reason did policy-makers and the public regard economic assistance from North America to western Europe and the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty as the principal assurances of Canada's vital interests in international affairs.[6] During the Second World War, with the conspicuous exception of the controversial and

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an overview had to rely on crass generalizations and gross over-simplifications, instruments with which, for some reason, I believed that students of politics might be familiar.

[5] St. Laurent, "Foundations of Canadian Policy." See also Kim Richard Nossal, "Business as Usual: Relations with China in the 1940s," in Kim Richard Nossal, ed., An Acceptance of Paradox: Essays on Canadian Diplomacy in honor of John W. Holmes (Toronto, 1982), pp. 39-55.

[6] Hector Mackenzie, "The White Paper on Reconstruction and Canada's Post-War Trade Policy," in Greg Donaghy, ed., Uncertain Horizons: Canadians and Their World in 1945 (Ottawa, 1997), pp. 167-88; Hector Mackenzie, "Canada, the Cold War and the Negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty," in John Hilliker and Mary Halloran, eds., Diplomatic Documents and Their Users (Ottawa, 1995), pp. 145-73. Though the Colombo Plan would later provide a framework for development assistance in Asia, its scale was comparatively modest.

ill-fated reinforcement of the Hong Kong garrison, the Canadian government had focused almost exclusively on the war in Europe and the Atlantic. Canadians were obviously aware of the defeat and occupation of Japan, but there was considerably greater interest in the European settlement. That attitude was not fundamentally altered with the onset of the Cold War.[7]

The announcement that Canada would appoint a high commissioner to India notwithstanding, Canada was under-represented in Asia and the Pacific in 1947. The only embassy, to China, was then between moves prompted by internal strife in the host country. The oldest diplomatic post in the area, formerly a legation in Tokyo, had been closed while Canada and Japan were at war, then revived in peacetime as a liaison mission to the American occupation authorities. Apart from a few trade offices, Canada's diplomatic profile in the region was dominated by the high commissions in Canberra and Wellington.[8] Indeed, its missionary presence in Asia was more obvious and arguably a greater source of concern for most Canadians.[9] It was also difficult for Canada to supplement its diplomatic contacts at the General Assembly of the United Nations, as only nine Asian states were members by 1950.[10]

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[7] For a contemporary analysis of Canadian policy, see: H.F. Angus, Canada and the Far East 1940-1953 (Toronto, 1953). For an excellent review of Canada's international relations in the early post-war years, see: Robert A. Spencer, Canada in World Affairs: From UN to NATO, 1946-1949 (Toronto, 1959). Geoffrey Pearson gives considerable attention to the Asian aspects of his father's diplomacy in his fine study, Seize the Day: Lester B. Pearson and Crisis Diplomacy (Ottawa, 1993). See also: Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein, Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s (Toronto, 1994), chapter seven; Nobuya Bamba and Tadayuki Okuma, "The Postwar Years," in John Schultz and Kimitada Miwa, eds., Canada and Japan in the Twentieth Century (Toronto, 1991), pp. 125-36.

[8] For information on Canada's diplomatic posts, see: Royal Commission on Conditions of Foreign Service (Ottawa, 1981), pp. 95-105; J.E. Thibault and Cheryl Moreau, Canadian Heads of Post Abroad 1880-1989 (Ottawa, 1991); John Hilliker and Donald Barry, Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume II: Coming of Age, 1946-1968 (Montreal & Kingston, 1995), especially pp. 12-14.

[9] Alvyn Austin, Saving China: Canadian Missionaries in the Middle Kingdom, 1888-1959 (Toronto, 1986); Peter M. Mitchell, "The Missionary Connection," in Paul M. Evans and B. Michael Frolic, eds., Reluctant Adversaries: Canada and the People's Republic of China 1949-1970 (Toronto, 1991), pp. 17-40; A. Hamish Ion, "Ambassadors of the Cross: Canadian Missionaries in Japan," in Schultz and Miwa, Canada and Japan, pp. 29-47; Patricia Roy, "Has Canada Made a Difference? North Pacific Connections: Canada, China, and Japan," in John English and Norman Hillmer, eds., Making a Difference? Canada's Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order (Toronto, 1992), pp. 125-62.

[10] Australia, China, India, New Zealand and the Philippines were founding members of the United Nations. Thailand (1946), Pakistan (1947), Burma (1948) and Indonesia (1950) joined later. Other Asian states were not able to join until the General Assembly dealt with the deadlock over new membership, in which the principal adversaries in the Cold War vetoed (in the Security Council) applications by states considered sympathetic to the other side in the conflict.

Nor was there likely to be a challenge to this Eurocentric approach for reasons of demography or cultural influences. On the contrary, Canada's immigration policy and its reaction to refugee crises simply confirmed this orientation. In the wake of the devastation and dislocation of the Second World War, the Canadian government employed emergency measures to open Canada's doors to refugees and displaced persons from Europe. In addition, there were three extraordinary flows of immigrants, consisting of Polish ex-servicemen, Dutch farm workers and Maltese immigrants. However, no such concession was made to oriental immigration. On 1 May 1947, Prime Minister King reaffirmed the "White Canada" policy that had prevailed between the wars. His carefully drafted statement was followed almost immediately by the introduction of legislation to repeal the Chinese Immigration Act of 1923. But that change was not a concession, as it simply added the Chinese to other Asian groups severely restricted under P.C. 2115 of March 1931.[11] For diplomatic reasons, symbolic quotas were granted in 1951 to immigrants originating from India (150), Pakistan (100) and Ceylon (50), but these concessions to fellow members of the Commonwealth were limited exceptions which simply proved the rule.[12] By then, immigration from Asia represented no more than 2 per cent of the annual total, compared to over 88 per cent from Europe. In the 1951 census, about one-half of one per cent of Canada's population identified its origins as Asian.[13] In other words, ties of ethnicity were not significant factors in Canada's relations with Asia. Though geography, and opinion in British Columbia, asserted that Canada was "a Pacific power," substantive links to the region were still limited.[14]

Certainly, there were developments in the Far East after the war which necessitated some response from Canada, particularly when it was a member of the Security Council of the United Nations in 1948-49. Burma's departure from the Commonwealth was certainly not as momentous as the redefinition of that institution to retain the membership of republican India, which Canada supported.[15] But the struggles against the colonial rule of the Netherlands in Indonesia and of France in Indochina reminded policy-makers in Ottawa that the rise of nationalism in Asia and the challenge to European domination of that region would have implications for countries other than those directly involved. Those distant conflicts also brought out in full relief the inadequacy of Canada's diplomatic representation in that part of the world and consequently its dependence on others, including its allies among the imperial powers, for information and analysis.[16]

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[11] Freda Hawkins, "Canadian Immigration and Refugee Policies," in Paul Painchaud, ed., From Mackenzie King to Pierre Trudeau: Forty Years of Canadian Diplomacy 1945-1985 (Québec, 1989) pp. 632-36.

[12] For the origins of the concession on immigration and the decision to enter into an agreement with India, Pakistan and Ceylon, see: Hector Mackenzie, ed., Documents on Canadian External Relations [DCER], Volume 14, 1948 (Ottawa, 1994), pp. 1316-29; Hector Mackenzie, ed., DCER, Volume 15, 1949 (Ottawa, 1995), pp. 1275-78; Greg Donaghy, ed., DCER, Volume 16, 1950 (Ottawa, 1996), pp. 1292-97; Greg Donaghy, ed., DCER, Volume 17, 1951 (Ottawa, 1997), pp. 1140-42.

[13] The estimates for immigration are based on figures for 1956 reproduced in F.H. Leacy, M.C. Urquhart and K.A.H. Buckley, eds., Historical Statistics of Canada, Second Edition (Ottawa, 1983), Series A385-416. The census figures for 1951 are from the same source, Series A125-163.

[14] John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957, Volume 2 (Toronto, 1982), chapter 9.

When his subordinates involved Canada on the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK), at American behest rather than out of any fundamental worry about the fate of Korea, King cited Canada's ignorance and neglect of the Pacific more positively as justifications for extracting Canada from what he regarded as an ill-advised and dangerous commitment. Once again, King viewed that involvement principally from the perspective of the Cold War and he was determined to avoid an entanglement which could be a flashpoint for war between the United States and the Soviet Union. That he was forced to compromise on Canadian participation in UNTCOK had more to do with the need to keep his Cabinet united than with an enhanced appreciation of the importance of Pacific affairs to Canada.[17] When UNTCOK dropped "temporary" from its title, Canada eased its way off the commission.[18]

However, it was more difficult for Canada to avoid participation when the United States decided to respond, within the framework of the United Nations, to the invasion of South Korea from the North. The St. Laurent government's initial emphasis was on diplomacy, not on a contribution from Canada's armed forces. Naval and military support was later given to the American-led assistance to South Korea, but Canadian and other allied concern rose when the American commander, General Douglas MacArthur, embarked on a crusade to liberate the North and thereby drew the People's Republic of China directly into the conflict. There is no need here to go over ground that has been thoroughly examined by other scholars. But it is worth recalling two points which accentuate the priorities in Canada's international relations.

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[15] Hector Mackenzie, "An Old Dominion and the New Commonwealth: Canada and Republican India, 1947-49," unpublished paper (Canadian Historical Association Annual Meeting, Victoria, 1990).

[16] See, for example, the selection of documents on the question of Indonesia in DCER, 14, pp. 201-32.

[17] C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies. Volume II: 1921-1948 The Mackenzie King Era (Toronto, 1981), pp. 414-15; J.W. Pickersgill and D.F. Forster, eds., The Mackenzie King Record, Volume IV, 1947-1948 (Toronto, 1970), pp. 133-53.

[18] DCER, 14, pp. 196-201.

Though the location of this clash, and therefore the destination for Canada's military commitments, was in Asia, Canadian officials viewed the outbreak of the Korean War as a challenge to Western interests associated with the United States and to the United Nations as an institution rather than as a matter of regional interest to another Pacific nation. Even before the conflict escalated, there was concern in Ottawa and other North Atlantic capitals that the invasion of South Korea was a "feint" designed to distract the West from the principal thrust of Communist expansion, Western Europe.[19] The Korean War provided the occasion for a significant increase in Canada's defence budget, but Asia was certainly not the principal regional focus of subsequent expenditures. Canadian efforts to negotiate an armistice were arguably intended more to limit the overall impact of the war than to secure the fate of Korea.[20] Perhaps appropriately, when Pearson warned against simplistic equation of Asian nationalism with the threat of Communism, he entitled his article "Don't Let Asia Split the West."[21]

A similar cautionary note should be sounded about Canada's other major involvement in international diplomacy associated with Asia, its participation as one of three delegations in the International Commissions for Supervision and Control (ICSC) established under the Geneva Agreements on Indochina. Though Canada had participated in the Geneva Conference, its nomination to the ICSC, along with India and Poland, came as a "shock" to the Canadian government. Privately, Pearson expressed his fear to British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden that "this responsibility" might "turn out to be as onerous as it was unsought."[22] Though the familiar mantle of the United Nations was missing from the commitment, the basis for Canada's decision to participate in the ICSC was a sense of international responsibility rather than regional interest. Canada was seen as a comparatively disinterested representative of the West on a panel that was designed to reflect the differing perspectives on the future of Asia within the context of the Cold War.[23]

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[19] See the discussion of the impact of the Korean War on Canadian (and allied) defence expenditures in David J. Bercuson, "Canada, NATO, and Rearmament, 1950-1954: Why Canada Made a Difference (But Not for Very Long)," in English and Hillmer, eds., Making A Difference, pp. 103-24.

[20] For analyses of Canadian policy in relation to the Korean War, see: Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the United States (Toronto, 1974) and Steven Hugh Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam, and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954 (Montreal & Kingston, 1995).

[21] The article was published in the American magazine World as a riposte to speculation by American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles about the consequences of direct intervention by China in Indochina. Douglas Ross, In the Interests of Peace: Canada and Vietnam 1954-1973 (Toronto, 1984), pp. 54-55.

[22] Pearson to Eden, 22 July 1954, quoted in Ross, In the Interests of Peace, p. 88.

[23] For Canadian policy in Indochina in this period, see especially: Lee, Outposts of Empire; Ross, In the Interests of Peace; James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada. Indochina: Roots of Complicity (Toronto, 1983).

However unwelcome the distinction may have been, the often frustrating task may have helped Canada to resist greater entanglement militarily or otherwise in Indochina.[24] For new recruits to Canada's foreign service, a tour of duty as a junior officer with the ICSC represented a rare opportunity for a posting in Asia and the senior appointments as well were important diplomatic assignments.[25] That experience may also have contributed to eroding the "special relationship" between India and Canada which had flourished earlier in the decade. Certainly, optimism about India's value as a "bridge" for the Commonwealth, and particularly for Canada, between East and West was dissipated by the obvious clash of values and policies during the Suez Crisis and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.[26]

For the government of John Diefenbaker, trade remained at the top of the agenda in Canada's trans-Pacific relations.[27] Canada had earlier agreed to most-favoured-nation treatment for Japan and the post-war revival of the Japanese economy was a subject of considerable interest and occasional anxiety for Canadians in the 1950s.[28] By 1955, Japan was already Canada's third largest trading partner and in the following decade trade between the two countries more than quadrupled. Though there was no advance in diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, and no sign that the Diefenbaker government regarded the issue as a priority, the Minister of Agriculture, Alvin Hamilton, was able to trumpet grain sales to China, culminating in a long-term agreement for sales of Canadian wheat, barley and flour.[29] Yet Diefenbaker's first and foremost venture as Prime Minister had been to increase trade with Britain and worries about the implications for Canada of that country's relationship with Europe still eclipsed trans-Pacific economic questions in importance.

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[24] John Holmes, "Canada and the Vietnam War," in J.L. Granatstein and R.D. Cuff, eds., War and Society in North America (Toronto, 1971), pp. 184-99.

[25] J.H. Taylor to J.W. Holmes, 22 December 1955, reprinted in bout de papier, XIV, 1, pp. 39-40. See also Hilliker and Barry, Coming of Age, pp. 115-21.

[26] The theme of a "special relationship" between Canada and India in the early 1950s is present in two books of recollections by Escott Reid: Envoy to Nehru (Delhi, 1981) and Hungary and Suez 1956: A View from New Delhi (Oakville, 1986). Geoffrey Pearson notes that Lester Pearson believed that the retention of India in the Commonwealth kept a "firm bridge, through that association, between the east and the west." Seize the Day, p. 25. Lee, Outposts of Empire, pp. 56, 90-92, sounds a cautionary note about the relative importance of Nehru and India in Pearson's reckoning.

[27] For assessments of the foreign policy of the Diefenbaker government, see: H. Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs (Toronto, 1989); J.L. Granatstein, Canada 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation (Toronto, 1986), especially chapter 3; Denis Smith, Rogue Tory: the Life and Legend of John G. Diefenbaker (Toronto, 1995); John F. Hilliker, "Diefenbaker and Canadian External Relations," in J.L. Granatstein, Canadian Foreign Policy: Historical Readings (Toronto, 1986), pp. 183-97.

[28] Klaus H. Pringsheim, Neighbours Across the Pacific: Canadian-Japanese Relations 1870-1982 (Oakville, 1983), pp. 113-36.

[29] Patrick Kyba, "Alvin Hamilton and Sino-Canadian Relations," in Evans and Frolic, Reluctant Adversaries, pp. 168-86; Arthur Blanchette, ed., Canadian Foreign Policy 1955-1965: Selected Speeches and Documents (Toronto, 1977), pp. 316-34.

Though Canada's diplomatic representation in Asia and the Pacific had increased during the 1950s, the pace of expansion lagged behind that in Latin America and it would be overshadowed again in the 1960s by the impact of decolonization in Africa.[30] By then, there was arguably less attention to a distinctive Asian dimension to Canada's international relations than to the escalation of American involvement in Indochina, the association of some Asian states with the non-aligned movement and with the issues of development in the emerging "Third World," and the impact of these trends on the United Nations. Those currents and cross-currents would buffet the first major public review of Canada's external affairs, which was published in 1970 by the government of Pierre Trudeau as *Foreign Policy for Canadians*.

The announcement of that comprehensive reassessment of Canadian policies in international affairs came during the 1968 election campaign in a statement by Trudeau in which he also declared his government's intention to recognise the People's Republic of China. Trudeau prefaced the latter pledge by referring to "a new interest in Pacific affairs generally" in Canada. "Because of past preoccupations with Atlantic and European affairs," he opined, "we have tended to overlook the reality that Canada is a Pacific country too."[31] *Foreign Policy for Canadians* attracted more critical comment for its repudiation of Pearsonian internationalism, for its disparagement of the United Nations, for its neglect of Canadian-American relations and for its ominous portents about Canada's commitment to the Atlantic alliance than for what it had to say about relations with countries in the Pacific. But the fact that one of the six booklets was devoted to *Pacific* suggests that the region was assuming a greater importance in Ottawa than before.

By 1970, one of the critical barriers to understanding and co-operation between Canada and Asia had been removed. Canada's immigration and refugee policy had been changed to meet the nation's economic requirements and the social reality of international migration, as well as to remove the stigma of racism. In 1962, the "White Canada" policy had been repudiated and, five years later, the "points system" for prospective immigrants had been inaugurated. At first, the impact on migration had been modest. During the 1960s, however, the proportion of the Canadian population claiming Asian origins nearly doubled (to about 1.3% or 285,540 individuals), primarily as a result of the new policies, and a significant upward trend was discernible as *Foreign Policy for Canadians* was published.[32] By then, "national identity, bilingualism and *multicultural expression*" had been identified as among "the main preoccupations of Canada and Canadians today," which necessarily had to be taken into account in any determination of Canada's interests and objectives in international affairs.[33]

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[30] Hilliker and Barry, Coming of Age, pp. 318-21.

[31] Extracts from statement by the Prime Minister, 29 May 1968, reprinted in Arthur E. Blanchette, ed., Canadian Foreign Policy 1966-1976: Selected Speeches and Documents (Ottawa, 1980), pp. 335-41. See also the discussion of Trudeau's approach in J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto, 1990), especially chapter one. On the specific question of recognition of the PRC, see: B. Michael Frolic, "The Trudeau Initiative;" Janet Lum, "Recognition and the Toronto Chinese Community;" and Arthur Andrew, "'A Reasonable Period of Time': Canada's De-recognition of Nationalist China," all in Evans and Frolic, Reluctant Adversaries, pp. 189-252; Maureen Appel Molot, "Canada's Relations with China since 1968," in Norman Hillmer and Garth Stevenson, eds., Foremost Nation: Canadian Foreign Policy and a Changing World (Toronto, 1977), pp. 230-67; John D. Harbron, "Recognizing China, 1970," in Don Munton and John Kirton, eds., Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases (Scarborough, 1992), pp. 227-36.

After a sketch of the region which emphasised political instability fostered by power rivalries in the context of the Cold War, the booklet on *Pacific* went on to describe the growth in awareness of the Pacific, particularly in Western Canada. That had been fostered by commercial, religious and academic links as well as by the flow of people. "By virtue of geography, history and present interest," the booklet declared, "Canada is a Pacific power," albeit "not a great power." To differentiate its interests and approach from the pervasive influence of the United States in the region was one of the principal challenges confronting Canada. For that purpose, *Pacific* emphasised the value of Canada's membership in the Commonwealth and its involvement in the developing association of francophone countries. That made particular sense to those familiar with the discussion of bilingualism as a national policy and its application to Canada's international affairs.[34]

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[32] Ellen Fairclough, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration from 1958 to 1962, had been instrumental in eliminating the "White Canada" policy, a move which was followed by the other principal countries of immigration, the United States (1965) and Australia (1973). Hawkins, "Canadian Immigration and Refugee Policies," pp. 639-43. The "points system" was introduced in the Immigration Regulations of 1967. It is reproduced in Appendix 2 of Freda Hawkins, Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern (Kingston and Montreal, 1988 - revised edition). The figures for origins of population are taken from the 1971 census (reproduced in Historical Statistics, Series A125-163. Pacific in Foreign Policy for Canadians refers (pp. 10-11) to 120,000 immigrants from the Pacific since 1946 and 19,500 in 1969 alone.

[33] The quotation is from page 11 of the first booklet of Foreign Policy for Canadians (which bears the same title as the collection) - the emphasis has been added. There had been an adverse reaction from those with neither British nor French origins to the seemingly exclusive attention to bilingualism and biculturalism as national policy in Canada. The policy of multiculturalism was adopted in October 1971. A Multiculturalism Act was passed in 1988. See: Mary Halloran, "Multiculturalism and External Policy in the Trudeau Era, 1968-1984," unpublished paper presented to meeting of Canadian Studies Association, Brock University, June 1996.

[34] J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto, 1990); Peter C. Dobell, Canada in World Affairs, Volume XVII, 1971-1973 (Toronto, 1985), chapters 9 and 11; Gilles Lalande, The Department of External Affairs and Biculturalism [Study for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism] (Ottawa,

When it came to recommendations for Canadian policy, however, the overwhelming emphasis was on economic relations and development assistance. The markets of Japan, Australia, New Zealand and China were identified as important destinations for Canadian exports, despite restrictions on access to the Japanese market for manufactured goods and the tremendous dominance of wheat in Sino-Canadian trade. Japan was the key, as it "may well become Canada's second most important one-country market" and Japanese investment in Canada "seems likely to expand." These interests and expectations prompted the Trudeau government to raise Canada's diplomatic profile in the region, with the projected establishment of an embassy in Beijing depicted as part of that process. For Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, the most propitious links would be provided by development assistance. But it would be difficult to address those needs and to assure vital stability and security in the area without an end to the war in Indochina.[35]

These various elements anticipated the dominant trends and events in Canada's relations with the Pacific over the next decade. Even before the exodus of "boat people" from Indochina, there had been a marked rise in the flow of immigrants from Asian countries to Canada. By 1976, more than 44,000 individuals annually, or nearly 30% of total immigrants to Canada, originated in Asia.[36] Immigration and population policies, which were increasingly subjects of national and international attention, had been the topic of a general review, followed by a green paper on immigration policy tabled in February 1975, a report by a special parliamentary committee in October 1975 and a revised Immigration Act in 1976. Together, these legislative changes and the international flows of refugees and immigrants bolstered the tendency to higher admissions to Canada from Asian origins.[37]

1969). See also the special issue of International Journal (XXVI, 1 [Winter 1970-71]) devoted to "Canada's foreign policy."

[35] Foreign Policy for Canadians: Pacific (Ottawa, 1970). The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, announced mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations between Canada and the People's Republic of China in the House of Commons on 13 October 1970. The statement is reprinted in Arthur E. Blanchette, ed., Canadian Foreign Policy 1966-1976: Selected Speeches and Documents (Ottawa, 1980), pp. 143-45. For critical appraisals of Canada's policy at the time of the review, see the article on "Canada and the Pacific" reprinted in John W. Holmes, Canada: A Middle-Aged Power (Toronto, 1976), pp. 161-74; Gilles Lalande, "Les relations avec les pays du Pacifique: constantes et perspectives," International Journal, XXVI, 1(Winter 1970-71), pp. 151-77; Peter C. Dobell, Canada's Search for New Roles: Foreign Policy in the Trudeau Era (London, 1972), pp. 103-15.

[36] Historical Statistics, Series A385-416.

[37] Hawkins, "Canadian Immigration and Refugee Policies," pp. 648-57. The Immigration Act was introduced in 1976, passed in 1977 and proclaimed in 1978. It provided statutory recognition of refugees for the first time, in part as an acknowledgement of Canada's obligations under the international Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (which Canada had signed in 1969). Gerald E. Dirks, Controversy and Complexity: Canadian Immigration Policy during the 1980s (Montreal and Kingston, 1995), p. 24.

Increased awareness of the value of trade and economic connections with Japan and the rest of Asia bolstered the traditional Canadian desire for "counterweights" to the preponderant influence of the United States on Canada's international relations. Though the principal focus for the "third option" articulated by Mitchell Sharp was still on relations with Europe – where the reception to Canadian overtures was complicated by the controversial decision to downgrade Canada's commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation - the country's interest in the North Pacific was formally acknowledged by a contractual link with Japan.[38] As for the People's Republic of China (PRC), its significance to Canada was accentuated not only by the exchange of ambassadors, but also by Prime Minister Trudeau's visit to China in October 1973 and by the priority assigned to good relations with the PRC in the dispute with the International Olympic Committee over participation by Taiwan in the 1976 Montreal Olympics.[39]

The government of Joe Clark did not last long, but it left two legacies which are relevant to the theme of this paper. The extraordinary reaction to the plight of the "boat people" who had fled Indochina was a significant advance on the Canadian reaction to previous refugee crises. That initiative by the Conservative government was sustained when the Liberals returned to power. Ultimately, the scale of the admissions from Indochina - over 80,000 by the end of June 1982 - far exceeded the totals admitted previously after political upheavals in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Uganda, Chile and Lebanon.[40]

Flora MacDonald, the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the Clark government, initiated a further review of Canadian foreign policy, entitled

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[38] The "third option" was seen in part as a response to critics of the silence about the United States in Foreign Policy for Canadians. For the text, see: Arthur E. Blanchette, ed., Canadian Foreign Policy 1966-1976: Selected Speeches and Documents (Ottawa, 1980), pp. 106-11. The "Framework for Economic Cooperation" between Canada and Japan was signed by prime ministers Trudeau and Miki in Tokyo in October 1976. Its provisions resembled those in the Contractual Link with the European Community. Arthur E. Blanchette, ed., Canadian Foreign Policy 1977-1992: Selected Speeches and Documents (Ottawa, 1994), pp. 83-85; Bothwell and Granatstein, Pirouette, pp. 172-77. For all the attention to "counterweights," Canada's international finance and trade remained dominated by the continental relationship with the United States.

[39] On the dispute over representation of China at the Olympics, see: Donald Macintosh and Michael Hawes, Sport and Canadian Diplomacy (Montreal and Kingston, 1994), chapter 3; "Competitive Boycotts: An Olympic Event," bout de papier, XIII, 4, pp. 41-2.

[40] Totals for the principal refugee flows: Hungary (37,566), Czechoslovakia (11,153), Uganda [Asian origins] (7,000), Chile (6,500), Lebanon (10,800), Haiti (4,500), Portuguese Angolans (2,000), Indochina (81,000). For a review of Canadian policy, see: Gerald E. Dirks, Canada's Refugee Policy: Indifference or Opportunism? (Montreal and London, 1977). The same author has a shorter account, "World Refugees: the Canadian Response," in J.L. Granatstein, ed., Towards a New World: Readings in the History of Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto, 1992), pp. 244-61.

"Canada in a Changing World," but it was not finished before the government was defeated. Eventually, the completed sections - an overview of "The Global Framework" and a study of "Canadian Aid Policy" - were tabled as discussion papers by MacDonald's successor, Mark MacGuigan, in the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence of the House of Commons in June 1980. The overall context for the projected review was still the familiar one of the Cold War, with recurrent anxieties about "Soviet military strength in the Pacific," the imbalance between Japanese economic power and military presence, the recent emergence of China from years of isolation, and the clash of interests in South East Asia. In that setting, Canada's political, security and economic interests complemented one another. "Canada is a Western country with western values," the text declared. Regional relationships, such as the Pacific Rim, which was mentioned in passing, were less important in the reckoning than the global threats posed by East-West and North-South tensions, dramatic increases in costs for energy and other resources, arms proliferation, international terrorism and environmental degradation.[41] The spine was broken on the cover of *Canada in a Changing World*, but it was promptly put back on the shelf.

The next major reappraisal of Canadian foreign policy came soon after Brian Mulroney led the Progressive Conservatives back to power. In 1985, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, issued a green paper, *Competitiveness and Security*. The introduction to that document, which described Canada's "national attributes," merits a brief glance. After two short paragraphs about Canada's peoples, regions and governments, the text predictably and deliberately distinguished Canada from its southern neighbour, while acknowledging the importance of continental co-operation. When it looked overseas, it affirmed first that "we are an Atlantic nation," before hastily adding that "we are a Pacific nation as well" and further that "we are an Arctic nation." As in previous assessments of Canadian interests and responsibilities, *Competitiveness and Security* stressed that Canada's "growing trade and immigration across the Pacific underline the increasing importance of our relations with countries in Asia."[42]

In its own report, *Independence and Internationalism*, the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations acknowledged that changes in Canada's population had had an impact on Canadian foreign policy. "New waves of immigration during the past 20 years from Asia, Africa and the Caribbean," the report noted, "have led to the establishment in Canada of communities with deep personal concerns about problems in parts of the world that previous Canadian governments paid little attention to." While arguing that "Canada's bilingual and multicultural heritage represents an asset," the committee stressed "that it is definitely not in the national interest to allow ethnic communities to draw Canada into taking sides on rivalries and disputes in their countries of origin." Left unsaid was the extent to which, in the past, the sentimental ties of Canadian people to the United Kingdom, France and the rest of Western Europe had inspired commitments beyond a narrow definition of Canada's national interest. Generally speaking, the committee paid more attention to the Atlantic and the Arctic than the Pacific, though it did note in passing that Canada's trans-Pacific trade had overtaken its trans-Atlantic trade for the first time in 1982.[43]

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[41] Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence. Appendix EAND-5. Discussion Paper: "Canada in a Changing World - Part I: The Global Framework," 30 November 1979 (tabled June 1980). The study of "Canadian Aid Policy" was tabled as Appendix EAND-6.

[42] Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada's International Relations, presented by Rt.Hon. Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs (Ottawa, 1985). The paper was designed not as "a traditional foreign policy review" but as a stimulus for the Parliamentary review to follow.

In its response to *Independence and Internationalism*, the government commented that "we must seek to intensify our links with an economically vibrant but diverse" Asia and the Pacific and "to play a more active consultative role on regional security issues." What that meant so far as priorities were concerned was a "special focus" on "the giants of Asia" - Japan, China and India.[44] How that differed in substance from earlier policy was unclear.

Within a few years, the global context which had framed the green paper would be dramatically altered, as anxiety about security in the Cold War was displaced by confusion about how to deal with the end of the bipolar era. However, the factors which had contributed to a greater awareness of Canada's interests in Asia and the Pacific had been augmented by subsequent developments. In the 1970s and 1980s, Asia had been the fastest-growing source of immigrants for Canada and, by 1990, it accounted for more than half of Canada's new arrivals. According to the national census of 1991, nearly 6 per cent of Canada's population traced their origins to Asia, more than ten times the proportion who did so in 1951.[45] That direction has been strengthened rather than undermined by the longer-term tendency to look to immigration to help to sustain Canada's economic performance and by the recent establishment of higher immigration targets for that purpose. By 1996, the seven leading places of origin for immigrants to Canada were all in Asia.[46]

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[43] Independence and Internationalism. Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations. June 1986. There is a brief analysis of the influence of ethnic groups on Canadian foreign policy in Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, The Domestic Mosaic: Domestic Groups and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto, 1985), pp. 45-47.

[44] Canada's International Relations - Response of the Government of Canada to the Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons. December 1986.

[45] The total who identified their origins as Asian in 1951 was 72,827 out of a national population of 14,009,429. By 1971, the population of Asian origin had risen to 285,540 out of 21,568,310 (1.3%). In the 1981 census, there was no equivalent question about origins. In the 1991 census, the total for Asian origins was 1,607,230 or 5.95% of the Canadian population (26,994,045).

The trend toward higher trans-Pacific trade and investment flows, which was noted in *Independence and Internationalism*, has become even more pronounced since then. Canada's reliance on trade for prosperity, already high, has soared even higher in recent years, reaching levels unknown since the end of the Second World War. Exports of goods and services, which had accounted for less than 30 per cent of Canada's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1993, approached 40 per cent of GDP by the end of 1996. Nearly 9 per cent of Canada's exports now go to Asia-Pacific countries, compared to less than 7% to European trading partners (including the United Kingdom). Of course, those tallies still do not rival the 81 per cent which flow south to the United States, but there is in those figures some manifestation of the importance of trade with Asia-Pacific to Canadian prosperity. More recently, that value has been spotlighted by the Team Canada missions to the region.[47]

These influences or trends clearly have had an impact on the recent sequence of reviews of Canadian foreign policy. When in opposition, the Liberal Party issued a position paper in May 1992 on Canada's international relations which was co-signed by Lloyd Axworthy, later Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Christine Stewart, later Secretary of State for Latin America and Africa. While acknowledging the continuing importance of immigration, trade and investment in Canada's trans-Pacific relations, that document argued distinctly that more could be done to make Canada "a true partner of the Pacific states" and that previous policy had neglected the "security challenges" there, ignoring Canada's "strategic interests" in the region.[48] The Liberal "Red Book" for the 1993 election campaign restored the emphasis to economic issues. "Expanding trade and investment with the Pacific Rim is crucial to our economic future," it asserted. "Asia has the fastest-growing economies in the world today, and Canada should take advantage of its growing markets for Canadian exports including food, telecommunications software, environmental and other technology, housing components, and complete homes." The chapter on "An Independent Foreign Policy" focused more on relations with the United States, items on the multilateral agenda and the "democratization" of Canadian foreign policy than on the regional directions for Canadian interests and policies.[49]

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[46] In order, with the number of immigrants supplied in 1996, the places of origin were: Hong Kong (29,676), India (20,986), China (17,403), Taiwan (13,031), Philippines (12,686), Pakistan (7,649) and Sri Lanka (6,044). Also in the top twenty were South Korea (3,129), which ranked 15th, and Vietnam (2,460), which ranked 19th. Total immigration to Canada in 1996 was 221,184. The practice of projecting desired levels of immigration began in 1980 (when figures were tabled for the following three years), as an elaboration of the annual targets required under the Immigration Act of 1976. Actual arrivals did not necessarily correspond to the projections.

[47] From tables prepared by the Trade and Economic Analysis Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, with figures supplied by Statistics Canada. The growth of non-governmental activity has been an important barometer of Canada's interest in Asia-Pacific. Lawrence T. Woods, Asia-Pacific Diplomacy: Nongovernmental Organizations and International Relations (Vancouver, 1993).

[48] The covering letter by the Chair and Vice-Chair of the Liberal Caucus Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (Axworthy and Stewart respectively) described the document as offering highlights of the Liberal Party's "foreign policy platform."

Since the 1993 election, there have been inter-related and comprehensive parliamentary reviews of Canada's defence and foreign policies. In its report, *Security in a Changing World*, the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy reiterated that "Canada is a Pacific country as well as an Atlantic one," with vital concerns in both areas. "If Canadians want to be able to influence events in the Asia-Pacific region," it observed, "we must show that we have a stake in the region, that we see a Canadian security interest and are prepared to invest resources in protecting that interest."[50]

The report of the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, *Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future*, supported that point. "Canada's interest in the region" had been defined as "primarily economic (trade and aid) and political," it noted. "With the end of the Cold War the situation has changed considerably." The committee urged the government to continue and even to enlarge its participation in regional discussions of security, though it doubted that "any regional security body will develop in the near future." Not surprisingly, however, the discussion of Canada's international trade and investment placed still greater emphasis on "the rise of Asia" as "without doubt the most momentous event of the latter part of the 20th century." That posed challenges as well as opportunities for Canada. But the prescription was familiar. "Success will depend," the committee advised, "upon Canada's ability to achieve greater market access and to develop initiatives that result in the greatest comparative advantage to Canadian exporters."[51] Responding to the recommendations in the foreign policy report, the government committed itself to greater participation in security discussions in Asia-Pacific as well as to further efforts to promote trans-Pacific economic activity.[52]

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49. Liberal Party of Canada, Creating Opportunity: the Liberal Plan for Canada (Ottawa, 1993).

50. Security in a Changing World. The Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy. (Ottawa, 1994), pp. 9, 11. This theme was emphasized as one of the "key recommendations" in the Summary Report.

51. Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future (Ottawa, November 1994), pp. 23-24, 28, 35, 79-80.

52. Government Response to the Recommendations of the Special Joint Parliamentary Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy (Ottawa, 1995), pp. 18 (2.8), 34-35 (3.5).

On the same day as it responded to the parliamentary committee's recommendations, the government issued a statement entitled *Canada in the World.* In the introduction, it noted that "Canada's geographical location gives it an important advantage as new poles of political power emerge in the Pacific and Latin America." That magnified its other assets in support of "an active Canadian foreign policy" which would "protect and promote Canada's values and interests in the world." As a confirmation of the importance of Asia-Pacific to Canada, the region featured in the elaboration of each of the three "key objectives" of Canadian foreign policy: "the promotion of prosperity and employment; the protection of our security, within a stable global framework; and the projection of Canadian values and culture."[53] That fact may not seem surprising today, especially in Canada's Year of Asia-Pacific, but it certainly distinguishes the perception and evaluation of Canada's position and interests from the situation when Louis St. Laurent delivered the Gray Lecture fifty years ago.

In the intervening years, throughout the various reviews of Canadian foreign policy, there have been certain recurring motifs which are especially relevant to the theme of this conference. With some trepidation as an historian looking towards the future, I venture to suggest that some, if not all, of these themes will still be relevant tomorrow. First, and this is especially pronounced in the most recent reviews, there has been a recognition of the profound impact of "globalization" on Canada, through flows of trade and investment, sharing of technology, knowledge and information. Thus far, Canada has responded well to this challenge, perhaps because so many aspects of our society and economy have been "international" for so long.

Secondly, and often linked to "globalization" through concerns about "competitiveness," both the fiscal realities and a shifting agenda in domestic and international affairs require frequent reassessments of Canada's priorities. Yet the overall framework - in foreign policy terms, what have been identified as the "three pillars" - remains relatively stable. What is more and more difficult to ensure is the flexibility to reply to national and international demands. To some extent, that reinforces the Canadian aptitude and preference for alliance-building and partnerships, what the Minister of Foreign Affairs has called "coalitions of the willing." The conduct of Canada's international relations already involves partnerships and co-operative arrangements, not only with other governments in multilateral settings, but also with non-governmental organisations and the private sector. For reasons both political and practical, that trend will likely continue as well. On the current agenda, however, I must defer to yesterday's keynote speaker, Mr. Axworthy.

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[53] Canada in the World: Government Statement (Ottawa, 1995), pp. 9-10.

As the Minister of Foreign Affairs emphasised, there is not a "crude choice" or a "zero sum game" involved when Canada increases its attention to Asia and the Pacific. It should not be assumed that this means downgrading or ignoring Canada's historic and current European or trans-Atlantic connections, or any other relationships. Perhaps we should also recall that, however important and beneficial may be "diversification" in Canada's international relations, we still share a vast continent - and so much more - with a great power which, whether or not it is "indispensable," is certainly, for us, before, now and in the future, unavoidable.

As well, the projection of Canada as a bilingual country with a diverse, multicultural heritage and composition will remain a feature of Canada's international activity - we are even beginning to see its impact on that sometimes overly traditional institution, the foreign service, whose current intake is much more representative of the Canadian population than it was in the past.

"Foreign policy" as such has traditionally been an elite preoccupation, but that too is changing. Though specialised knowledge will always have a premium attached to it, the determination of priorities and options for Canada in international affairs has always been influenced significantly by public opinion. As students of politics, you will appreciate that such preoccupations and linkages will not disappear. "Democratization" of foreign policy should be seen as an advantage rather than a threat or challenge to traditional habits of policy-making, as an informed and interested public is valuable, indeed indispensable, for national support of Canada's interests, values and policies internationally. "A policy of world affairs, to be truly effective," St. Laurent asserted fifty years ago, "must have its foundations laid upon general principles which have been tested in the life of the nation and which have secured the broad support of large groups of the population."[54]

Though the articulation and application of those principles, and the context for decision-making, may have changed over the years, the values identified by St. Laurent then remain vital to Canadians and thus to Canada's foreign policy today. That consistency and continuity suggests that there is greater consensus on the fundamental purposes and objectives of this country in international affairs than the rhetoric surrounding disagreements over priorities or methods sometimes conveys. That interpretation is fortified by a close reading of the successive reviews of Canadian foreign policy.

The agenda in international affairs will always reflect concerns about prosperity and security, but it must also respond to other impulses (environmental, humanitarian, cultural) which have not historically been the foremost or exclusive concerns of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade or its predecessor, the Department of External Affairs. Again, this is not a new phenomenon - for example, Canada's role in the reconstruction of the international economy after the war, whatever the historical files of my own Department may suggest, was influenced more decisively by the Department of Finance and the Bank of Canada. But it does serve as a reminder that "foreign policy" is not a synonym for "international relations."

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[54] St. Laurent, "Foundations of Canadian Policy," p. 389. For a later, and more sceptical, assessment of "democratization" and foreign policy, see Peyton V. Lyon, The Policy Question: A Critical Appraisal of Canada's Role in World Affairs (Toronto, 1963), pp. 9-10, 12.

To conclude briefly and simply, the world was very different in 1947 and Canada was very different then from what it has become today. Not surprisingly, those changes are reflected in our international relations.

Canada's Expanded Security Agenda

Francis J. Furtado
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NO GRAND CONCEPTS, NO RIGID DOCTRINES: THE SECURITY AGENDA OF THE 1994 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER[*]

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Introduction

In December 1994, the Government of Canada released its White Paper on defence.[1] The White Paper was the product of a year-long review of defence policy that began shortly after the Government took office. The resulting policy reflects a combination of public consultation (including an eight-month review by a special parliamentary committee[2]), the influence of broader governmental priorities (including -- but not limited to -- deficit reduction), and advice from the Department's civilian officials as well as the military leadership of the Canadian Forces.

On the whole, reaction to the White Paper has been positive, if muted. With a few exceptions, observers found the policy's focus on retaining armed forces which, while smaller, retained the capabilities of a fighting force to be a sensible and prudent approach to defence in the immediate post-Cold War period.

Having said this, the case can be made that critical aspects of the White Paper are not clearly understood. Such misunderstandings have taken the form of:

- the claim that the White Paper identifies certain regions, organisations, or missions as the first priority for the Canadian Forces -- or that the White Paper *should have* done this;
- the claim that the White Paper identifies 'criteria' for the deployment of the Canadian Forces abroad -- or, again, that it *should have* done this; or,

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[*] Text of a paper presented at Between East and West: Atlantic and Pacific Dimensions of Canadian Foreign Policy (1997 University of Manitoba Political Studies Students' Conference, February 1st, 1997).

[1] 1994 Defence White Paper. (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services: December 1994).

[2] In February 1994, the Minister of National Defence asked that a joint committee of the Senate and House of Commons conduct public consultations on the future of defence policy. The Committee issued its report on October 31st, 1994. See Security In A Changing World: The Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy. (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group: 1994).

- the claim that the core of the policy set out in the White Paper -- the decision to maintain multi-purpose, combat-capable forces -- is misguided because it is premised on a reading of the international environment which is either improperly slanted or otherwise underdeveloped.

In some instances, these claims are based on a genuine disagreement with the Government's defence policy.[3] I suspect, however, that a certain amount of misunderstanding prevails either on the nature of the Government's defence policy, or even the very nature of defence policy statements themselves.

The Nature of Defence Policy Statements

A defence policy statement is fundamentally different from an analytical piece that might appear in a scholarly journal. Instead of dissecting a given problem in order to illuminate certain dimensions of a given issue, defence policy statements seek to draw logical and consistent links between a series of assertions about the strategic environment with mediating concepts about how to address priority issues in order to buttress the case for specific decisions on defence capabilities and programs. In this respect, a defence policy statement is more akin to a work of *theology* than *analysis*.

Sometimes, this is easy. Widespread agreement about the problem to address, along with the strategy and means for dealing with it, leads to very robust theology where such disagreement as exists takes place at the margins of the issue and new developments can be absorbed without disturbing the Government's basic approach. Canadian defence policy statements during the Cold War represent a case in point. Although the emphasis on various elements of Canadian defence policy changed over time, the basic approach was never really in question and shows a remarkable amount of consistency over a forty-year period.[4]

In other cases, the task is more difficult. Where there is little in the way of consensus about fundamentals -- particularly assumptions -- the theology becomes quite a bit more fragile.[5] Faced with this possibility, there is a temptation to resolve the issue by making bold predictions about what the future will bring, using these as a basis for far-reaching change in the policy and its associated program. However satisfying this approach might seem at the time, it is not without risk -- specifically, the risk that the future will not unfold as predicted, thus raising the prospect of a policy that fails across the board.

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[3] I would put Janice Gross Stein's views into this category. Whatever criticisms she may make on the substance of the Government's decisions on defence, I believe that her characterization of the Government's policy is, for the most part, quite accurate.

[4] In saying this, I am not suggesting that the Canadian security community was not engaged in vigorous debates through this period – particularly over such sensitive issues as how the Government should approach a world filled with nuclear weapons, for example. But to the extent that these debates tended to focus on the emphasis that the Government should give to arms control instead of measures to support the West's nuclear arsenal, the character of such debates remained marginal. Nor am I suggesting that there were not debates over more fundamental issues such as the virtues of alliance membership versus non-alignment. It is only that successive Canadian postwar governments never appeared to give serious consideration to the alternatives to continuing Canadian participation in NATO and NORAD.

One should also remember that the nature of defence policy statements is heavily influenced by the need to forge consensus within government and win political support beyond it.[6] This might appear to be stating the obvious, but the need for consensus can contribute to a certain issues only being addressed at a high level of generality -- or not being addressed at all. Simply put, what emerges in a defence policy statement reflects what the traffic will bear among the various players involved.

In conducting its defence review, the Government faced the second type of policy-making environment -- characterised by a high degree of uncertainty and widespread disagreement about the future and its implications for the Canadian Forces. The Government's response was to focus on the maintenance of combat-capable forces as the central concept of the White Paper and avoid -- *as a matter of conscious choice* -- setting out a very specific, highly structured security agenda.[7]

1994 Versus 1987: An Unstructured International Security Environment

One way to gain a sense of the unstructured nature of the *1994 Defence White Paper* is to compare it to its 1987 predecessor, *Challenge and*

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[5] It could be argued that something like this happened between 1989 and 1991 -- after domestic and international developments began to erode the credibility of the 1987 Defence White Paper, but before the Government had settled on a new statement of defence policy. With no new policy in hand to replace Challenge and Commitment, the Government went through a two-year period where it maintained that 'the basic parameters of the White Paper remained valid' -- to the satisfaction of almost no one.

[6] After all, at a very minimum, a respectable work of theology must have the blessing of the higher clergy (in this case, other Ministers and their respective departments) and sustain the faith of the parish at large (the general public).

[7] Indeed, in a paper submitted to the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, Denis Stairs suggested that the Government might adopt an approach to the security dimension of foreign policy that would protect "practitioners in the professional foreign policy community... from the awkward and impracticable constraints that come from policy doctrines that are too rigidly defined and too mechanically applied." See Denis Stairs, "Contemporary Security Issues" in Canada's Foreign Policy: Position Papers, the third volume of the Report of the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group: November 1994), Pg. 11.

Commitment.[8] Whatever else one happened to think of *Challenge and Commitment*, its highly structured nature is in evidence throughout. This is especially true of its reading of the international security environment which flatly states that *all* developments abroad *must* be seen as a reflection of the Cold War.

To take a few examples:

- "Canadian security policy must respond to an international environment dominated by the rivalry between East and West. These two groups of nations, each led by a superpower, are in conflict, a conflict of ideas and values... It is a matter of fact, not interpretation, that the West is faced with an ideological, political and economic adversary whose explicit long-term aim is to mould the world in its own image."[9]

- "Central Europe is the geographic focus of the wider contest between East and West[10]... Much of Canada's defence effort is focused on Europe. That is where the conventional threat is concentrated and, in war, where the decisive conventional battle would be fought. Deterrence is not divisible. If it fails in Europe, it fails everywhere. By contributing to deterrence in Europe, Canadian forces are serving Canadian interests and contributing to Canada's security."[11]

- "Conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact involving Canada and Canadian interests could have its genesis outside the sphere of either alliance in regions where instability and the potential for violence are widespread. As a responsible member of the world community, Canada has a respected record of peacekeeping service and a proven capacity for difficult assignments in pursuit of the peaceful settlement of disputes. Such disputes will seldom directly involve the security of Canada. In many parts of the world, however, armed conflicts are likely to engage the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States, or their major allies, and thus potentially sow the seeds of a superpower conflict."[12]

In short, Canadian defence policy is inextricably bound up in the Cold War and the division of Europe. Contributing to the defence of NATO-Europe is our first priority. Other missions are only important to the extent that they help forestall the spectre of a Soviet-American confrontation that could escalate into an intercontinental nuclear exchange that would incinerate Canada and Canadians.

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[8] Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada. (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services: 1987).

[9] Challenge and Commitment, Pg. 5.

[10] Challenge and Commitment, Pg. 5.

[11] Challenge and Commitment, Pg. 21.

[12] Challenge and Commitment, Pg. 24.

Challenge and Commitment cast the Canadian defence problem in what now must seem like fairly dramatic terms. But *Challenge and Commitment* is interesting for several other reasons. Its reading of the international environment not only views everything through a Cold War lens, but uses this to tightly *link* developments abroad to threats to Canadians at home, in terms of their sovereignty, security, and survival.

It also uses this structure to set some fairly clear priorities in terms of:

- *regions* -- and here the priority is safeguarding NATO-Europe and North America as regions under threat -- other parts of the world are scarcely mentioned;
- *missions* -- and, here again, defending North America and NATO-Europe is the key priority -- other missions are distinctly secondary, apart from the contribution they make to forestalling an East-West conflict; and,
- *setting departmental priorities* -- which, in this case, comes down to building up the Canadian Forces after a decade of neglect had left them unable to carry out their missions -- resolving a situation then called the 'commitment-capability gap'.[13]

Contrast this to the assessment of the international environment set out in the *1994 Defence White Paper*.

- "The Cold War is over. The Warsaw Pact has been disbanded and the Soviet Union no longer exists. In a few short years, we have witnessed a fundamental realignment in the global balance of power, yielding significant advances in arms control, conflict resolution and democratization. We have also seen the outbreak of localised, violent disputes, arms proliferation, as well as the often fruitless struggles of collective security organisations to cope with the challenges of the new era. Progress toward a safer world, most evident in the dramatically reduced threat of global war is balanced by the persistence of conflict within and between states."[14]
- "The break-up of the Soviet Union significantly reduced the

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[13] Challenge and Commitment, Pp. 43-47.

[14] 1994 Defence White Paper, Pg. 3.

> threat of nuclear annihilation that faced Canada and its allies for more than 40 years. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and German unification marked an end to the division of Europe into hostile blocs... Significant progress has been achieved in the elimination, reduction, and control of various categories of weapons... Notwithstanding frequent outbursts of violence the world over, progress has been made in resolving several protracted conflicts."[15]

> ○ "Among the most difficult and immediate challenges to international security are.. civil wars fuelled by ethnic, religious and political extremism... The spread of advanced weapon technologies to areas of potential conflict has emerged as another major security challenge of the 1990s... the breakdown of authority in certain states is another source of instability."[16]

So the White Paper notes the passing of the Cold War, and points to the emergence of new problems that require our attention. But the dominant flavour in all of this is that these issues are not linked in any particularly compelling way by an overarching structure. Nor does the White Paper put them into a context defined by a paradigm of any sort. No one security *issue* can be said to concern us above all others. Out of the range of problems that could lead to violent conflict, we are not indicating that one might be any more *likely* than any of the others. No one *region* holds sway over Canadian thinking.

1994 Versus 1987: Rationales for the Maintenance of the Canadian Forces

If the White Paper has a central concept at its core -- an agenda for the Department and the Canadian Forces -- it is to be found in Chapter Three, which sets out the Government's commitment to maintain forces that are multi-purpose and combat-capable. But this commitment is not based on a highly specific reading of the threat -- across the Atlantic, the Pacific, or anywhere else.

In other words, you won't find the rationale for the maintenance of combat-capable forces expressed in terms such as:

> "We need to retain these forces because, we believe that, ultimately, Russia is headed toward a period of resurgent nationalism that will come to threaten NATO"; or,

> "We need to retain these forces because we are convinced that we will eventually need to be part of an effort to contain the Chinese".

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[15] 1994 Defence White Paper, Pp. 3-4.

[16] 1994 Defence White Paper, Pp. 5-6.

However, this should not be interpreted to mean that the Government is not *concerned* about a wide range of things such as:

- the prospect of ethnic conflicts breaking out across the swath of territory that runs along the periphery of Western Europe and the Russian Federation;
- the risk that, without careful management, an emerging combination of wealth, power, and instability will end up producing conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region that go far beyond the occasional border skirmish;
- that, despite our best efforts on the arms control side of the non-proliferation equation, states whose intentions range from unclear, to erratic, to aggressive, will come to possess weapons of mass destruction; or,
- that the absence of Great Power consensus and engagement will make concerted action to address security problems impossible.

The Government and the Department *are* concerned about these issues and are monitoring developments in these areas closely.[17] What the Government is *not* doing, however, is tying the future of the Forces to a gamble on which of these worries represents the greatest threat to Canada.

Consequently, the White Paper does not designate of one type of mission -- such as "peacekeeping" or "sovereignty protection", or "contributing to NATO" -- as our main priority, or the principal rationale for our force structure. Instead, the Government's commitment to the maintenance of multi-purpose combat-capable forces is based on the inherent *flexibility* that such forces give the Government in carrying out a wide range of missions now, and the ability to deal with unforeseen developments in the future.

This is quite remarkable in that it comes very close to saying:

> *"We want to maintain this type of capability simply because we want it. We can't predict with certainty how the Canadian Forces will or will not be used in the future -- and neither can any of our critics. What we do believe is that, at some point in the future, the Government*

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[17] One can find public expressions of such concern in the Departmental Outlook that the Minister of National Defence referred to the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans' Affairs in 1995 and 1996, or the Directorate of Strategic Analysis' Regional Overviews 1995: A Contribution to Strategic Assessment (Ottawa: Department of National Defence: September 1995) and Strategic Overview 1996 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence: November 1996).

> *may well have to call on the Forces in combat situations, and, thus, maintaining the capabilities of the CF as a fighting force is the only responsible thing to do."*

Such a rationale represents a clear departure from the traditional approach to defence planning in which one identifies a potential regional conflict or threat and, from this, draws up a set of preferred missions, and a force structure to carry these out. In fact, it virtually *reverses* the traditional relationship between threats, missions, and force structure.

This type of policy rationale -- that stresses the inherent value of military capabilities, even in a 'threatless' environment -- has a certain lineage in the brief history of the post-Cold War period. Elements of it can be found in NATO's 1991 Strategic Concept, as well as in the defence policy statements issued during the last three years of the Mulroney Government [18]. But the *1994 Defence White Paper* is notable for the purity of this approach. In articulating the Government's decision to retain combat capabilities in all three services, the White Paper does not look back over its shoulder -- as those earlier pieces did, in places -- for a rationale rooted in vestiges or remnants of the Cold War. Nor does the White Paper look ahead for clues that would suggest that something similar to the Cold War might come our way in the future. It simply takes the value of such forces as a given.

1994 Versus 1987: No Preferred Missions?

With Chapter Three offering no clues on how the Government's agenda might be structured in terms of regions and missions, one might be tempted to scrutinise the following three, which talk about the various missions of the Forces at home and abroad. But, such an examination does not, in fact, reveal anything by way of a set of preferred missions for the Canadian Forces.

Chapter Four -- which deals with the role of the Canadian Forces at home -- might not appear to offer much food for thought for students of an international security agenda, but it does prompt two observations. The discussion of the role of the Forces in protecting Canadian sovereignty has, again, become much more generic and low-key. This reflects the fact that, with the end of the Cold War, our northern air and maritime approaches have become a lot less interesting to other countries -- which has made military violations of Canadian sovereignty a far less pressing concern. Instead, the focus is now on retaining the capability to operate in Aid of the Civil Power as well as Search and Rescue, disaster relief, and the support that we provide to various other departments.

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[18] For a copy of NATO's Strategic Concept, which was approved at the Rome Summit in November 1991, see the NATO Handbook (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 1992), esp. Pp. 153-159. For the post-Cold War defence policy statements of the Mulroney Government, see Statement on Defence Policy (Ottawa: Department of National Defence: September 1991) esp. Pp. 1-4, and Canadian Defence Policy (Ottawa: Department of National Defence: April 1992), esp. Pp. 4-13.

One begins to gain a sense of the generic way in which the CF's missions are described in Chapter Five on Canada-U.S. defence co-operation. With the end of the Cold War, the focus of Canada-U.S. defence co-operation has shifted. There is less emphasis on the defence of North America, although the foundations for this remain in place. What Canada-U.S. defence co-operation is *really* about is the opportunity it provides for the Canadian Forces to operate with their U.S. counterparts. But, here again, this is principally as a means for them to maintain a high level of combat proficiency as a result of training with the U.S., along with the information and intelligence sharing, joint technology development, and other activities that are a part of maintaining interoperability.

But if there is one place where the generic nature of the White Paper's security agenda emerges most strongly, it is in Chapter Six, which deals with the contribution of the Canadian Forces to international peace and stability.

In a sense, Chapter Six is notable for what is *not* in the text.

- No one *region* provides the focus for the Government's activities -- outside of the commitment to come to the defence of a NATO state, the White Paper gives no indication that Canada expects or is prepared to focus on any one region -- Europe, Asia, or the Americas -- more than any other.

- The Government has not designated any one *mission* -- such as peacekeeping, for example -- as the pre-eminent role for the Canadian Forces.

- Nor are there lists of highly specific *criteria* for the commitment of the Canadian Forces to missions abroad.

So if Chapter Six does not contain any of these things -- just what does it contain?

- There is a general discussion of the Government's perspective on multilateral operations which sets the context for the Government's willingness to entertain Canadian participation in such operations.

- There is some commentary on contemporary issues bearing on key multilateral institutions of which we are a member -- particularly the UN and NATO.

- The chapter reviews and describes a spectrum of missions --

ranging from preventive deployments, through peacekeeping, to combat operations -- to which the Government would consider committing the Canadian Forces.

- There is a discussion of some broad considerations that will, depending on the circumstances, factor into a Government decision to participate in a given mission.
- There is a highly specific, quite technical listing about what we are willing to undertake in terms of defence commitments to organisations and contingency deployments.

All of this should sound very generic and descriptive, as it was intended to be that way.

- In terms of *regions*, the Government is saying that it could well envisage the Canadian Forces participating in operations in Europe. Or Asia. Or Latin America. Or Africa.
- In terms of *organisations*, the Government is saying that it could well envisage the Canadian Forces participating in operations under a UN mandate. Or just a UN resolution. As part of NATO. Or with the WEU. Or as part of a *ad hoc* coalition.
- What *missions* the Forces would be engaged in would all depend on what was required the circumstances. The Forces could be engaged in traditional peacekeeping and observer activities. Or enforcing a no-fly-zone. Or carrying out arms control verification. Or combat operations. Or peacebuilding. Or an operation that combines these and other elements -- to address contingencies that could be as well defined as the Gulf War, or as fluid as the situation in eastern Zäire.

Of course, the Government is *also* saying that it can envisage circumstances where Canada would *decline* to participate in a given operation -- for a variety of political, operational, or monetary reasons.

Again, this is all quite remarkable, because it comes very close to saying:

"We are willing to entertain doing almost anything, anywhere, with anybody."

"The key questions are:

- *Is this a good idea?*
- *Is the necessary coalition in place to make this work?*
- *Are Canadians really what is required?*

- ○ *Do we have people who are suitably trained and equipped?*
- ○ *What else are we doing these days? Can we do this without prejudice to our existing and foreseeable commitments?*
- ○ *Can we afford it?*

"If the answer to these questions is yes, almost anything is possible."

1994 Versus 1987: No Preferred Regions?

Certainly, from a regional perspective, Canadian defence policy has changed. Europe is no longer the pre-eminent focus for Canadian defence. But it is hardly irrelevant. One can see this in terms of our continuing commitment to an evolving NATO, a continuing focus on developing a special relationship with Russia, and periodic Canadian initiatives in the OSCE. It is also evident in the role that we have played in the Balkans, whether initially through UNPROFOR, a continuing presence in IFOR, or through what is now an expanded presence in SFOR.[19]

Outside Europe, our involvement may not have the formal, institutionalised quality that NATO provides, but it has the potential to be significant. In the Asia-Pacific region, we may not, at the moment, be doing all that much beyond exercises, ship and aircraft visits, officer exchanges, and various confidence building initiatives. But this is still more than what we were doing before, and it may well represent the limits of the possible for the time being. More importantly, there has developed in Ottawa a sense that all of this has the potential to change very suddenly. To use two examples that have run their course for now, one could envisage that the number of Canadian Forces personnel deployed in the region could have gone up significantly if a major peacebuilding initiative had been undertaken in Cambodia, or -- at the other end of the spectrum -- if the crisis on the Korean peninsula in the summer of 1994 were to have deteriorated further.

Beyond this, when we are speaking of our engagement outside Europe, it bears noting that, these days, some of our major engagements do not reflect either an Atlantic or Pacific orientation -- neither East nor West, but *South* -- in the Americas and in Africa. These cases -- which include our role in fortifying the return of democracy to Haiti, or dealing with the consequences of failed states in central Africa -- point to a security agenda that is less focused on *regions* than *problems*. In this context, the long-standing debate over where the Government should be putting its emphasis -- in Europe or in the Pacific -- is moot as far as the

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[19] For a more complete exposition of the Government's approach to European security, see Kenneth J. Calder, "Doing the Things That Matter: Canada and European Security" in International Journal (Vol L., No. 4, Autumn 1995).

Government's defence policy is concerned.

1994 Versus 1987: Discretionary Engagements With No Criteria?

How we see the range of missions that we would be prepared to undertake has also changed. Where it was once all collective defence, the potential agenda is now much broader and the policy framework has left the Government with a good deal of latitude when it comes to changing, with the circumstances, the emphasis it wishes to place on specific aspects of the agenda.

But while the White Paper notes that we are willing to consider doing quite a wide variety of things, it also introduces the note that -- with one or two exceptions -- we are not *obliged* to do anything in particular. This reflects the evolution of Canada's strategic situation, in which -- as Joel Sokolsky and Joseph Jockel pointed out in 1993 -- the engagement of the Canadian Forces abroad has become an increasingly discretionary matter.[20]

This scarcely means that we intend on abandoning the field internationally -- far from it. But it does bear noting that, in recent years, we have come to deploy forces abroad out of a perceived need to protect Canadian foreign policy *values* -- such as limiting human suffering in Bosnia or building democracy in Haiti -- than a classically-constructed notion of Canadian *interests*.

This, in an important sense, is a very positive development. It reflects the compassion that makes Canada such an attractive country in the eyes of many. But in thinking about values as an approach to engagement abroad, two things ought to be borne in mind. First, with limited defence resources,[21] Canada simply cannot be everywhere and should not try. Second -- and this is more speculative -- it is just possible that, despite several years of reductions in government spending across the board, there is a certain lag in public understanding about what reductions in government spending actually foreshadow in terms of sustaining existing government programs in such key areas as health care and social assistance. Should the reality of reduced government services to Canadians be driven home forcefully -- and painfully -- over the next few years, domestic support for Canadian voluntarism abroad stands to be severely tested.

If the White Paper suggests that the involvement of the Canadian Forces in missions abroad should not be automatically assumed to be a blank cheque, then one should also note that -- on the other hand -- in considering new missions, we do not intend to be bound by 'criteria' in the formal, rigid sense of the word. There is no 'checklist' of things that has to be satisfied before we will say yes or no to a given mission.

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[20] For a well-argued -- and influential -- statement of this view, see Joseph T. Jockel and Joel J. Sokolsky, Dandurand Revisited: Regional Instability and Canadian Defence Policy in the 1990s. Queen's Centre for International Relations Occasional Paper No. 45. (Kingston, Ont.: Queen's Centre for International Relations: February 1993).

[21] This particularly true in two respects. The first is the very high rotation rate that has been required to support our current slate of operational missions -- with its attendant stress on our personnel. The second is that the notion of limited resources applies with particular force to certain military occupational categories -- such as engineers -- which are in constant demand.

This makes some people uncomfortable, but the fact is that the utility of such criteria had been in decline since 1989. First, as we began to get involved in new kinds of operations, the list began to grow: from 5 to 9; to 14; to 19; and, finally, to a high point -- or low point, as the case may be -- to *23* in the last months of the previous government. At best, the list was growing a little unwieldy, but it seemed more likely that hard-and-fast criteria were becoming a less useful instrument either to guide government decisions or evaluate them later on.

All of which led, at one point of the defence policy review process in 1994, to the following scene. Gathered around a conference room table at the headquarters was the senior leadership of the Department and the Forces, discussing what some of the principal elements of a notional White Paper might involve. The issue of criteria comes up. Fortunately, someone has a copy of the current list of criteria -- all 23 points -- and expresses the view that the criteria are getting a little out of hand: we just seem to be adding new items to the list with no end in sight.

In response, another participant suggests measuring the utility of the criteria by assessing one of the new operations -- Rwanda -- against the list. Now, I should say that -- down to the last person in the room -- everyone agreed that the decision for us to participate in the Rwanda operation was a good idea. Indeed, the problem, in the minds of many around the table, was that we did not do more -- and more quickly.

Of course, it transpired that Rwanda did not meet *any* of the criteria! And it was at this point that the notion of criteria appearing in the White Paper died a quiet -- and largely un-mourned -- death.

So not only is the Government's agenda focused on problems instead of regions, it also frames the issue of Canadian engagement not in terms of whether we are *bound* to do -- or not do -- something in any given situation, but whether we *can* and *want* to. And the challenge for defence is not about closing 'gaps' between commitments and capabilities, but settling on maintaining a certain level of capability as a starting point, and then proceeding to employ the Forces on a case-by-case basis.

Indeed, comparing the rhetorical approach of *Challenge and Commitment* with that of the *1994 Defence White Paper* illuminates this distinction quite well.

Challenge and Commitment set out the problem -- the Soviet threat -- in a very simple (indeed, stark) way and from there posed a straightforward solution, exhorting us to close the commitment-capability gap so that the Forces could carry out a set of missions whose importance was self-evident.

And "exhort" is the key word.

- *"We must respond to the clear and present danger posed by the Soviets."*
- *"The focus of our defence activities must be the collective defence of North America and NATO-Europe."*
- *"To do this effectively, we must recognise that there is a gap -- between the equipment that currently have and that which we must have -- that simply has to be closed."*

The *1994 Defence White Paper* frames the question quite differently.

- *"The environment of the Cold War -- with its clear threat to Canada and Canadian interests -- has been replaced by something new."*
- *"The new environment is more difficult to read than the old one. It is less predictable and its security problems are more complex."*
- *"What's more, we do not know whether the current phase is merely a state of transition toward something more structured, or whether this is the way of the future for some time to come."*
- *"Even though the localized nature of post-Cold War conflicts means that our involvement has become a more discretionary matter, we have settled on maintaining armed forces that, while smaller, retain the characteristics and capabilities of a fighting force. Not because we feel under imminent threat, but because -- given the generalized sense of uncertainty about the future -- we simply feel that it would be a good idea."*
- *"In the interim, this level of military capability -- which represents a floor and ceiling at the same time -- will provide the foundation to carry out a wide range of less demanding missions. And we fully expect the missions themselves continue to evolve. So here is the range of missions to which we would currently consider contributing the Canadian Forces, along with a variety of other factors that will have a bearing on our decisions."*

By comparison with 1987, this White Paper *explains what the Government is thinking about* more than it *prescribes what must be our way forward.* Admittedly, form an analytical perspective, this approach is not very neat and tidy. But it *does* represent a more accurate and honest explanation of how the Government intends to proceed in this area than had the White Paper adopted a more singular, conceptual approach. There is no question that the watchwords in all of this are "pragmatic", and "flexible" -- and for the Canadian government, which confronts a fluid environment with limited resources, this represents a sensible approach.

Reactions and Critics

Nevertheless, there were those who found the generic character of the agenda -- and the thrust of Chapter Three -- a little irksome. Writing in *International Journal* shortly after the White Paper's release, Janice Gross Stein argued that the Government's reading of the international environment was flawed, leading it to a mistaken focus on retaining 'Cold War' missions and combat capabilities for the Canadian Forces.[22]

In fact, if one compares Chapter One with the reading of the international environment contained in the *Canada 21* report -- to which Stein was a major contributor -- both assessments cover many, if not most, of the same elements.[23] Where I think there *is* genuine disagreement is on the *meaning* of recent developments abroad for Canada and the Canadian Forces. By interpreting the post-Cold War environment through the lens of common security, Canada 21 arrived at a very singular assessment of the future that underpinned their "bold strategic choice" to specialise the Canadian Forces -- essentially, for the range of missions that they have carried out since the Gulf War.

The Government, by contrast, could not adopt such a singular approach. For one, the uncertainty and unpredictability that has characterised developments abroad over the past few years would not argue for adopting a highly specific view of what the future will bring. Certainly, our record of prediction -- actually, *anybody's* recent record of prediction -- did not imbue anyone in Government with the confidence to endorse any such assessment, particularly if this was intended to be taken as sufficient evidence to underpin far-reaching -- and likely irreversible -- changes to the structure and capabilities of the Canadian Forces.[24]

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[22] Janice Gross Stein, "Ideas, even good ideas, are not enough: changing Canada's foreign and defence policies" in International Journal (Vol. L, No. 1, Winter 1994-95).

[23] See Canada 21: Canada and Common Security in the Twenty-First Century (Toronto: Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, 1994), esp. Pp. 18-21, 43-44, 47-49, and 53-55.

[24] One can also take issue with whether or not the anti-submarine warfare capabilities and air-to-ground capabilities which Canada 21 wanted shorn from the CF are

The Government faced a similar type of criticism -- but with very different policy implications attached -- from another quarter. Certainly, one can sense that more conservative Canadians would have preferred a much more traditional reading of the international environment -- based on a dire warnings about the inevitability of interstate conflict, based on human nature, a realist reading of the international system, the historical record of empires in decline, and so on. This would clearly justify

the expenditure of resources sufficient to maintain -- if not regain -- certain capabilities that the Canadian Forces either may lose or have lost already.[25]

Here again, the Government was unconvinced of the wisdom of endorsing such a specific view in such an uncertain period. And the Government's clear endorsement of this dark prospectus is what would have been required if defence were to have received -- virtually unique among areas of program spending -- an exemption from the Government-wide program of fiscal restraint.

Ultimately, the consequences that flow from the possibility that the world may not evolve in ways that a highly specific reading of the international environment suggests may be tolerable for a group like Canada 21 or its more conservative counterparts. But, given its responsibilities for defence and the long-term management of the armed forces, it is most definitely *not* acceptable for the Government of Canada.

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peculiar to a 'Cold War' set of missions. I would argue that they are simply capabilities that are part of modern armed forces. The Government's defence policy and its associated program does not put undue emphasis on these capabilities -- but neither is there an inclination to treat these capabilities as outmoded relics of the Cold War.

[25] For an interesting liberal advocacy of a more muscular force structure for the Canadian Forces see Douglas Alan Ross, "Canada and the world at risk: depression, war and isolationism for the 21st century" in International Journal, Vol LII, No. 1, Winter 1996-97. I can agree with the desirability of proceeding with many of the defence programs advocated in the article -- and, indeed, many of these remain part of the Department's plans. I would simply point out that the repeated cuts to DND's budget over the past several years has required planners to constantly revise the defence program to ensure that the program remains balanced and that funding remains for priority items -- and this, simply put, takes time.

Conclusion

The Government's agenda as it applies to defence could be characterised as 'an unstructured agenda for an unstructured world'. It is defined not by *regions* but by *problems*. To this point, its approach to the deployment of the Canadian Forces abroad has been defined more by *values* than by *interests*. And it has adopted a focus on *capabilities* rather than *missions* to strike a sensible balance between responding to an evolving range of missions in the short-term, while preserving the combat capabilities that future Canadian governments may require at some point in the years ahead.

Doug Ross

"THE END OF THE WORLD.....AND ALL THAT": 21ST CENTURY INTERNATIONAL SECURITY THREATS AND THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM

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This paper explores several bleak interpretations and forecasts of what may be in store for Canada and the world in coming decades. The perspectives of analysts such as, *inter alia*, Gwynne Dyer, Samuel Huntington, Paul Kennedy, Robert Kaplan, Thomas Homer-Dixon and Ivan Head are assessed with a view to their implications for security policy in the United States, Canada and other 'Western' allies. It then concludes with a brief critique of the emerging isolationist orientation in Canadian foreign and defence policies. The risk of Canada being confronted with a future era of conflict and uncontrolled migration caused by environmental-economic collapse in various continental regions is assumed to be very high. The intellectual and political ability of Western elites to recognise the imminence of these future crises, to anticipate the direct threats they will present to the Canadian people, and to respond in a timely preventative way to such challenges, is assumed to be very low or nil.

Governments throughout the global North, including Canada's, are likely to be increasingly driven by domestic political agendas shaped by rising levels of structural unemployment, the compounded growth of governmental debt, and an increasingly xenophobic civil society. The last portion of the paper briefly reviews the feasibility of a significant, coherent, ameliorative strategy by Ottawa. The case is stated for continued Canadian activism on international security policy issues, rather than alternative approaches premised on strategic disengagement and de facto geopolitical isolationism. A sustained Canadian commitment to liberal internationalism is advocated as the most appropriate response for the time being, until a more systematic, highly leveraged strategy to promote sustainable international development and a steadily expanding circle of institutions for managing regional and global security are developed. A compromise will be required between the rich, demographically stable northern countries and the poor, demographically exploding southern states. The compromise will necessarily entail a severe cut to the material standard of living of people in the rich northern states. No aspect of life will be unscathed. Everyone will be affected by:

- severe universally applied taxes on all fossil-fuel based transportation;
- stiff carbon taxes on all other uses of fossil fuels for space heating or industrial processes;

- imposition of other appropriate 'green taxes' to ensure the sustainability of renewable resources, protection of the ozone layer, the minimisation of toxic waste and prevention of pollution of arable land and the major ocean fisheries;
- an internationally agreed upon, but nationally legislated and enforced, limit of something like one car for every ten people in each country (to be kept in force at least until solar or hydrogen fuel cell technology can be substituted as standard power sources);
- universal rationing of energy, meat and fresh water among the world' countries;
- job sharing and a legislated reduction of the work week to 4 days, to prevent social upheaval in a time of ever scarcer employment.

In Dyer's optimistic scenario, through such 'rationing' as well as radically increased levels of international development assistance, the standard of living of the poorest nations in the world would continue to rise and would eventually converge with the level of material comfort enjoyed by the rich northerners--but within exactly the same resource consumption and pollution control constraints as applied to the wealthy. In Dyer's view, such sharing of the pain of conservation and the responsibility for the preservation of the natural environment and the human habitat is unavoidable. Massive foreign aid transfers would not be an act of charity. As he put it bluntly: "this is not morality; it is the logic of survival". The alternative would be a world without collective compromise and enlightened self-restraint in which the global domain was afflicted by 3 billion cars following 'successful' Indian and Chinese industrialisation, permanently brown skies, a destabilised atmosphere and climate, and a dying biosphere--in other words, global suicide by the human race.

Critics in Canada have dismissed Dyer's call for a Grand Compromise, and ignored his forecast of incipient environmental crisis. Neo-conservative techno-optimism from the United States casts a long shadow. Others point out that regardless of the plausibility of Dyer's catastrophist prediction, the American policy elite seems to doubt that the environment is a problem at all. If the Americans refuse to act, what can Canadians too? The obvious answer to such counsels of despair is constructive action by Ottawa (environmental reforms at home and far larger aid allocations conditional on effective population control measures and resource management etc.) as a prelude to persuasion, public relations and 'communication' measures aimed at the American public.

Dyer partly anticipated such defeatism by noting that while it certainly would be preferable for the Grand Compromise to come by rational dialogue and enlightened foresight, it is also quite likely that a global consensus will not emerge until after some major environmental catastrophe. Most likely such a calamity would have to take place in the North so as to generate the appropriate degree of economic sacrifice by the rich. The simultaneous inundation of New

Orleans, Miami, much of Holland and Venice (not to mention Cairo, Bangkok, Ho Chi Minh City and Calcutta) because of rapid global warming-induced flooding might conceivably suffice to provoke the needed change in leadership thinking. This is a possibility.

While the UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicted a rise in ocean levels of less than one-half metre over the next century,[1] new evidence from Greenland since 1993 and Antarctica since 1995-6 suggest that the planetary climate and ocean levels may be far more unstable than geophysicists typically assumed.

The West Antarctic ice sheet may already have started a rapid break-up. Huge sheets of ice have broken off from the Ross Sea ice shelf and along the Antarctic peninsula.[2] If the entire West Antarctic sheet (most of which is sitting below water level, not on rock) were to break up and melt, ocean levels would rise over 5 metres--engulfing many of the world's large cities and flooding much of the world's productive agricultural land. If global warming succeeded in melting additionally some one-third of the East Antarctic ice sheet, world ocean levels would climb by more than 45 metres.[3] Global warming is certainly capable, then, of administering the necessary bracing shock to catalyse reform. But whether the human race would have enough time to adapt to radically changing conditions is quite uncertain. As is now clear from the past climatological record, a period of intense warming might well set off cataclysmic changes in ocean current circulation patterns that could trigger a new ice age with extraordinary speed--in as little as two decades, in fact.[4] Most of the planet's geological history has been spent in ice age conditions. We are currently living in the longest interglacial period on record. It will end. But will the human race be ready for it?

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[1] The head of the Intergovernmental Panel was far more pessimistic than the final consensus report stating in early 1996 that it may already be too late to stop major flooding, especially in the sub-tropical regions, with a consequent generation of "large numbers of environmental refugees". John Vidal, "Global warming disaster 'imminent'," Guardian Weekly, 25 February 1996. Ice core evidence from the last interglacial has indicated that average temperatures can shift as much as 18 degrees F within interglacial periods, and that these sudden shifts up and down in temperature can occur with frightening speed--in as little as two decades. See "Study of Greenland Ice Finds Rapid Change in Past Climate," New York Times, 15 July 1993. Sudden dramatic temperature drops have occured at both poles according to recent research. Malcolm W. Browne, "Antarctic Ice Core May Help Predict Start of Next Ice Age," New York Times, 9 July 1996.

[2] For information on the widespread character of the latest thaw in Antarctica see Roger Atwood,"A crack at the bottom of the world," Globe and Mail, 15 Februrary 1997. For a brief review of the debate between sceptics and advocates of the prospect of rapid cataclysmic thawing, see Beth Livermore, "Antarctic Meltdown," Popular Science, February 1997.

[3] The West Antarctic ice sheet was fully melted between 110,000 and 130,000 years ago, with sea levels some 5 metres higher than at present. See David Schneider, "The Rising Seas," Scientific American, March 1997. The estimate of a 45 metre increase should one-third of the Eastern Antarctic ice sheet melt may be found in Walter Sullivan, "New Theory on Ice Sheet Catastrophe is the Direst Yet," New York Times, 2 May 1995. The last complete melting of all polar ice occurred during the Cretaceous period from 65 to 135 million years ago. Complete melting of all ice would lead to ocean level rise on the order of 60 to 70 metres.

A second possibility that Dyer does not discuss concerns attacks on citizens of the affluent states by governments or subnational groups from poor states. Such attacks could involve blackmail, a for revenge for perceived wrongs, or simply intense anger over the indifference of the rich to the plight of suffering billions. State-sponsored terrorism might yet play a role in 'integrating' the affluent North with the impoverished 'South'. It might also ignite a catastrophic period of convulsive, incredibly destructive biological-chemical-radiological warfare from which civilisation would never recover.

In defence of his avowedly "hopelessly optimistic" reading of the next century in which he forecasts the victory of democracy, peace, conscience and common sense world wide, Dyer notes that we are all living in a social and political culture that is:

- a mere six generations from the socially accepted imposition of slavery;
- only three or four generations from a world where war and conquest was widely glorified as the most admirable part of most national histories;
- and only one generation into the process of liberating women from patriarchal oppression.

The war 'system', authoritarianism and the subjection of women are all crumbling across the planet. The decade of the 1990s is the first time in human history that a majority of the world's population has lived in functioning liberal-democratic political systems.[5] Thanks to the spread of basic literacy and, through the mass communications information revolution, 'political literacy'[6], democracy in almost every country is now practically attainable. According to Dyer, it is "inevitable". And just as important, the peoples of the world now have the means to conduct the 'Great Negotiation' that will precede the 'Grand Compromise' on consumption and environmental sustainability. The bargaining between rich and poor may take decades to achieve a global consensus, but come it must. The exceptional affluence of the richest countries will have to be sacrificed as a key part of the process, but, as Dyer notes, even the reduced standard of living will be far beyond what was experienced by the kings of Europe in the late 18th century. As Dyer put it: "It's been a great ride, but now it's time to grow up."

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[4] For an overview of how ocean currents interact with climate producing ice age conditions in what we know as temperate zones, see Wallace Broecker, "Chaotic Climate," Scientific American, November 1995, pp. 62-8; also W. Dansgaard et al, "Evidence for General Instability of Past Climate from a 250-KYR Ice-Core Record," Nature (vol. 364) 15 July 1993, pp. 218-220.

[5] According to 1996 U.N. figures some 3.1 billion people live in democracies, while 2.66 billion do not--a margin of 53.8% to 46.2%. See David W. Chen, "The Numbers Favor Those Living in Democracies", New York Times, 21 January 1997.

[6] Political literacy is distinguishable from basic literacy in so far as many people are conversant with key political issues in their countries through access to television and radio even before they acquire reading and writing skills.

If we do not show collective maturity or do not develop an enlightened sense of collective self-interest, then exploring alternative scenarios for 'the end of the world', certainly the end of civilisation as we have come to understand it, will take on new relevance.[7] At that point the darkest visions of Robert Heilbroner, Robert Kaplan, Paul and Ann Ehrlich, Fred Ikle and Laurie Garrett would become germane.

Environmental catastrophe and global anarchy scenarios are the authentic contemporary manifestation of 'thinking about the unthinkable'[8]. Ten years ago the phrase *still* meant analysing the dilemmas and paradoxes of nuclear strategy, the force balances of ever more destructive conventional weapons, or the risks incident to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. A decade ago, despite the rise of the environmentalist movement in North America and Europe, despite the cogent warnings and widely read writings of demographers and biologists like Paul and Ann Ehrlich[9], and despite the work of the Brandt, Palme and Brundtland Commissions[10], theorists of national and international security were still reluctant to admit that 'the environment' mattered. The policy complex involving unregulated population growth, desertification, food and freshwater scarcity, loss of biodiversity, atmospheric chemistry and climatology and computer modelling tended to be lumped together under the catch-all phrase "environmental issues" and relegated to tertiary importance.

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[7] Dyer is not alone in this assessment. Former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, Douglas Roche, set out similarly apocalyptic alternative worlds for the early 21st century in Building Global Security: Agenda for the 1990s (Toronto: NC Press, 1989), pp. 11-21.

[8] The phrase originated with the late American strategic theorist Herman Kahn; see his widely criticized, controversial work, Thinking About the Unthinkable (New York: Avon/Discus, 1962); and the revised elaboration of this critical contribution to popular understanding of the nuclear debate, Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980s (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1984) . Kahn was the first American strategic analyst to capture a wide national audience and help provoke a continuing vital national policy debate in the U.S. on nuclear strategy and arms control. For this reason among others, the eminent French sociologist and theorist of international relations Raymond Aron praised Kahn's work despite its elaborate examination of counterforce strategies saying: "...critics will be tempted occasionally to believe that the subtlety of the analysis has become and intellectual game, that the behaviour hypothesized is incompatible with the passions and irrationality of statesmen and mere mortals. It may be indeed that the first atomic or thermonuclear bombs may unleash what I elsewhere call homicidal madness, the objective becoming for each belligerent to destroy as many cities as possible,....But is not demonstrated [by Kahn] that it must be this way, and in differentiating the diverse kinds of thermonuclear war, in creating scenarios of possible crises and attacks, Herman Kahn...renders a service to everyone, civilian or military, responsible for the survival of his nation and of humanity itself." From Aron's introduction to Thinking About the Unthinkable , pp. 13-14.

A serious and constructive debate about the risks and probable consequences of impending ecological catastrophe may require the publication of a similar public policy 'primer' if the peoples and governing elites of the northern affluent states are going to begin to act sensibly to avert disaster.

[9] For a recent statement of the 'population as cause of global catastrophe thesis' see Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich, The Population Explosion (NY, London, Toronto etc.: Touchstone/Simon and Schuster, 1990). Paul Ehrlich produced The Population Bomb (NY: Sierra Club/Ballentine, 1968) which in two editions went through at least 25 printings through September 1971. In 1990 the Ehrlichs noted the absence of any real progress in changing attitudes of Western governments: "America and other rich nations have a clear choice today.

Few if any analysts were prepared to say that environmental management had become the most critically important field of international relations and the primary determinant of the security agenda of the 21st century. Controversies during the 1970s over the Limits to Growth[11] or probable damage to the ozone layer by CFCs or stratospherically invasive supersonic air transports[12] were dismissed during the Reagan-Bush era of renewed 'cowboy capitalism', elite tax rescinding[13], and corporate abuses as fantasies of an extremist, left-wing environmentalist fringe. In short, there was said to be nothing to worry about.

While the end of the Soviet-American Cold War certainly shook up the field of international security studies in the early 1990s, it did not do so to the point where leading security analysts would actually confront the full scope of the environmental threat to human welfare and survival. Ten years after the Brundtland's Our Common Future international security analysts have not come very far intellectually in reformulating the global security challenge. In American journals on foreign affairs and international security there has been no sea change

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They can continue to ignore the population problem and their own massive contributions to it. Then they will be trapped in a downward spiral that may well lead to the end of civilisation in a few decades. More frequent droughts, more damaged crops and famines, more dying forests, more smog, more international conflicts, more epidemics, more gridlock, more drugs, more crime, more sewage swimming, and other extreme unpleasantness will mark our course. It is a route already traveled by too many of our less fortunate fellow human beings. Or we can change our collective minds and take the measures necessary to lower global birthrates dramatically. People can learn to treat growth as the cancerlike disease it is and move towards a sustainable society. The rich can make helping the poor an urgent goal, instead of seeking more wealth and useless military advantage over one another." The Population Explosion , p. 23.

[10] See World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Report of the Brundtland Commission) (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1987); and the Independent Commission on International Development Issues (the Brandt Commission), North-South: A Programme for Survival (London: Pan Books, 1980); also relevant is the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (the Palme Commission), Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1982).

[11] See Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows et al The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind (New York: Signet/Mentor, 1972).

[12] See Douglas A. Ross, The Concorde Compromise: The Politics of Decision-Making," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 34 n. 3 (March 1978), pp. 46-64.

[13] Because of Reagan's tax 'relief' for the rich, by 1996 income and wealth inequality in the United States deteriorated to the worst levels since the 19th century. John Kenneth Galbraith rightly termed the Reagan-Bush era and subsequent Republican anti-tax policies as a "war on the poor".

in thinking about the long-term threats to the United States. Following the Gulf War, in the full flush of 'New World Order' euphoria, the Bush Administration's national security planners briefly flirted with the idea of an explicit policy of attempting to ensure American military and political supremacy for the indefinite future through actively suppressing the emergence of rival centres of military power.[14] After a chorus of protest from the liberal wing of the American national security community, the concept of assured military dominance (referred to elsewhere as 'hegemony' or 'imperialism') was apparently rejected as politically unmarketable, both at home and abroad.

Bill Clinton's presidency has made little impact on the overall thrust of American security planning. Under his first Secretary of Defense, the late Les Aspin, the Pentagon went through its 'Bottom-Up Review' of defence policy and came to the conclusion that only incremental adjustments needed to be made in American security planning and defence spending. The huge budgets given to the Pentagon continued undiminished.[15] It was decided to allocate more to the pursuit of cutting edge technology and ensuring American leadership in the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). And while many recently retired generals and admirals began to advocate 'going to zero' in nuclear weapons, the Clinton team held fast with the step by step implementation of START I and II. Environmental security concerns may have provoked a few high-level seminars but little else.

American foreign aid, however, which has been in recent years far and away the smallest level of Official Development Assistance of any wealthy northern state as a percentage of GNP, was reduced to even lower levels. With the end of Soviet-American global military rivalry, the perceived need to try to buy influence with Third World elites (and thereby deny military bases to Soviet naval and air forces) has evaporated and the residual American willingness to assist the poorest peoples of the planet on grounds of altruism alone is apparently negligible. Given the bizarre proclivities of a Republican-dominated Congress which attempted to *expand* the defence budget by building more B-2 bombers and reviving Reagan's 'Star Wars' missile defence plans, the effort to protect social programs shunted aside any concerns about preserving the international development budget. Accordingly with no "peace dividend" by the mid-1990s, American Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a percentage of GNP fell further, and the growing American debt to the UN continued to severely impair that organisation's effective functioning.

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[14] For a discussion of parts of the draft memorandum of March 1992 concerning the Pentagon's Defense Planning Guidance Document for 1994-99, and the possible implications of accepting the premises of the original draft, see Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise," International Security, vol. 17 n. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-67.

[15] At roughly 260 billion (U.S.) per year, American defence spending in real terms is roughly equal to average expenditures during the 'peacetime' years of the Cold War (the years when American troops were not in combat in Korea and Vietnam).

In such a political context, there has been no talk in the United States of any Grand Compromise with the world's poor, nor any official recognition of the need to address the incipient crises posed by the population-environment problematic. The fixation with domestic economic prosperity became yet another excuse for a de facto rejection of ODA and a refusal to try to help the countries of the global South most threatened by economic and ecological collapse and anarchy. Vice-President Al Gore's inclination for environmental activism was marginalized by the exigencies of Presidential-Congressional politics. A congressional majority overtly hostile to the UN and to foreign economic aid as 'welfare for foreigners' blocked the Democrats' residual impulse to practise liberal internationalism.

In sum, there is little if any prospect for a receptive audience in Washington to suggestions from Ottawa or other allied capitals that it is time to change course on international security policy. For the most part, Washington is stuck in its Cold War, anti-environmentalist policy-making ruts. The status quo of the 1980s endures in only a modestly evolved form. If this refusal to face facts continues for much longer then the likelihood of an even more painful reckoning will increase. It is at this point, with the recognition that the United States elite is badly out of touch with the most important issues of international relations, that one must begin to contemplate more extreme scenarios of global change and evolution.

Competing American Perspectives on the 21st Century

If American national security analysts have demonstrated a remarkable ability for denying the gravity of the impending threat of ecological-economic catastrophe, international relations specialists have fared little better. Post-1990 American international relations theorists engaged in a protracted bout of navel gazing in assessing the allegedly remarkable stability of the Cold War and the putative dangers of a new multi-polar balance of power.[16] Typically the farthest

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[16] For example the inordinate amount of attention given to John Lewis Gaddis's The Long Peace (Oxford, NY, Toronto: Oxford UP, 1987). This book whose title is drawn from the last chapter of the work gave primary impetus to the lengthy debate among so-called structural realists such as Kenneth Waltz, neo- realists, liberal institutionalists and critical theorists from 1989 to the present. The alleged stability of the Cold War is a highly dubious proposition. Fears of nuclear attack and of escalation of limited conventional wars to nuclear conflict were endemic to the 1950s. In the 1960s war with China that might have seen either American or Soviet nuclear strikes on the PRC was a real risk. Only the mid-to-late 1970s offered any real sense of tension reduction, but even that was soon buried by the anxieties attendant the "new" or "second" Cold War unleashed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and American hawks determined to re-

American academic analysts moved towards acknowledging the scale of the environmental problematic was to admit that the risk of uncontrolled immigration into the U.S. was likely to worsen because of demographic momentum in the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) and widening income disparities between the LDCs and the affluent 'northern' states.[17]

In a major collaborative work out of Harvard University intended to chart a map of most probable national security 'futures' for the United States, comprising 20 chapters and 27 authors, only economist and strategist Thomas C. Schelling felt compelled to address the implications of widening income disparities, population growth and uncontrolled migration from the poor to the rich states.[18] Schelling's emphasis on the need for new collective institutions for global governance was in stark contrast to the 'military-strategic business as usual' approach taken by most other contributors. Schelling summarised the "depressing" central truth of the human condition as follows:

> We live in a world that is one-fifth rich and four-fifths poor; the rich are segregated into the rich countries and the poor into the poor countries; the rich are predominantly lighter skinned and the poor darker skinned; most of the poor live in 'homelands' that are physically remote, often separated by oceans and great distances from the rich. Migration on any great scale is impermissible. There is no systematic redistribution of income. While there is ethnic strife among the well-to-do, the strife is vicious and destructive among the poor. ....we have defined national security as 'preserving the U.S. as a free nation with our fundamental institutions and values intact'. 'Values' is a wonderfully ambiguous word. I believe it must include what we *possess* a well as what we *appreciate*. It includes our material standard of living. We protect those institutions and values by, among other things, protecting our national boundaries.[19]

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establish a clear margin of strategic nuclear superiority over the USSR through rapid proliferation of counterforce weaponry and early deployment of strategic defences on the earth and in orbit.

[17] Nuclear strategist Donald Snow for example concluded that "the immigration dilemma, already being experienced in the United States, can only get worse. The most obvious solution is to improve the conditions at home so that people will not want to leave." See The Shape of the Future: The Post-Cold War World (Armonk, NY: M.D. Sharpe, 1991), p. 17. Snow, like Huntington, was far more preoccupied by the incipient rivalry with Japan and a uniting Europe than with the regional conflicts and 'drug war' spillover from the LDCs zone.

[18] See T. C. Schelling, "The Global Dimension," in Graham Allison and Gergory F. Treverton, Rethinking America's Security (NY, London: American Assembly/Council on Foreign Relations, W.W. Norton, 1992), pp. 196-210.

[19] Schelling, "Global Dimension," p. 200. It is noteworthy that Gwynne Dyer also began his "Human Race" series by also highlighting South Africa's use as a metaphorical microcosm for global reconciliation.

Schelling expressed virtually no hope at all that the American government could be expected to "play a leading role in elevating population growth to the status of a major threat to international peace and security". American 'values', he wryly noted, are sufficiently 'elastic' to accommodate a doubling of world population over the next two decades.[20] Nor is the US likely to take any significant role in curbing CO2 emissions--a matter Schelling clearly views as critically important. The international political activity on environmental reform during the 1990s, he believed, would be spent in erecting institutions--and not in achieving or even consensually setting significant goals for dealing with incipient climatic change, pollution, resource depletion and population control. Furthermore, he detected no political willingness among Americans to prevent further decreases in development assistance. [21] Such a shirking of commitment by Washington, he added, will occur at a time when the problem of climate change could only be dealt with by increasing Official Development Assistance (ODA) to "several times the magnitude of all current aid to the developing world."[22]

An American journalist, Robert Kaplan, attempted to integrate the various impacts of the varied but profound challenges to world order and global security in his milestone article "The Coming Anarchy".[23] Kaplan's warning of an incrementally spreading anarchy moving outward from Africa and Central Asia and of the collapse of China and India as viable state entities fell on deaf ears. Kaplan's dire assessment drew on both the careful, measured academic analysis of Thomas Homer-Dixon[24] and the much more speculative predictions of Samuel Huntington. American national security analysts largely ignored the Kaplan piece as environmental sensationalism. Instead they responded to the traditional and comparatively optimistic analyses offered by Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilisations' thesis and Henry Kissinger's forecast of a 21st century global balance of power.[25] Huntington's work is particularly important because it is likely to continue to be highly influential in the United States and abroad--a sort of practical handbook to 21st century foreign affairs for American technological cornucopianists, and an acknowledgement of American decline and Asian ascendance for those in Beijing, Baghdad or Bombay who would like to flex newly created economic and military muscle.

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[20] Schelling, "Global Dimension," p. 202.

[21] Schelling, "Global Dimension," pp. 206-09.

[22] Schelling, "Global Dimension," p. 210.

[23] Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy", Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, pp. 44-76; hereafter cited as Kaplan, "Coming Anarchy".

[24] See Thomas Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict," International Security, vol. 16 n. 2 (Fall 1991), pp. 76-116; and Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict," International Security, vol. 19 n. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 5-40.

[25] The first statement of his argument on the 'new' geopolitics of language, culture and religion in the 21st century is found in Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", Foreign Affairs , vol. 72 n. 3 (Summer 1993), 22-49; cited hereafter as Huntington, "Clash". Huntington's response to critics of this article is found at "If Not Civilizations, What?: Paradigms of the Post-Cold War World", Foreign Affairs, vol. 72 n. 5 (November/December 1993). A follow-up article drawn from a book length treatment of the 'clash of civilizations' thesis is available in Huntington's "The West Unique, Not Universal," Foreign Affairs, vol. 75 n. 6 (November/December 1996), 28-46; cited hereafter as Huntington, "West Not Universal". The book itself is The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (NY: Simon and

Huntington sees a new balance of power system emerging in the 21st century in which ethno-linguistic and religious divisions among 7 or 8 loosely defined 'civilisations' (Western, Hindu, Confucian, Islamic, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, Japanese, and "possibly" African[26]) will shape the pattern of rivalries and the incidence of mass violence. Russia is seen as a declining 'core state' for the Slavic-Orthodox zone which will probably be compelled to work with 'the West' on whatever terms are offered. India too may lean to the West. Both India and Russia are in Huntington's view likely to fear the rising power of the Islamic and Chinese 'civilisations'. The balance of power dynamic will continue but it will be played out on a grander 'civilizational' scale. At root, Huntington reflects the conformist, ideologically inculcated optimism of American liberalism in so far as he espouses a firm belief in the ability of science, technology and market economics to cope with virtually all problems of famine, resource scarcity and pollution. There the optimism ends, however, for wars will not be avoidable in the next century and they could become very destructive indeed.

The foreign policy recommendations that flow from Huntington's 'civilizational clash' premises may be summarised as follows:

(1) distancing the United States from past security commitments to countries in Asia--particularly Japan[27], while narrowing the American security umbrella to cover only 'kin countries' in Western and in some cases Central Europe;

Schuster, 1996). Henry Kissinger's not dissimilar classical realism is found in Diplomacy (New York, London, Toronto etc.: Simon & Schuster, 1994), chapters 1 and 31.

[26] Huntington, "Clash", p. 25.

[27] In an article published just prior to the 'clash of civilizations' essay, Huntington argued bluntly that the American government should act to contain the growth of Japanese economic power and political influence. In his view the Japanese leadership had in effect been practising "economic warfare" against the U.S. for decades in pursuing dominance in key high-technology, high value-added industries, in racking up financially destabilizing trade surpluses year after year, in systematically accumulating extensive ownership positions in U.S. industry, and by buying direct political influence in the U.S. electoral system. See "Why International Primacy Matters," International Security, vol. 17 n. 4 (Spring 1993), esp. pp. 73-81. In an earlier article, Huntington also denounced the Japanese as explicit threats to American interests, economic and geo-strategic declaring that "economic measures will be central to dealing with the Japanese challenge....not only foreign and defence policy but also domestic policy on the budget, taxes, subsidies, industrial policy, science and technology, child care, education". See "America's Changing Strategic Interests, "Survival, vol. 33 n. 1 (January/February 1991), as reprinted in Richard K. Betts, Conflict After the Cold War (NY: Macmillan, 1994), p. 518

(2) maintaining or widening American military superiority over all other states for as long as scientifically and economically possible, the better to safeguard and promote world order consonant with American and Western values[28];

(3) intervening much more selectively to advance American interests where and when required but without establishing any unconditional political or strategic ties, except with civilizational 'kin countries'[29]; according to Huntington in the culturally clashing world to come "promiscuous intervention" would only be a waste of resources and make relations with the other leading civilisations needlessly difficult[30];

(4) restoring and safeguarding the cultural, linguistic and socio-political heritage of the West against subversive forces from other civilisations that threaten to reduce the coherence of its values, the stability of its core institutions--or even its very survival;[31]

(5) henceforth using NATO as "the security organisation of Western civilisation" whose "primary purpose is to defend and preserve that civilisation", and admitting all culturally Western societies to this organisation "but not countries that have historically been primarily Muslim or Orthodox"[32];

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[28] "Why International Primacy Matters," pp. 70-71 and 82-83. Huntington wrote: "If the United States is unable to maintain security in the world's trouble spots, no other single country or combination of countries is likely to provide a substitute." p. 82. Military superiority underwritten by continuing economic hegemony is clearly essential to perpetuating a constructive role for the world's most universalizing state. With the death of the USSR, Huntington argued, the United States is left as "the only major power whose national identity is defined by a set of universal political and economic values....liberty, democracy, equality, private property, and markets." p. 82 In the post-Cold War era, moreover, arms control has ceased to be a mechanism for fostering great power detente and instead "the primary objective of arms control is to prevent the development by non-Western societies of military capabilities that could threaten Western interests." See "Clash of Civilizations", p. 46.

[29] Huntington, "Clash of Civilizations", p. 49. Huntington specifically enumerates a goal for 'the West' of limiting "the expansion of the military strength of Confucian and Islamic states" and maintaining Western "military superiority in East and Southwest Asia".

[30] As he noted in his most recent article: "As Asian and Muslim civilizations begin to assert the relevance of their cultures, Westerners will come to appreciate the connection between universalism and imperialism and to see the virtues of a pluralistic world....The time has come for the West to abandon the illusion of universality and to promote the strength, coherence, and vitality of its civilizations. The interests of the West are not served by promiscuous intervention into the disputes of other peoples." As in "The West, Not Universal", p. 41.

[31] The promotion of "greater cooperation and unity within its own civilization" is seen to be crucial for the West, in particular deepening relations between the North American and Western European branches of this cultural complex. "Clash of Civilizations", pp. 48-9. Huntington wrote in a later article: "Maintaining the unity of the West, however, is essential to slowing the decline of Western influence in world affairs....United the West will remain a formidable presence on the international scene; divided, it will be prey to the efforts of non-Western states to exploit its internal differences by offering short-term gains to some Western countries at the price of long-term losses for all Western countries. The peoples of the West, in Benjamin Franklin's phrase, must hang together or most assuredly they will hang separately." As in Huntington, "West Not Universal", Foreign Affairs, p. 44.

[32] Huntington, "West Not Universal", p. 45.

(6) sealing the frontiers of North America against uncontrolled migration from countries belonging to the Latin American, African, Islamic or Asian 'civilisations'--"as every major European country has done and as the United States is beginning to do" while "ensuring the assimilation into Western culture of the immigrants who are admitted"[33];

(7) supporting arms control and disarmament as a way of advancing American and Western interests by slowing the diffusion of advanced weapons technology to the rival 'civilisations of tomorrow--especially to those 'Islamic' and 'Confucian' states that are hostile to the United States or Europe; the universalism of past arms control measures, then, is to be jettisoned and a blunt advocacy of arms control and disarmament as a way of containing the growth of rival centres of military power is to be publicly embraced by the 'West'.[34]

Despite Huntington's *nominal renunciation* of isolationism and unilateralism[35], his practical policy conclusions are hardly reflective of a middle ground between disengagement and global interventionism to which he lays claim. Certainly in comparison with the approaches recommended by Paul Kennedy, Huntington's message calls for a very substantial and dangerous retreat into 'civilizational' isolationism--at a time when, according to Kennedy, Kaplan, Homer-Dixon and Dyer, the world can least afford a collapse of international solidarity and co-operative reform of global institutions.

Whatever one may make of Huntington's overall diagnosis and prescriptions for American international security policy, he *is almost certainly correct* in asserting that the broad foreign policy choices Americans make during the 1990s will have an impact on the international environment comparable in scale to the consequences of choices made by American leaders in 1898 and 1945. [36] At this the epochal high tide of American hegemonic power in the international system, what the American elite chooses may well set the pattern of world politics for decades to come--just as American isolationism in the 1920s and 1930s set the world on course for World War II. Huntington's call for what might be termed a foreign policy of 'protective disengagement' essentially entails a most threatening abdication of moral and political leadership by the United States.

Huntington's critics are of course legion and many of their most telling comments deserve close attention, but space precludes an exhaustive review of the detailed criticisms.[37] Huntington's overall message is one of caution and restraint to American policy-makers, telling them that their pre-eminent duty is

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[33] Huntington, "West Not Universal", p. 45.

[34] Huntington, "Clash", p. 46.

[35] Huntington, "West Not Universal", p. 46.

[36] Huntington, "America's Changing Strategic Interests", p. 520.

[37] An initial set of criticisms may be found in comments by Fouad Ajami, Kishore Mahbubani, et al in "Responses to Samuel P. Huntington's 'The Clash of Civilizations', " Foreign Affairs, vol. 72 n.4 (September/October 1993).

the preservation of Western influence as we move into an era when demographic trends will reduce the Western peoples to a small minority of the world's population, and when its share of world production, armaments and power may soon enter into sharp relative decline. China and India will grow and thrive in his view, and become rival challengers for global power and influence. Japan is, in Huntington's view, already in a fundamentally antagonistic posture towards the United States.

Huntington in his own way may be appealing to (and perhaps influenced by) millenarian sentiments with his articulation of dire portents of a cultural or 'civilizational' end time for the West. But make no mistake, Huntington is sincerely worried about American security in the long-term. For him the 1990s are no 'unipolar moment'. The economic struggle with Japan that has been underway for almost two decades is crucial to American abilities to protect national self-interest in coming decades, and the American position in this rivalry may be slipping.[38]

In late 1996 Huntington declared bluntly:

> Maintaining the unity of the West, however, is essential to slowing the decline of Western influence in world affairs. Western peoples have far more in common with each other than they have with Asian, Middle Eastern, or African peoples. The leaders of Western countries have institutionalised patterns of trust and co-operation among themselves that, with rare exceptions, they do not have with leaders of other societies. United the West will remain a formidable presence on the international scene; divided it will be prey to the efforts of non-Western states to exploit its internal differences by offering short-term gains to some Western countries at the price of long-term losses for all Western countries. The peoples of the West, in Benjamin Franklin's phrase, must hang together or most assuredly will all hang separately.[39]

Critics have focused on a number of fundamental problems with Huntington's perspective. Some analysts simply rejected it out of hand saying it has more in common with necromancy than political science. Systematic critiques have emphasised the following points:

• (1) Many commentators have disputed the 'civilizational' categories that he has selected, suggesting that no such entities exist--and are unlikely ever to coalesce. Islam for example is composed of many nation states and, as Fouad

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[38] See Huntington, "America's Changing Strategic Interests", p. 519. Here Huntington stresses the risk that the U.S. might lose the economic war with Japan and become "simply a major power like all the others", rather than retaining a position of primacy.

[39] Huntington, "West Not Universal", p. 44 (emphasis added).

Ajami asserted, nation states run 'civilisations'--not the other way around. State structures have gone through four centuries of adaptation and change and they are unlikely to disappear anytime soon--liberal pluralist speculative musings notwithstanding.[40]

* (2) Despite being a nominal champion of the diffusion of liberal democratic process in the world--across cultures--Huntington's 'clash' writings suggest that a "Fortress West" concept should be the guiding light of American foreign policy. Huntington is thus preaching an exclusionary approach to foreign policy, and is ranged directly opposite those who support 'democratic enlargement' and a responsible exercise of international leadership (per Anthony Lake's formulation[41] while he was Clinton's first-term Assistant for National Security Affairs).

* (3) As George Modelski has noted, Huntington's approach owes less to Arnold Toynbee's optimistic reading of history and much more to the pessimism of Oswald Spengler. Furthermore, *Huntington's notion of 'civilisations' at war with each other has no historical precedent to back up such speculative musing.*[42] Throughout recorded history, and in particular during the last four hundred years, wars have been fought by nations and states, but never by 'civilisations'. [43]

* (4) Huntington's analysis, while concurring in predictions by other futurists of a shift in the global balance of population, economic strength and power, artfully but dubiously avoids the entire question of imminent global ecological and economic crises that will flow directly from the consequences of excessive and destabilising population increase.

While one may speculatively attribute the success of Huntington's writings in attracting a large audience to widespread psychological denial in the American policy community who are ideologically and culturally predisposed to accept the tenets of technological optimism, the deeply neo-conservative tenor of American national politics may have more to do with the negative reception accorded to the ecological pessimism embodied in writings by Kaplan, Homer-Dixon and Kennedy.

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[40] On the demise of the state and government as one possible future for North America see David Elkins,

[41] Lake's views may be found in "Confronting Backlash States", Foreign Affairs, vol. 73 n. 2 (March/April 1994), pp. 45-55. He calls for "a genuine and responsible effort, over time, to protect American strategic interests, stabilize the international system and enlarge the community of nations committed to democracy, free markets and peace." p. 55.

[42] Modelski to the Pacific North West Colloquium on International Security seminar at the University of Washington in reply to lecture by Samuel Huntington, 24 October 1993.

[43] As stressed by Ajami, "Responses", pp. 2-3, and Modelski, ibid.

In fact Huntington's whole approach is remarkably free of implications that might necessitate major adjustments to current American foreign and defence policies. Because the West is going to be threatened in the 21st century, it must continue to ensure its military dominance and scientific and economic leadership in strategically critical dimensions of industry. Hence there must be no obvious 'peace dividend'. Japan should be economically contained and its military role kept circumscribed. China should be obstructed in its efforts to become a first-rate military power by regulating the transfer of advanced technology to it. NATO should be renewed in its unity, and expanded in its membership to include all 'truly Western', non-Slavic, non-Muslim peoples in eastern and southern Europe. Russia should continue to be contained and its relations with the West kept at arm's length. Foreign aid, if given at all, should be confined to the member states of the West and, presumably, any other states which provide strategic or political advantages for U.S. foreign policy. 'Horizontal' proliferation of technologies for weapons of mass destruction or advanced conventional arms should also be contained through aggressive pursuit of non-proliferation agreements--but that is the full extent of Huntington's recommended 'internationalism'.

In practical terms Huntington endorses the neo-isolationism that Arthur Schlesinger has so strongly deplored as an abandonment of the great American dream of collective security.[44] In short, according to Huntington, the 21st century will look pretty much like the 19th and 20th centuries--with the exception of the Cold War era. Only the names and nation-state actors in the leading roles of the 'new' balance of power will have changed.

Robert Kaplan's analysis it must be acknowledged was much more difficult to connect to direct policy-relevant conclusions, shaped as it was by such direly unconditional warnings of impending engulfment by chaos, criminal anarchy and uncontrolled migration.[45] Kaplan's work, despite attracting much attention in numerous reprints, failed to provoke any dramatic rethinking of American national security policy. Nor have the futurist writings of the more intellectually credible Paul Kennedy whose lengthy work, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century, is full of warnings of impending ecological crisis as well as cautionary advice for heading off economic and demographic catastrophe.[46] An even more candid warning about the fate of the world was published by Kennedy shortly after Kaplan's "The Coming Anarchy". In this equally troubling assessment of life in the 21st century, Kennedy and co-author Matthew Connelly in 1994 sketched out a grim warning of literal engulfment of the rich states by hundreds of millions of poor migrants by 2025--unless the rich states change their self-indulgent, selfish ways and act soon to mitigate the deteriorating conditions in the LDCs.[47]

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[44] Schlesinger notes that neo-isolationism rose significantly among American public opinion between 1990 and 1995. 'Defending the security of American allies' drew only 41% support in 1995 (and 61% in 1990); 'protection of weaker nations against foreign aggression' fell from 57 to 24%. Support for 'promotion of human rights' fell 24% and support for foreign aid 19%. See "Back to the Womb? Isolationism's Renewed Threat," Foreign Affairs, v. 74 n. 4 (July/August 1995), p. 7.

[45] Hence it was perhaps understandable that Thomas Homer-Dixon was invited to speak to the Clinton Administration's National Security Council staffers rather than Kaplan.

[46] Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century, (Toronto: Harper Collins, 1993). Kennedy's comment on India and China is apt: "Both those nations are engaged in a race

Kennedy and Connelly deplored the emerging 'siege mentality' of the northern countries who are now frantically trying to reassert control of their borders. They deplored too the demise of ODA flows of any consequence from the US and other OECD states, and the failure to redirect the scientific expertise developed during the Cold War towards creation of pollution-free energy sources (solar and photovoltaic power, fuel cell technology etc.). Kennedy and Connelly are, to say the least, cautious in their expressions of hope that a revolution in foreign policy thinking can be effected, noting that "we will have to convince a suspicious public and cynical politicians that a serious package of reform measures is not fuzzy liberal idealism but a truer form of realism." The climate of the time in the United States is not propitious they conclude. It may take "the collapse of continents rather than single states" before the peoples of the rich states can be awakened from their materialistic, foolish, self-indulgent, neo-conservatively blinkered torpor.[48]

How ought we in Canada react to such analyses of planetary troubles and alarms? We can sort out the diagnoses and respective prognoses into four quadrants, separating the environmental optimists from the pessimists, and secondly separating those who predict an imminent transition to a world transcending war and militarism from those who expect a conflict-prone international existence to continue (see Figure 1). For purposes of this paper there is no discussion of the 'southeast' quadrant, of those who subscribe to ecological optimism and a vision of a conflict-free future. Clearly this category exists in the real world of American policy debate and is peopled by neo-

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against time, for if their population explosion continues it will erode gains in agricultural and manufacturing output, reduce expectations of increases in real income, worsen regional imbalances and damage the social peace....On the other hand, if China and India with their three billion people do happily manage to triple their average standard of living (to levels which the West would find intolerably low) , that would not only damage their local environment and pubic health, but also threaten the earth's overall atmosphere....The only logical solution remaining, therefore, is for the developed world to apply its capital, technology and brainpower to help these two giant populations escape from poverty without harm to themselves and the planet, while at the same time embracing technological solutions including alterations in energy use and life-style, to reduce its own, even larger damage to the global environment." (p. 192).

[47] Matthew Connelly and Paul Kennedy, "Must It Be the West Against the Rest?", Atlantic Monthly, December 1994, 61-84; cited hereafter as "West Against Rest?"

[48] Connelly and Kennedy, "West Against Rest?", p. 84

conservative ideologues and other naive or wilfully ignorant, liberal-pluralist utopians.

Fig. 1: A Taxonomy of Hypothetical 21st Century Futures *(Douglas Ross, 1997)*

	Environmental/ Economic Pessimists	Environmental/Economic Optimists
	Eco-Doom Quadrant	Quasi-Isolationist 'Fortress West' Quadrant
Conflict as Highly Probable if not Certain	**Robert Kaplan** **Robert Heilbroner**	**Samuel Huntington** **Joseph Nye & William Owens** **Alvin & Heidi Toffler** **Henry Kissinger**
	Thomas Homer-Dixon **Laurie Garrett**	
	Liberal International Quadrant	Rose-Tinted Spectacles Quadrant
Conflict as Mitigatable if not Transcendable	**Gwynne Dyer** **Ivan Head** **Paul Kennedy**	**Most economists, neo-conservative and liberal-pluralist utopians**

Those who find Huntington's relative optimism impressive may wish to regard Canada as an outpost of an increasingly beleaguered 'Western civilisation'. For them the north-east quadrant of "Fortress West" is the conceptual home. A more isolationist orientation might logically be the preferred response for this school of thought, and presumably a role for Canada of playing the loyal ally--especially in those confrontations that involve the Americans and the peoples of our 'kin countries' in Europe against all 'the others'. Under this approach to world affairs there is only an obligation of loyalty to support fraternal cultures; hence this sector can be labelled quasi-isolationist. In the American policy debate it may also be the probable or 'natural' home of all the high technology warfare theorists who foresee a continuing intense struggle for military supremacy in coming decades and who wish to divert as much of the still immense U.S. defence budget to research and development of critical 'leading edge' technologies.[1]

Those who subscribe to Dyer's call for renewed responsible internationalism, for assisting the world's poor with truly sustainable development, and for commencing the Great Negotiation, can be placed in the 'south-west quadrant'. Writings by international development assistance advocate (and former foreign policy advisor to Pierre Trudeau) Ivan Head can be positioned here too because Head, like Dyer, still advocates massive aid transfers to the poorest states by the rich.[2] In his view, on both moral grounds and out of enlightened self-interest, the logic of Canadian foreign policy and Canadian international security relations should be focused on remedial efforts to save Africa and key parts of Asia from incipient ecological and economic collapse. Head, like Dyer, sees global interdependence as extending from the economic and environmental realms into the strategic. Hence all countries, rich and poor alike, have a common interest in forestalling a resort to armed conflict on international class-warfare lines--what Head terms "world-wide outbreaks of resentment"[3].

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[1] Representative writers in this sub-field include Joseph S. Nye and William A. Owens, "America's Information Edge", Foreign Affairs, vol. 75 n. 2 (March/April 1996), pp. 20-36; Eliot A. Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare," Foreign Affairs, vol. 75 n. 2 (March/April 1996), pp. 37-54; Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century (Boston, NY, Toronto, London: Little Brown, 1993; and James F. Dunnigan, Digital Soldiers: The Evolution of High-Tech Weaponry and Tomorrow's Brae New Battlefield (NY: St. Martin's, 1996). See also the collection of papers available on the web written by Martin Libicki of the American Institute for National Strategic Studies, most notably: "Information and Nuclear RMAs Compared," in Strategic Forum of the INSS, no. 82 (July 1996) [URL: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum82.html] ; and Libicki, "The Next Enemy", in Strategic Forum (INSS), no. 35 (July 1995) [URL: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum35.html] ; and also Libicki and Richard Szafranski, "Tomorrow's Air Force," Strategic Forum, (INSS), no. 79 (July 1996) [URL: http//www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum79.html].

[2] See Ivan L. Head, On a Hinge of History: The Mutual Vulnerability of South and North (Toronto, Buffalo, London: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1991). Head concludes his study by denouncing neo-conservative ideological forces that attempt to substitute the judgement of markets for wise regulation and collective will. He writes: "In a period of enchantment about a global economy and the genius of the market, we forget that the abdication of political leadership in favour of the uninhibited jungle the market is the extreme escape from social responsibility." p 215.

Both Dyer and Head can point to the fact that Canada is one of the two wealthiest countries in the world (as measured in terms of overall quality of life and net wealth). Dyer has argued further that Canada, if it can surmount the ethnic nationalist challenge in Quebec and preserve its bilingual, multi-cultural character is likely to become an ideal prototype community of post-national, post-modern international citizens. For them the 'south-west' quadrant is home, as it is for the British expatriate and Yale University professor, Paul Kennedy, who, despite his bleak assessment of international environmental and economic developmental trends, still thinks the logic of co-operation and ODA sharing with "pivotal states" should outweigh the dubious attractions of fortress-like isolationism in any fully rational American strategic calculus.[4] Kennedy, like Arthur Schlesinger, worries about the risk that the global scale of the population-environment-development crisis may simply confuse American leadership and prevent clear thought or concerted action, while blocking the appropriate large increases that are needed in American ODA.[5] He too recognises that authentic 'internationalism' is in short supply in Clinton's America. Nevertheless his diagnosis of international ills and his policy recommendations are remarkably close in spirit to those animating residual liberal internationalist sentiment in Canada.

Finally, one should add that the research of Laurie Garrett on the risks of communicable diseases and biological warfare, also complements a re-emerging Canadian liberal-internationalist perspective on the 21st century.[6] As does Ivan Head, she emphasises the ecological consequences of the emerging 'borderless world' of international business and the extraordinarily heightened risks of both new and mutated 'old' infectious diseases. While the exploding populations of the poor states may find it difficult to migrate in large numbers, bacterial and viral diseases that they catch that have been flushed from the newly penetrated tropical forests can migrate easily on the tens of thousands of 'economic migrants' now crossing frontiers. And in the appallingly unsanitary, crowded shantytown conditions of the new suburban slums around the major cities of the LDC zone, old diseases can rapidly mutate.[7] Inadequate or dangerously incomplete use of anti-biotic drugs by the new very poor slum-dwellers compounds the problem by helping to accelerate the evolution of drug-resistant strains of various diseases. To date local authorities have shown an understandable reluctance to even admit the onset of plague, Ebola, or other traditional fatal diseases, let alone seek help: after all, tourism and commerce would surely suffer.

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[3] Head, Hinge of History, p. 194.

[4] See Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill, and Paul Kennedy "Pivotal States and U.S.Strategy," Foreign Affairs, vol. 75 n. 1 (January/February 1996), pp. 33-51. Here Kennedy explicitly elaborates a strategy for allocating ODA and other American strategic and technical support to his preferred "pivots" whose collapse, he believes, most clearly threaten to do damage to American interests. Mexico and Brazil, Algeria and Egypt, Turkey and South Africa, Pakistan and India, and finally Indonesia. Unlike Homer-Dixon Kennedy, by implication, seems reasonably optimistic about the ability of China and Russia to pull through the current painful transitions.

[5] Kennedy et al, " Pivotal States", pp. 49-50.

[6] Laurie Garrett, "The Return of Infectious Disease," Foreign Affairs, vol. 75 n. 1 (January/February 1996), pp. 66-79; and Garrett, The Coming Plague: Newly Emerging Diseases in a World Out of Balance (

Diseases will, in this view, become a great unifier of rich and poor--however distasteful and frightening that prospect may be for the affluent. 'Lifeboat' fantasies by the rich and powerful concerning this problem are hopelessly naive. Over a million people a day crossed borders each day during 1996. Surveillance at airports or other ports of entry is useless because the incubation period of 'hot' viruses is usually too long for readily identifiable symptoms to show up in infected travellers.[8] With respect to the incidence of infectious diseases in both the rich and poor zones, public health is thus fully, globally interdependent. Epidemics must be checked at their source.

The 'new' diseases provide further arguments for working within a conceptual paradigm of interdependence. The opportunities for ingenious and relatively inexpensive application of artificially created diseases to some of the manifold political causes promoted by international terrorist networks is certainly growing. The use of sarin nerve gas on the Tokyo subway in March of 1995 may be the precursor of other such attacks--biological, not 'merely' chemical. As Laurie Garrett noted:

> ...one hundred kilograms of a lethal sporulating organism such as anthrax spread over Washington, D.C. by a crop duster could cause well over two million deaths. Enough anthrax spores to kill five to six million people could be loaded into a taxi and pumped out its tailpipe as it meandered through Manhattan. Vulnerability to terrorist attacks, as well as to the natural emergence of disease, increase with population density.[9]

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[7] Garrett, "Return of Infectious Disease," p. 71.

[8] For an elaboration of the risk of rapid uncontrolled, worldwide spread of 'hot' viruses (those with no cure and a fatality rate in excess of 20 to 90%), see Richard Preston, The Hot Zone (NY: Random House, 1993). As Preston noted: "A hot virus from the rain forest lives within a twenty-four hour plane flight from every city on earth. All of the earth's cities are connected by a web of airline routes. The web is a network. Once a virus hits the net, it can shoot anywhere in a day--Paris, Tokyo, New York, Los Angeles, wherever planes fly" (pp. 11-12). Civil aircraft an international airports are excellent means for spreading diseases given the dry recycled air on the planes and the congestion in the airports.

[9] Garrett, "Return of Infectious Disease," p. 76.

The most bleak pessimists--Robert Kaplan, Thomas Homer-Dixon (although he may in fact straddle quadrants) and from an earlier era Robert Heilbroner[10]--are simultaneously conflict-pessimists and ecological-economic pessimists. Homer-Dixon and Kaplan both subscribe to the view that state collapse is a serious risk in many of the largest, multi-ethnic countries now experiencing rapid population growth and severe ecological stress. But Kaplan goes further in his assessment predicting that the 'coming anarchy' in many parts of Africa will inevitably spread to other parts of the globe--including the regions inhabited by the most affluent peoples who will vainly attempt to huddle behind their oceanic moats, electrified fences and airborne and satellite-based sensors. Conflict, he argues, will degenerate in the 21st century and become "re-primitivized". Brutal methods will be reasserted in the LDCs and they will soon be 'exported' to the industrialised states. The future of major cities in North America and Western Europe is being developed now in the shantytowns of Africa.[11] Kaplan does not try to see beyond this spreading chaos, brutality, criminality and confusion, but like historian Martin van Creveld he is convinced of its imminent arrival.[12]

Homer-Dixon does not venture out onto such speculative limbs, but his vision of the future while carefully circumscribed and qualified in his academic writing is hardly benign.[13] While pessimistic, it nevertheless holds out the hope that timely, effective action by the major powers today will be able to stave off a new dark age. By contrast the writings of Robert Heilbroner, an American economist and respected analyst of international development, represents the ultimate, bleak, long-term scenario for future world disorder.

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[10] See Heilbroner's still unrivaled effort to sketch out the most disturbing aspects of the 'long' view of the next four to five hundred years in his An Inquiry into the Human Prospect (NY: Norton, 1975). Heilbroner's work is the complete antithesis of Dyer's rosy perspective. For Heilbroner democracy is doomed to death by 'iron' regimes arising among the global poor, when the combined forces of economic and ecological crisis arrive with a mutually reinforcing jolt sometime during the 21st century. Such dictatorial regimes may, Heilbroner believes, engage in "wars of redistribution"--threatening massive destruction through acts of nuclear terrorism, or terrorism via other weapons of mass destruction thereby hoping to blackmail the affluent into a vast programme of development assistance.

[11] Kaplan, "Coming Anarchy", p. 76.

[12] Kaplan cites liberally from van Creveld's book The Transformation of War. See also an earlier work Technology and War (NY, London: Free Press/Macmillan, 1989) in which van Creveld argues that "much if not most modern military activity takes place below the sophistication threshold, and conversely many kinds of military technology have become too sophisticated, too powerful, and too indiscriminate for use in real-life warfare" (p. 283). It was his view then (writing before the Gulf conflict) that because of nuclear weaponry and the contemporary fascination with electronic sophistication on the battlefield , advanced conventional weaponry which had to be constantly subordinated to the risk of uncontrolled escalation was "being turned into toys and conventional war into an elaborate, but fundamentally pointless game." The risk, however, already exists that 'barbarians' who refuse to play by the rules will "pick up the playing-board and use it to smash the opponent's head". In his view, "new forms of warfare are threatening to put an end to our delicate civilization" (p. 296).

[13] See Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases", International Security vol. 19 n. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 5-40; and Thomas Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes As Causes of Acute Conflict," International Security , vol. 16 n. 2 (Fall 1991), pp. 76-116; and finally, Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, Jeffrey H. Boutwell and George W. Rathjens, "Environmental Change and Violent Conflict",

In Heilbroner's Inquiry Into the Human Prospect written in 1974, there is virtually no prospect of avoiding a return to predatory, authoritarian rule in all states. Liberal democracy will be doomed in the 21st century. The resort by governments in the poorer zones of the planet to 'wars of redistribution' will sooner or later guarantee a return to savagery and oppression.[14] The only way to halt the population explosion and to protect the affluent in their first-class compartments will be through 'iron' governments. But governments able to force radical social control on their peoples are likely to be revolutionary and authoritarian and are highly unlikely to stop with domestic 'reform'. Wars of redistribution, Heilbroner argued, "may be the only way by which the poor nations can hope to remedy their condition".[15]

The future of the poor states is bleak indeed. Environmental stress in many forms will be added to the problem of demographically induced crisis with disastrous results. Food and water will become ever scarcer. A tide of desperate and utterly dependent humanity will surround and engulf all major cities of the poor states. Preventing a "massive human deterioration in the backward areas can only be avoided by a redistribution of the world's output and energies on a scale immensely larger than anything that has hitherto been seriously contemplated." Accordingly, Heilbroner declared:

Scientific American, (February 1993), pp. 38-45. Homer-Dixon argues persuasively that: "...environmental scarcity causes violent conflict. This conflict tends to be persistent, diffuse and sub-national. Its frequency will probably jump sharply in the next decades as scarcities worsen in many parts of the world. Of immediate concern are scarcities of cropland, water, forests, and fish, whereas atmospheric changes such as global warming will probably not have a major effect for several decades, and then mainly by interacting with already existing scarcities" (emphasis added). As in "Scarcities and Violent Conflict", pp. 39-40.

[14] Robert Heilbroner, An Inquiry Into the Human Prospect (NY: Norton, 1975), pp. 43-4.

[15] Heilbroner, Inquiry, p. 43.

> Under the best of circumstances such a redistribution would be exceedingly difficult to achieve. Given the constraints on economic growth that will make their presence felt with increasing severity, such an unprecedented international transfer seems impossible to imagine except under some kind of threat. The possibility must be faced that the underdeveloped nations which have 'nothing' to lose will point their nuclear pistols at the heads of the passengers in the first-class coaches who have everything to lose. [16]

The risk of a train 'derailment' is thus seen to be immense. Even if derailment does not occur the nature of life on the train will be radically different after the first threats and attacks are made. Whether wars of redistribution are waged by the poor, or wars of industrial suppression are waged by the rich against the poor, the prospect for an eventual peace being arranged to stop the carnage is difficult to imagine. What is certain, however, is that with the diffusion of chemical and biological weapons manufacturing capability to many developing countries in the global South, there are now many less expensive but still highly destructive alternatives to 'nuclear pistols'.[17]

Penetrating Prognoses or Pulp Fiction? The Implications for International Security Policy

Americans have considerable ability to make reality conform to their 'visions'. In this respect the debate among American international security analysts is potentially of great consequence. Accordingly, the perspective on global affairs developed by Canadians may also be of significance if it can have an impact on American attitudes. What image of global relations in the 21st century is being projected by current Canadian policy? Which view of the future does Canadian international security policy seem to validate?

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[16] Heilbroner, Inquiry, p. 44.

[17] Iraq, for example, was found to have 160 bombs and 25 missile warheads filled with biological agents by U.N. inspectors. According to Canadian sources British researchers are presently investigating whether 'Gulf War syndrome' cases may be caused by an Iraqi biological agent. Mark Hume, "National defence fears biological war", Vancouver Sun, 9 May 1997. The Pentagon estimates that between 35,000 and 100,000 veterans of the Gulf War and their family members have been hit by chronic and often fatal ailments of unspecified origin. Ed Offley, "Veterans vent frustration at Redmond forum...", Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 8 May 1997. The Gulf War Veterans Association estimates that the number seriously afflicted is closer to 200,000. The U.S. Veterans Administration reportedly raised the number of American combat deaths for the Gulf War to 6,526 from 148 in 1995. The Association further estimates that three-quarters of the spouses of affected veterans have also come down with similar symptoms, suggesting that the condition is communicable and may well be the product of an active, communicable biological agent not merely exposure to chemical contamination. See William Thomas, "U.S. faces the scope of Gulf War syndrome," Vancouver Sun, 15 May 1997.

Judging by cuts to both defence spending and ODA, the Canadian government seems to belong in the Rose-Tinted Spectacles quadrant. Thanks to the triumph of Canada 21-style quasi-pacifist doctrine[18], and the public relations disaster of the Somalia inquiry, the future of the Canadian Forces is exceptionally bleak. The foundations of Canada's international security policy have been eroded by unwise decisions over the past three years to 'restructure' the military for what politicians and policy-makers in Ottawa foolishly believe will be a comparatively benign post-Cold War era.

Deficit-cutting mania can be adduced perhaps to explain some of the reasons for the government's approach. And an electorate increasingly preoccupied with rising levels of hidden unemployment caused by the 'casualization' of labour.[19] Indeed, foreign policy has been reduced to Team Canada trade missions to communist and ethnically repressive states (China and Indonesia), and fervent, well-intentioned but largely irrelevant speeches on disarmament and peacekeeping at a debt-ridden, paralysed and imploding United Nations.

The facts of retrenchment are unassailable. The army will not be getting a new Main Battle Tank any time soon, and therefore the ability to send Canadian troops to high-intensity conflicts such as the Gulf War of 1991 has been terminated[20]. Replacement submarines for the navy are on hold and may be terminated, casting into doubt the ability of the Canadian Forces to enforce Canadian fisheries laws. No new plans are afoot for replacement of the obsolescent CF-18s. And the ship-borne helicopters are many years away from acquisition let alone deployment, leaving Canada's million dollar frigates in a highly vulnerable condition unable to venture into waters where adversaries possess submarines. Doctrines and policies may come and go, but the capability of weaponry (or its lack) will endure. Ottawa's approach to international security policy since 1989 has amounted to little more than ritualised advocacy of peacekeeping, preventive diplomacy and 'initiatives' on non-proliferation. Canada has only a quite marginal military capability to apply to international crises when they arise.[21]

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[18] Policies of severe retrenchment of the Canadian military were outlined in Canada 21: Canada and Common Security in the Twenty-First Century (Toronto: Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, 1994), which were then embraced by many leading members of the Liberal Party. The result of this profoundly imprudent development, coupled with the public relations disaster of the Somalia inquiry and publicity attendant the other assorted misdeeds of Canadian military personnel, has been the destruction of the Canadian Forces as a usable, militarily consequential instrument.

[19] In 1996 almost 5 million Canadians lived below the poverty line. Nearly one-fifth of Canadian children lived in poverty. At no time since World War II has income polarization been as severe between top and bottom income earners.

[20] In ancient MBTs like the Leopard I, the risk of casualties would be extremely high. On the practical consequences of post-industrial societies' intolerance of casualties see Edward Luttwak, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," Foreign Affairs, vol. 73 n. 3 (May/June 1995); also "A Post-Heroic Military Policy," Foreign Affairs, vol. 74 n. 4 (July/August 1996); and "Where Are the Great Powers?", Foreign Affairs, vol. 72. n. 4 (July/August 1994).

In an increasingly troubled and uncertain world where advanced military capability is rapidly diffusing, a Canadian de facto retreat into Fortress North America is a disturbing step. If one of the ten or twelve richest countries in the world, and arguably one of its least threatened, cannot summon up the will and enlightened leadership to enable it to participate meaningfully in international security relations, what hope is there for other states who are even more troubled by real internal economic crisis or incipient refugee floods or warfare on their very frontiers?

The Chrétien government's even more dubious attack on Canada's international development assistance, confirms the fundamentally isolationist drift in Canadian foreign policy. In impact it mimics the recommendations of both Huntington and the American Republican majority in Congress. Slashing foreign aid from 0.49% of GNP (then some $ 3.18 billion) in 1991 to 0.29% in 1995 and a mere 0.25% by 1998-9,[22] is peculiar to say the least given the clear understanding in Ottawa of the gravity of the problems facing the poorest third of the world's population, and given the country's twenty-five year long commitment to eventual attainment of Lester Pearson's 0.7% commitment. There is no logic whatsoever in cutting both defence spending and foreign aid--unless the object of the exercise is to cut and run to 'Fortress West' or still worse 'Fortress North America'.

A few academics have underlined the ambiguity of the threats that are to be faced in a world without a Soviet empire.[23] But most commentators have managed to persuade themselves that in the post-Cold War era there is no credible direct threat to Canadian security. This position ignores the darker aspects of our current condition.

Russian leaders still have the weaponry to menace North America directly. Russian long-range strategic warheads still in service numbered some 7,000 as of

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[21] Douglas Fisher's comment is aptly illustrative of Canada's decline: "In Bosnian peacekeeping, Canada is the weak sister, thanks to military impotence and its prolonged opposition to tougher action. We are a small contributor to a powerful military force run by the big boys. Having relegated ourselves to the same league as Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden, nations a fraction our size, we boast [of our peacekeeping prowess]. We should be ashamed." Ottawa Sun, 28 August 1996. Fisher's reference to Sweden is in fact too flattering to Ottawa.

[22] Daphne Bramham, "Canada cuts aid to poorer countries," Vancouver Sun, 13 March 1996.

[23] See comments of Dan Middlemiss as quoted in "Report of the Special Joint Committee of the House of Commons and the Senate, 1994", p. 4; available at < http://superior.carleton.ca/npsia/policy_reports/finrpt/s6.html.>

January 1996.[24] Additional warheads for tactical purposes including air to ground, air to air, surface to air, ground to ground numbered between four and five thousand.[25] Even if START II were to be fully implemented, more long-range warheads could be retargetted at North America from their present 'oceanic co-ordinates' in a few hours[26] than menaced North America for the first twenty-five years of the Cold War. And the deployment of that much nuclear firepower in a country wracked by massive unemployment, starving military officers and homeless soldiers, is less than encouraging. The old nuclear threat has not disappeared, just receded.

It is noteworthy too that since 1991 the Russian government and military have rejected the previous Soviet commitment to nuclear No First Use. And it is certainly of consequence that discussion of NATO enlargement usually provokes Russian threats to cease implementation of START II.

NATO enlargement is a major mistake. A sensible Canadian response that is true to the liberal internationalist traditions of Canadian foreign policy would explore alternatives to provocative and destabilising enlargement. Ottawa could work to postpone the enlargement decision, or at least mitigate its most obvious negative consequences. Ottawa has no forces to withdraw from Europe, so only symbolic steps are available. A dedicated Canadian aid program to Russia of approximately $ 1 billion a year to help clean up nuclear and other toxic waste sites, and an aid program that could be broadened to include ODA from other existing Western European states, might help to mitigate Russian fears.

At least since late 1994 Canadian defence planners have been examining American 'theatre' missile defence concepts, despite the distress and suspicion that possible abandonment of the ABM Treaty by the U.S. would cause in Russia.[27] American strategic systems continue to be tested under the CANUSTEP umbrella agreement, including no doubt both B-2 bombers and advanced cruise missiles. And the NORAD agreement was renewed in the spring of 1996 with little exploration of other less symbolically threatening ways of providing effective early warning and strategic surveillance.[28] These decisions too should be reconsidered and perhaps revised if NATO enlargement sours relations with Moscow.

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[24] See Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, "NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Russian (CIS) Strategic Nuclear Forces, End of 1995," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 52 n. 2 (March/April 1996), pp. 62-3. Some 3,565 warheads remain deployed on 4 types of ICBM, 2,272 warheads on 3 types of Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles, and some 1,398 on 113 strategic bombers comprising three types (although 44 based in Ukraine are so poorly maintained that they cannot be said to be operational).

[25] As of September 1996 Norris and Arkin estimated, based on conversations with American intelligence sources, that the Russian military had some 4,400 warheads in non-strategic offensive roles. "Estimated Russian Stockpile, September 1996," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September-October 1996, pp. 62-3. Many thousands of older strategic warheads are being held for dismantling, but thousands of others are undoubtedly being held back from dismantling as a long-term hedge against a renewed threat--in mirror image of American actions and policies.

[26] As part of a reciprocal safety-enhancing and confidence-building measure, President Boris Yeltsin announced in early 1994 that henceforth Russian ballistic missiles would be targeted on Arctic Ocean coordinates rather than at specific military sites in North America. American missiles are said to have no target coordinates entered at all, which must provide some symbolic comfort even though they can be reentered in less than 15 minutes in many cases. Russian retargetting abilities are thought to be considerably less agile than American, given the gap in computer expertise.

Ottawa apparently has no clear policy on nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War era--despite some momentary enthusiasm for the recent ICJ statement on nuclear use. A renewed commitment to nuclear non-proliferation through endorsement of the recommendations of the Canberra Commission certainly deserves close attention. As the former head of SAC General Lee Butler noted recently, the only way to speed up progress on the nuclear proliferation front is by having the existing nuclear weapon states commit themselves to a rapid schedule that will end in complete nuclear disarmament as soon as possible. Only in this way can the prima facie discriminatory character of the NPT be remedied and real pressure be brought to bear on the most dangerous proliferant states.[29]

The appellation 'regional' to threats arising from these countries is a misnomer. Furthermore, Samuel Huntington's advice to avoid 'promiscuous' intervention in other people's troubles is completely inappropriate. The threats emanating from aggressive regimes unhappy with their regional status quo, are in no way analogous to regional military and geopolitical rivalries in the pre-World War II era. The diffusion of industrial technology has transformed what would otherwise be exclusively limited risk military engagements into potential wars of mass destruction: millions of people, in some cases tens of millions, are in fact at risk.

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[27] On 12 January 1995 the then Chief of the Defence Staff, Gen. John de Chastelain, said: "We're talking about joint involvement in the development of a product that would produce a regional ballistic missile defence....We said no before because in the context of the Cold War it would have been a destabilizing move, but now it is not....The threat is no longer bipolar, it is now multi-possible [sic], and an anti-ballistic missile system is attractive." Dennis Bueckert, lCanada eyes Star War defence system," The Montreal Gazette, 13 January 1996. So-called Theatre Missile Defence systems would not necessarily contravene the ABM Treaty but research and development on them would unavoidably support the achievement of a 'national' (or continental) missile defence capability by the United States.

[28] Much of the active air defence capability has been 'mothballed' and many radar surveillance systems in both Canada and the U.S. have been deactivated. NORAD's modestly revised role is to continue to focus on aid to the civil power in combating narcotics smuggling, and improvements in aerospace surveillance of the approaches to North America.

[29] The Weapons technology proliferation to poorer LDCs has already occurred. According to the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency "more than 40 countries" now have the technical capability to build nuclear weapons, and "more than 15 countries" have ballistic missile development programmes under way. In addition, "more than two dozen countries" have chemical weapons under development. From remarks by John D. Holum, director of ACDA, at Georgetown University, 2 November 1995; text of speech was found at <gopher://198.80.36.82:70/OR50632134-50639863-range/archives/1995/pdq.95 >.

Nuclear terrorism or terrorism with Chemical or Biological Weapons is a real threat.[30] In the near future these bulky truck bombs may well be replaced by small, unsophisticated atomic devices (or BW dispersal systems) that could kill millions or render half of Manhattan, or much of Tokyo, London or some other large Western financial capital uninhabitable for decades. American industry and population is not necessarily the most likely victim of international terrorist strikes in the first instance: highly visible, journalistically accessible cities in countries allied with the United States with porous national security systems might ultimately prove to be attractive targets for 'demonstration' purposes.[31]

The risk of war in the Middle East using weapons of mass destruction has most certainly not dissipated with the humbling of Saddam Hussein and UNSCOM's five-year long effort to identify and destroy all weapons of mass destruction. Syria already has a considerable chemical weapons capability and is generally credited with possessing a biological arsenal as well. It is well stocked with short-range ballistic missiles able to attack Israeli military bases with less than three minutes warning. Iran is thought to be between 2 and 4 years from its first nuclear weapons, unless purchase of fissionable materials smuggled from the former Soviet Union accelerates that timetable. The Iranian military has been buying SCUD missile variants from North Korea and developing longer range cruise missiles on its own.[32] And of course, Saddam Hussein is still scheming to re-establish Iraq as a major regional player. Despite UNSCOM, Iraq's pre-1991 war production capability has been almost completely rebuilt. Strategic pre-emption could well prove irresistible to the Israelis in some future crisis.

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[30] The risk of fissile nuclear materials from the former Soviet Union being purchased by states such as North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya or by international terrorist groups bent on revenge or irrational, apocalyptic-millenarian agendas is very substantial. The Aum Shinrikyo sect in Japan responsible for releasing nerve gas in the Tokyo subway system in 1995 also purchased land in Australia, ostensibly according to Japanese authorities, in a quest for accessible supplies of uranium. The same organization also had successfully recruited individuals with advanced biotechnology training sufficient to begin their own biological warfare development programme. Explosives experts concluded that the components of the crude fertilizer-fueled bomb set off in February 1993 under the World Trade Center in New York, had they been stacked optimally, would have been sufficient to bring down one of the Centre's twin towers, causing the death of thousands. As noted by Joseph B. Treaster, "The Tools of the Terrorist: Everywhere for Anyone," New York Times, 20 April 1995.

[31] From the perspective of a terrorist organization the point of such an attack would be to inspire fear in the American public and political elite sufficient to change behaviour. An attack on Washington itself would be counterproductive because it contains the leaders whose behaviour is to be influenced. An attack on some other American city might be a poor idea because it could stimulate an irrational reflex for revenge in American public opinion that could lead to catastrophe for the organization committing the terror and its national base. For an overview of recent American moves to deal with chemical and biological threats from terrorist organizations see Barbara Starr, "Briefing: Chemical and Biological Terrorism," Jane's Defence Weekly, 14 August 1996. As American security measures improve, the attractiveness of essentially undefended targets in neighbouring allied countries will presumably increase as well.

Tension between India and Pakistan has been growing steadily through the post-Cold War era. India's covert arsenal of nuclear warheads is thought to number more than two dozen, Pakistan's more than ten. Both countries are developing a ballistic missile capability: India through indigenous development (the Prithvi with a range up to 250 km and the Agni up to 2500 km), and Pakistan with the extensive nuclear assistance from China and the purchase of Chinese short-range M-11 missiles.[33] In the wake of the Surat pneumonic plague episode of 1994 near Bombay, accusations were made in India that the outbreak was caused by Pakistani covert biological attack.[34] As more of the missile systems go operational, and while the numbers of deployed nuclear weapons remain comparatively few (less than one hundred per side) the reciprocal temptation to try to pre-empt will certainly be felt in both capitals during intense confrontations, notwithstanding efforts to reduce tensions over Kashmir.

While the Korean situation has improved over the past three years, it is still far from stable. North Korean Nodong-1 IRBMs with a range of 1000 km are expected to be operational by the end of 1996; Taepo-Dong 1 and 2 missiles with ranges of 2000 and 3500 km respectively are moving forward in testing. CIA assessments claim all these weapons are being designed to carry nuclear, chemical or biological warheads.[35]

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[32] James Bruce, "Iran's long-range Tondar causes concern in West," Jane's Defence Weekly, 22 May 1996. Some American strategic analysts view Iran as the chief threat to the Middle East regional peace and advocate Israeli cultivation of a comprehensive nuclear preemption option vis a vis the Iranian unconventional weapons programmes. Some pessimistic estimates suggest Iran may be within one to two years of a crude nuclear deterrent. See Louis René Beres, "Power Preemption and the Middle East 'Peace Process', " Midstream, December 1995; also available on the World Wide Web at <http://www.freeman.org/feb96/beresp.htm >. U.S. Department of Defense sources have in recent years estimated an Iranian nuclear capability to be at least seven to ten years distant (the year 2000 at the earliest according to the CIA Director, John Deutch). But American intelligence clearly had no accurate idea of the rapid progress that Iraq had been making in the late 1980s towards a nuclear arsenal and seriously overestimated the year of Iraq's initial nuclear operational capability. Certainly had the war not occurred in 1991, Iraq would have had at least two weapons by the end of 1992 and potentially dozens within another five years.

[33] Missile range estimates from Jed C. Snyder, "South Asian Security After the Cold War," Strategic Forum, (Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University); as found at
< http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/strforum/forum16.html >, August 1996. Snyder credits the Pakistani version with a range of up to 300 km., but it should be noted that with a 2200 pound warhead the M-11 is thought to have range of no more than 150 km. See "Beijing Steps Up Campaign of Military Pressue," New York Times, 7 March 1996.

[34] See Laurie Garrett, "The Return of Infectious Disease," Foreign Affairs, Jan/February 1996, p.

Finally, China represents a final huge zone of strategic uncertainty. The Beijing leadership's failed effort to intimidate the population of Taiwan during the presidential elections on the island in the spring of 1996, nevertheless demonstrated that the Chinese authorities are willing to play the game of coercive diplomacy just as readily as are the Americans. So too did aggressive Chinese behaviour in the South China Sea in seizing disputed islands. The further deepening of relations with the repressive government of Myanmar (in return for naval and intelligence gathering deployments in that country) and the persistent export of missile and nuclear technology to Pakistan, Iran, and Algeria suggest the Western countries will see continuing problems in relations with Beijing. Any interruption in mainland China's recent economic success might very well lead Chinese leaders to try to play the nationalist 'card' and forcibly reintegrate Taiwan. Leaders in Taipei too might provoke a showdown if they come to believe that the US will gradually retreat from the western Pacific.

In virtually none of these cases can Canada offer militarily meaningful assistance to the United States or the United Nations in efforts to deter resort to weapons of mass destruction or aggressive warfare. Without modern armour, adequate rapid airlift and state of the art fighter interceptors, Ottawa is condemned to the margins of diplomacy in future conflicts.

To date we have seen only rhetoric in Ottawa about the need to adopt a much more comprehensive concept of security.[36] Opposition parties accepted the present government's self-congratulatory assessment that it had provided "Canadians with an effective, realistic and affordable defence policy" in the 1994 White Paper.[37] Canadian leaders have virtually opted out of any effective contribution to collective defence, collective security and international development. By so doing they are only likely to accentuate the tendency in the United States towards unilateral decision-making and de facto isolationism. Canadian inaction and Canadian defection from its liberal internationalist traditions will only validate Huntington's exclusionary approach to foreign policy. The emerging reality of the 21st century is one of unavoidable interdependence among the peoples of the world. Strategic and economic insecurity flow automatically from this reality. The rich cannot isolate themselves from the pain and suffering of the wretched of the earth. To attempt to do so in pursuit of some truncated version of 'realism' would guarantee an ultimate disaster for the human species. In the face of the immense challenges we now confront, the advice of Ivan Head and Pierre Trudeau is apposite: "Our future as humans will be influenced immeasurably by our definition of community and our acceptance of the common destiny of our species....Conscience is much more than a guide for human behaviour; at the conclusion of the twentieth century , it is the elevated--and only certain--path towards the survival of civilisation."[38] A hypothetical and speculative 'clash of civilisations' must not dominate our thoughts about international security in the next century, but rather a determination to forge ever broader common standards of civilised and responsible behaviour for the troubled decades ahead.

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[35] Barbara Starr, "CIA expect Nodong deployment next year," Jane's Defence Weekly, 11 November 1995.

[36] See Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future, Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons Reviewing Canadian foreign policy, chaired by Allan MacEachen and J.R. Gauthier, (Ottawa: Parliamentary Publications Directorate, 1994); and chapter 1 of 1994 Defence White Paper (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services/Canada Communication Group-Publishing, 1994).

[37] 1994 Defence White Paper, p. 49.

The diffusion of technologies of mass destruction and the recently recognised environmental instability of our common global habitat indicate the need for:

1) a permanent commitment to ever greater levels of co-operation in the management of international security;

2) the early negotiation of binding accords to forestall radical climate change and loss of biodiversity;

3) the onset of good faith negotiations aimed at defining a global economic regime that will foster sustainable development, restore and expand international aid flows, and lead eventually to the eradication of poverty and disease throughout the world.

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[38] Ivan Head and Pierre Trudeau, The Canadian Way: Shaping Canada's Foreign Policy, 1968-1984 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1995), pp. 318-9.

Denis Stairs

CANADA'S EXPANDED SECURITY AGENDA

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Like my predecessors at the podium, I do want to thank our hosts for inviting me to what has turned out to be a perfectly splendid occasion. The conference has been beautifully organised, and we have all been pampered beyond belief — even to the point of hangover!

Until now, the *intellectual* fare, too, has been first class. I fear that I may be about to lower the level. Besides, if I had any thunder at all to deliver, Francis has just now stolen it! And if there was any positional advantage in coming last, Doug has just now destroyed it!

But perhaps you are all sufficiently over-hung — and sufficiently absorbed in planning how you are going to eat, drink and be merry before one of Doug's disasters does you in — that you won't notice.

I was given three questions to consider. I will begin, therefore, by reading them out to you, along with a short answer in each case. After that, I suppose I should blather on at a little greater length, in a doubtless futile attempt to explain myself.

- First Question: What types of issues will represent security concerns to Canada in the future?
- Short Answer: Whatever types we choose. Currently we are choosing a lot.

- Second Question: Where are these security concerns likely to occur?
- Short Answer: Given the choices we seem to be making, almost anywhere.

- Third Question: What capabilities will we need to address these security concerns?
- Short Answer: Far more than we have, and far, far, far more than we will ever be willing to deploy.

Conclusion: The Emperor is wearing too few clothes, and should find some more to put on (or else, be a little less anxious to lead the parade).

So much for the short answers. Now for the tedious blather. Canada is a secure country. As secure — at least — as a country can get.

With the cold war departed, and with Ottawa wisely ensuring that Americans will not be seriously (as opposed to mildly) inconvenienced by anything that Canada might do, Canadians have no need in the short or medium term to feel directly threatened by external military menace. If their state is in danger of disintegration, the challenge comes from within, not from without. And if Canadians fail to meet it, the fault will be entirely their own.

Internal quarrels apart, it is possible to mount a persuasive argument even to the effect that Canadians have no security agenda at all. And if they insist on having one, they must either invent it, or wait for external forces -- forces over which they have no direct control -- to create it anew.

This may have been true even during the cold war itself, when a colleague of mine (Mike McGwire) used to observe with disconcertingly effective precision that Canada's defence problem was that it had no defence problem. The Americans, he pointed out, would defend us whether we liked it or not, and while our diplomatic and foreign policy interests were doubtless well served by our military deployments at home and abroad, only in very rare cases could it be said that our physical safety was significantly enhanced by the effort we made.

But this was a judgement that came from a very traditional form of analysis, in which the term "security" was taken to mean the protection of the territory, population, property, and government of the state (its land, labour, capital and management, if you like) against attack, invasion, seizure, subjugation or overthrow by an outside power (or powers). Occasionally it also meant the protection of the established regime against subversion by malcontents at home — in which case the security function of the armed forces was to stand ready to provide "aid of the civil power" — in other words, to put the blighters down!

Currently, however, it has become the fashion to think of "security" in much broader terms, and to regard it as demanding not merely a military response to a military threat, but as requiring also other kinds of response, aimed at other kinds of threat. Wars persist, and for all the traditional reasons. But we are now said to face, in addition, a quite different array of perils — equally deadly, equally demanding of pre-emptive defences. The potential destruction of our natural habitat is one. The political chaos that can result from poverty in the poorest regions of the world is said to be another. The depletion of the non-renewable natural resources upon which our economic prosperity depends is claimed to be a third. The looming presence and possible proliferation of incurable diseases (new ones, like AIDS, and old ones newly resistant to old remedies, like TB) is a fourth. The sale into frighteningly unreliable and unsophisticated hands of nuclear weapons is a fifth. The explosion in the population of stateless, and hopeless, refugees is a sixth. And some would add to this melancholy list such further manifestations of social injustice as the routine violation in many countries of what the liberal democratic world regards as fundamental human rights, and the exploitive oppression in many societies overseas of both women and children.

Acts of humanity and acts of God alike being cruelly inventive, this litany of existing and potential woes is easily extended. The forces of darkness, moreover, are often said to reinforce one another — the oppression of women, for example, being taken as inimical to economic development, and both together being a recipe for political instability, and hence for belligerence abroad.

That these are serious problems -- most of them, anyway -- cannot be doubted. What is less certain is why they have come to be so commonly regarded as **security** problems.

For this, certainly, is now the official Canadian position. It cropped up in the 1994 Parliamentary review of foreign policy. It was re-asserted in the government's "white paper" response (Canada in the World). It can even be found in the white paper that issued in the autumn of 1994 from the Department of National Defence. It permeates as well (this hardly needs to be said) the rhetoric of the NGO community. And it is reiterated constantly by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. As recently as December 13, for example, Mr. Axworthy told the National Forum on Foreign Policy here in Winnipeg that

> It is increasingly clear that preserving "human security" — human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, sustainable development and social equity — is as important to global peace as arms control and disarmament."

Now, there is nothing wrong with this argument. Or, at least, there is nothing wrong with it in principle. As I have said, these are all serious matters, worthy of our close attention. But it should be clearly understood that the decision to regard them as problems of **security** is a decision that we make ourselves. It is not a decision that is thrust upon us by others. We can choose to regard them in this way if we wish, or we can choose NOT to regard them in this way. But the choice is entirely ours to make.

This is not, of course, how most other countries derive their security agendas, and the luxury we enjoy in being able to proceed in such a fashion is just that — a "luxury". In the end, it is the product of our geopolitical good fortune. But however that may be, if we DO choose to define our security problems in this fashion, then by definition we are going to be dealing with them as "security issues" for the foreseeable future. For they are unlikely to "go away" (although some of them may well go out of fashion).

I suppose a question to be asked about all this is WHY we have so recently chosen to define them in the manner I have described. Two of the reasons for doing so seem to be relatively obvious, and they appear (on the surface, at least) to be analytically respectable. The first is that they are all similar to war in that they pose the possibility of death, destruction and human suffering on a significant — sometimes even on a massive — scale. Since security, as an obligatory objective of state, entails the successful avoidance of "death, destruction and human suffering on a significant scale", there is a sense in which these other problems look as if they might belong in the same sort of disaster-category as war itself, and therefore be worthy of a similarly central place in the priorities of government.

The second reason is that they are directly related to war (or so it is commonly argued) by virtue of their being included among its causes. It is assumed, for example, that wars — whether between states or within them — are often rooted in economic, political, social, or other forms of extreme deprivation and impoverishment. Radical politics, so the argument goes, is like crime. It feeds on desperation. And war is radical politics.

Now it is not self-evidently clear that these various empirical assumptions are true. Certainly they are not entirely true. Some of the worst wars in modern times, for example, have been triggered, not by the poorest states, but by the richest ones. To the extent that such assumptions are true, moreover, it is not completely obvious that the conflicts to which they give encouragement pose any very direct threat to Canada.

But in the real world of foreign policy politics, that's probably not the point. The fact is that all these phenomena are unpleasant. Other things being equal, therefore, we would prefer to be rid of them. Since Canada is not distracted by externally-driven security concerns of its own, it can afford to focus on problems that are at several steps removed from the ones that bear on the service of its most immediate interests. Hence we can decide if we wish — and we have in fact so decided — that our security agenda be geared (as Boutros Boutros-Ghali would wish it to be) to what we assume are the underlying causes of conflict, rather than to conflict itself. (As an aside, it may be worth emphasising that this is not at all a novel concept. Many of the Specialised Agencies of the United Nations, engineered for the most part in the late 1940s, were constructed on essentially the same premise. But in politics, old wine often seems to taste better in new bottles.)

There is, however, a third reason for the current Canadian attachment to a broader conception of the security agenda than the traditional one. No one talks about it very much because it's a little sneaky. It reflects a sleight of hand. But the fact of the matter is that those who have been most enthusiastic in their support for the broader view have been that way partly because they want the government to give the same pride of place to these other issues as has customarily been given to the maintenance of the military security of the state itself. If everyone agrees that the depletion of the ozone layer is a security problem, as opposed to some other kind of problem, the assumption — and the hope — is that it will be taken more seriously. In concrete terms, development assistance policy becomes defence policy. Environmental policy becomes defence policy. Natural resource conservation policy becomes defence policy. Human rights policy becomes defence policy. And so on.

In addition — and as a corollary — there is the concomitant hope that the re-definition of what security means will give the policy-advocates in the new security issue-areas a favoured position in laying claim to such resources as may be released to the public treasure as a result of reductions in traditional forms of defence spending. Indeed , it can give them a strong foundation for arguing that such reductions ought to be instituted in the first place. The implication here is clear. If we spend less money on (say) military aircraft, we will think first of assigning the savings that result to other forms of security policy — international development assistance among them — rather than to deficit reduction, hospital care, the universities, or those who are in need of social services in our own communities (many First Nations communities among them).

I hasten to emphasise that this may well be the right thing to do -- morally, politically, or both. Making such decisions is one of the more difficult of the existential responsibilities that politicians, in spending the public funds that are entrusted to them, are obliged to assume. All I wish to point out here is that the packaging of these various matters into a single "security issues" basket can in practice influence the way in which the budgetary trade-offs are made, if only because it tends to limit (artificially) the range of options that we are inclined to regard as appropriate.

I should perhaps add nonetheless — and this is a purely personal judgement — that I would be more than a little reluctant to see our conventional defence establishment too extensively whittled away in response to these other claims. This is because I am not at all sure that we are going to rid ourselves of traditional manifestations of warfare within the foreseeable future, and I think we need to maintain some significant capabilities, "just in case." In any event, there is all sorts of evidence that initiatives in the other security issue-areas often require military cover and protection if they are to have any hope of being effective. I am also persuaded that a military establishment is in many contexts essential to the buttressing of an effective Canadian diplomacy. Those who think otherwise ought to take a good look at the declining level of Canada's influence in Europe, now that we have no standing military presence in the European theatre.

But enough of that!

I have also been asked to consider, not only WHAT TYPES of security issues will be of concern to Canada in the future, but also to assess WHERE these security concerns are likely to occur.

As I indicated at the beginning, the short answer to this is, "Almost anywhere." This is partly because of the power of the so-called CNN phenomenon — which has the effect periodically of generating enormous public pressure on governments to undertake remedial initiatives, even where the probability of success is low and the connection with real Canadian interests next to non-existent.

The policy-community in Ottawa amuses itself from time to time by deliberating on the geographical areas to which Canada ought to give first priority. In reference to "functional" foreign policy issues,. that may sometimes be useful (although I think its value tends to be over-rated). But in reference to "security" issues, it is a mug's game. This is partly because one of the side-effects of incorporating some of the more remote ingredients of the causes of war in our account of our security agenda is that it de-legitimises a geopolitical approach to the making of our security policy. I just know that this is going to get me into all sorts of trouble. But let's take the case of Africa. The hard fact of the matter is that what happens in sub-Saharan Africa really has very little bearing on any discernible Canadian interest. The entire region could go up in flames, and assuming that there were no escalation of the conflict to parts of the international community closer to home, Canada would be largely unaffected. By the traditional standards of statecraft, therefore, "Africa" ought to be off our priority list. But in fact it is not, and the reality is that Canada — albeit somewhat capriciously and unpredictably — will continue to find itself responding from time to time to tragedies on the African continent in ways that it thinks may be helpful. This is partly because doing so is regarded as useful to the maintenance of our general position in international politics, and partly because reflects a widespread conviction in Ottawa and elsewhere that our involvement in such matters has the potential to encourage the construction of a more fully and effectively institutionalised international order (in which Canada has a diffuse interest). It is also, however, because the government will be instructed to intervene by its own constituents, who will want to respond to *moral* imperatives — imperatives founded on a humanistic compassion — rather than to the principles of raison d'etat alone.

This may be a good thing — although I doubt that it is always a good thing. But the conclusion in any case remains: When "security" is defined very broadly, as we have now chosen to define it, all of the world's regions become open to the possibility of a Canadian intervention.

Well, almost all of them. I doubt that we will be asked to do any peacekeeping in the feudal outbacks of hinterland China. But I imagine you have the point..

I have been asked to consider, finally, what capabilities we will need in order to address the security issues we will face.

This is an interesting question. But like the other questions before us, it looks a lot simpler than it really is. I have already indicated that I believe in keeping the powder dry (as Lester Pearson used to put it). Certainly I think it would be very unwise of us to reduce our armed forces to the level of a kind of "social worker constabulary." We have need of the Salvation Army. But I am afraid I am enough of a sceptic about the human condition to think we need the other kind of army, too.

Still, that's not very interesting in itself.

What IS interesting derives from the requirements of the rest of the issues now assigned to the security basket, presuming that those issues are taken seriously. (As an aside, it could be argued here that I am indulging in a false premise, and that the government's use of the language of security in reference to the new agenda is no more than a rhetorical device aimed at political mobilisation. The vocabulary of government — sometimes — is a vocabulary of leadership, to be assessed by reference to its political effect rather than to its literal meaning. That may be so. But conniving in this political game is not the academic's proper function — not, at least, when dressed in academic clothing. Democracy is served by acts of leadership. It is also served by blowings of the whistle.)

The reality, of course, is that the problems that are included in the basket economic development, the advancement of human rights, the export of the institutions and practices of democracy, the eradication of eradicable diseases, the preservation, even, of ordinary trees — all these problems and many more like them have dimensions that are, quite simply, horrendous.

Some of them may well lie entirely beyond the remedial capacities of humanity as a whole, much less the small Canadian part of it — even if humanity were inclined to devote itself in unison to the completion of the tasks required.

To make this sobering observation invites, perhaps, a protest. For it threatens to make the best the enemy of the good. Surely Canada can at least do its part. In other words, it can *try*. And certainly it can encourage others to do the same.

But when all is said and done, it still seems to me that we have begun to define the problems before us in a way that will make it certain that our initiatives will be seen to have failed, with the result that disillusionment will then set in. There is, after all, a certain lack of humility in our current aspirations. We have had considerable difficulty, I think we would all agree, in engineering the economic development of Newfoundland and Cape Breton (I apologise for being a trifle parochial). Why, then, do we assume that we can do the job so easily by short-term initiatives elsewhere in the world? Why did we think we could modernise Somalia — rendered chaotic in a Hobbesian state of nature — in a few months? (This, I suspect, was more of an American sin than a Canadian one, but we were happy enough to join in.) Do we really think now that the generations of animosity in the Balkans can be calmed down to reasonable levels in a mere year or two? Are we convinced that six weeks of training in Regina, and the tendering of some on-going advice in Port-au-Prince, is going to convert the Haitian constabulary into a Canadian-style police force — even in a context in which almost all of the normal buttresses of the "rule of law" (including above all the social and behavioural conventions upon which that depends) are absent?

I am not attempting to argue here against our trying to do some of these things. But if I am asked, in the light of the security agenda that we have set for ourselves, what capabilities we will actually require to address it, my answer, quite simply, is "More capabilities than we have," and "Many, many, many more than we will ever be willing to assign to the task."

I will take this point one step further before I stop, and before the glaze I am beginning to detect in your eyes takes over entirely!

One of the things that I think may well happen in the future — it may already be happening now — is that instead of the broader definition of security leading ultimately to the assignment of yet more resources to the security basket, it may actually lead to the assignment of less. This is because the promise to take initiatives in the newly emphasised issue-areas can be more easily fulfilled than the traditional ones by no more than token displays — activity, as it were, "on the cheap." For example, Canada for some years has been despatching large numbers of electoral specialists abroad to supervise and otherwise help to administer elections in countries that are experimenting with the democratic process. This is a perfectly sensible and useful thing to be doing. But it hardly amounts to a sacrificial effort. And while the appropriate conduct of the electoral process is important to the practical functioning of representative democracy, it is only a very tiny component of the complex foundation upon which the construction of a reliable democratic tradition must depend.

To put the point another way, we can make the claim that the democratization of the political process is one of the keys to the prevention of war; we can then help to administer some elections in far away places; and after that we can claim to have made a significant contribution to the security of ourselves and the world. But the claim may ring a trifle hollow to those who understand the security problem in more sophisticated terms, and whose expectations of Canada are of a higher order.

There is, in short, a danger that in practice we will buy into the rhetoric, but not into the substance. This may not be a particularly useful way of enhancing our credibility abroad, or of making a real contribution to our defined security objectives.

As always, therefore, we may be well advised to keep a closer eye on what our rulers are doing than on what they are saying. And it might be helpful as well if we were to encourage them to pick and choose, and to focus their efforts — in short, to establish some priorities (even if they keep them to themselves).

This is easily said, less easily done. But it might make the job a little more feasible if we were to give up at least some of our messianic zeal, and asked ourselves instead some hard questions about what our real interests are. It is the responsibility of the government of Canada, after all, to mind the business of Canadians. Minding the business of other people is a more gratuitous undertaking, and it is prone to ineffectuality, if not to accident.

It is, in fact, a form of imperialism. But imperialism is an arrogance — even if well-intentioned — more appropriately left to great powers than to modest ones. Certainly Canada's modest Caesar should not seek to join the imperial parade unless adequately dressed.

Closing Remarks

James Fergusson

Jim Fergusson
CLOSING REMARKS

Jim Fergusson is Deputy Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies and Assistant Professor of Political Studies at the University of Manitoba.

> Now is the winter of our *Atlantic* discontent, made glorious summer by our *Team Canada*, and all the clouds that lord upon our *Cold War* house in the deep bosom of the *Pacific Ocean* be buried.

This opening, somewhat altered, passage from Richard III reflects in many ways the implicit, if not explicit, division present in the discussions and debates at this conference concerning Canada between East and West. It is a division in which the West (geographically the East) refers to the Atlantic and Europe, to the dominant issue of security, and finally to a well-known past that implies a pessimistic perspective on Europe and Canada's relations with it. On the other hand, the East or the Pacific has been dominantly viewed as new, and dynamic; a region for Canada dominated by economic opportunities and a significant degree of optimism. Certainly Mr. Dubois clearly pointed out the dynamic opportunities emerging in the new Europe, although the phrase "the new Europe" is not an entirely new one of the post Cold War era. Nonetheless, the new Europe of the EU, as it marches toward the glory of federal integration, the widening and deepening of the Union in the near future, provides a range of opportunities for Canada. These opportunities reflect not only Canada's long-standing commitment to European security and Canada's potential role in facilitating the new security environment in Europe, but also of economic opportunities emerging from further integration within the Union, and the developing "free market" economies of Central and Eastern Europe. In a sense, as implicitly argued by Mr. Dubois, Europe may be the "Pacific" of the future, and Canada would be remiss to ignore the economic opportunities that may emerge in next decade in Europe. In other words, Europe may not be the past, but rather the future of a dynamic integrated economy within a stable security environment. At the same time, one should be cautious about the optimism attached to the Pacific. Dr. Boutilier clearly noted the underlying degree of insecurity and instability in the Pacific/Asian region.

Regardless of the overarching images and arguments about Europe and the Pacific as they relate to Canada, there is one important point in the security realm for Canada that seems to have been largely uncontested; Canada's only voluntary security commitment remains to Europe, and it remains with NATO. To echo Dr. Nossal's comments about the Atlantic Community, this commitment is not a North Atlantic one. Rather, it is a European commitment on the part of Canada. This is no where more clearly evident then in the treatment of Canada's security relationship with the United States. Of course, Canada's relationship with the United States is somewhat outside the purview of this conference. Nonetheless, images implicitly presented about this relationship indicate that it is not a voluntary one, but rather a given fact of life for Canada. The United States will defend Canada no matter what, so that a security relationship is vital to ensure that Canada has some input into its own defence. Moreover, it has also been clearly recognised , and there is little evidence to support otherwise, that both for Canada and the United States, North American defence has very little to do with European defence. Both Canada and the United States continue to keep these compartments separate. Despite the Canadian-U.S. Regional Planning Group of NATO, in reality, Europe is Canada's only permanent voluntary security commitment, and it is not contradictory to call this commitment both permanent and voluntary. Dr. Ross spoke about the potential withdrawal of Canada from NATO, that reflected its voluntary nature. Yet. Mr. Kirby spoke of the likelihood of Canadian involvement in a European crisis even in the absence of a formal security commitment through NATO; an image of Canada reminiscent of 1939. In this sense, Canada's response would be an automatic, or semi-automatic response that reflects a permanence to the relationship. Of course, this may simply reflect Canada's overall commitment to international peace and security. Regardless, the arguments and discussion reflect the dominance of security in Canadian thinking about the Atlantic and the Atlantic tradition.

Turning to the Pacific, with the noted exception of Mr. Furtado who provide a hint, there has been no discussion about Canadian security commitments to this region. Yet, Canada does have one security commitment that emerged out of Canadian participation under the United Nations flag in the Korean War. Although fairly ambiguous and open-ended in operative terms, following the armistice, Canada, as the other members of the U.N. force, committed military force to the defence of South Korean from a future war with the North. Even beyond this point, the question of whether or not Canada needs to make some form of security commitment in the region has been left unasked. It is an issue that was never discussed. Certainly with declining resources confronting the Department of National Defence, it is very difficult to conceive of Canada even contemplating a security commitment. However, if the Pacific is becoming more and more important to Canada, as argued by many people here and elsewhere, it certainly opens the door to questions about security commitments for Canada.

In ignoring security issues in favour of economic ones, the Pacific has been portrayed as a region of opportunities and challenges for Canada. Opportunities for Canada's economy to develop and exploit; challenges stemming from structural and cultural obstacles confronting Canadian business, as well as more general political and social interaction between Canada and Asia-Pacific that affect the development of Canada's role and identity as a Pacific nation. Reflecting the security-Atlantic/economic-Pacific division, this may be Canada's Year of Asia Pacific, but it is not Canada's Year of Living Dangerously with regard to the region.

Despite the eloquent case made by the Foreign Minister, the Honourable Mr. Axworthy, and Mr. Furtado about the functionalist approach to Canadian Foreign and Defence policy, there is a clear correlation between a regional or geopolitical analytical superstructure and an issue area-functionalist agenda. Europe, or the Atlantic for Canada is security oriented, and underpinned primarily by latent fears of Russian imperial resurgence or Russian collapse; the potential for a new Cold War, and the importance to avoid such an outcome. In the Pacific, there is the issue of economic dynamism and the fear of the consequences for Canada of *missing the boat*. For the rest of the world, at least for the Foreign Minister, the issue for Canada is human rights and the moral imperative of Canadian functionalism. Combining the three together may clarify what Minister Axworthy meant by Canada having global interests and global reach. Canada, it would appear, now possesses the attributes of a great power, including of course a wonderful imperial messianic ideology of goodness and cosmopolitanism.

Regardless of one's perspective relative to the various points made over the last three days, three key points emerged. The first, emphasised particularly by Dr. Keenes, concerns the perceptual wholeness and home of Canada. It reflects the age old dilemma of the Canadian identity relative to its shaping by geopolitics. Second is the discussion around the principles of Canadian Foreign Policy as they relate to the apparent dichotomy between Canadian values and interests. Finally, there is the *sum of all fears:* the drift to the past. Concerning identity and geopolitics, the discussions have clearly indicated that the ghost of MacKinder still remains, despite the claims about the decline and demise of the territorial state, the shrinking of the globe through technology, and the pressures of globalism. Interestingly. the conference has pointed out that traditional directional labels or images have largely become obsolete. One used to think of Europe as the west, and it is now the east; the Pacific and Asia used to be the east, the Far East, and it is now considered the west in the Canadian context. Perhaps, it is just a matter of time before North and South have switched perceptual location as well.

The identity and locational problem for Canada with regard to its geopolitical reality may be related to the range of domestic political, economic, and cultural/social forces that affect or are perceived to affect the nature of Canadian foreign policy. It is useful to bring to one's attention Pearson's comment that foreign policy is simply domestic politics with its hat on. It was interesting, and hinted at Dr. Boutilier in the round table discussions how this identity problem can be understood through the lens of the City of Winnipeg. Winnipeg, it appears, is neither east nor west; just ask the Winnipeg Blue Bombers, who keep being moved from the western division to the eastern division of the CFL and back again and again. In Ottawa, a Winnipeger is a westerner; in Vancouver, he/she is an easterner. Perhaps Canadian identity problem will be resolved when Winnipeg's problem is. If, or when, the proposal for Winnipeg as the north-south transport corridor comes to fruition, Dr. Keenes' argument of Canada finally finding its home in the Americas may be confirmed. This, of course, may have always been the case, with the problem being the inherent fear of Canada being *home alone* in an American house.

Second, the division between values and interests in Canadian Foreign Policy considerations, that has been present here and stood out in the recent National Forum meeting is not only misleading, but patently false. Nonetheless, this schizophrenia about values and interests may be at the analytical, or psycho-analytical root of the dilemma in Canadian foreign policy discussed at length here. It is a false dichotomy because it implies that Canadian policy choices in today's uncertain world are based upon some idea of carefully weighing benefits and costs relative to the dominant conflict between values and interests. Or perhaps, it may imply a reluctance to do so, that as a result produces a paralysis in policy; the failure to make a choice and/ or the inability to choose. Clearly, there is a need for a better understanding of Canadian interests as a function of values. In effect, there is a need to try to understand what Canada's interests truly are, and how they are, or should be, determined as dictated by Canadian values. This need represents a key analytical problem for decision makers who are tasked with making hard choices about competing values as they determine Canadian interests. Here again, as evident in the panel discussion this afternoon, is the question of the need for, and the importance of public debate. However, it is a debate that can only be led by political elites and government; ones who are reluctant to do so.

Closely related to the issue of public debate and input are the points made about the policy process in this country as a whole, and the importance and the need for its reform. Reform does not simply mean the veil of democratisation that has been evident of late, but rather the clear articulation by elites, government and bureaucratic, of Canadian values and interests. One need not suggest a Royal Commission or an inquiry to start the process, but at least some sort of level playing field in the relationship between external and internal political inputs, and between

Foreign Affairs and National Defence. Given that Foreign Affairs has five cabinet ministers, perhaps National Defence should get five as an initial step.

Regardless, everyone here, more or less, is empathetic with the policy dilemma that Canada faces in the uncertain post-Cold War world. There is no single target on its radar screens as there was in the past, but multiple ones; which are real and which are ghosts are likely to be only discovered long after the fact. Nonetheless, given the recognition of fiscal reality and declining resources, hard choices have to be made, and choice is a point that has been implicitly, if not explicitly, made by all the speakers. Choice may be directed in an east-west, or north-south sense for example. It is not to be understood in an either/or sense, but rather within degrees of emphasis or prioritisation. Of course, in some foreign and defence policy areas, hard choices are being made. It is the way, as noted above, that choices are made that is problematic. In other cases, no choices are being made. Canada lacks a strategic vision, a strategic mind set, a strategic culture. Adopting one may be extremely difficult, and as it has been pointed out, adopting one does not guarantee that it will be the correct one. But at least it would bring some degree of order vital to making choices, allocating resources and clearing up the problem of the competition between values and interests in the context of both the Atlantic and the Pacific, if not Canada's place in the world as a whole.

On the other hand, perhaps this view is incorrect. Perhaps there is a strategic vision, and it is just hidden. There is a strategic blueprint that underpins Canadian foreign and defence policy, as noted earlier on. It is a security tie to Europe, an economic focus on the Pacific in its broadest sense, including the Americas, and a humanitarian, moral imperative for the rest of the world or the south in general, and Africa in particular. Or perhaps the true strategic blueprint in this country is more aptly understood in the final point: the drift to the *sum of all fears* - continentalism. One could not help but recall over the past several days the 1920's: a world of uncertainty, optimism, and pessimism. If one looks back to some of the writings of scholars in the field of international politics 1920's and the journalists writing for the major newspapers in the 1920's, many of the issues discussed are almost identical to today. Many of the approaches, ideas of institutionalisation, multilateralism, and co-operation are all visible in speeches given by Foreign Ministers to the assembled members of the League of Nations. Drawing one's mind to the 1920's is not to suggest an economic future of the 1930's and a security future of the 1940's, even though both have been present at this conference.

In relation to the 1920s and 30s, there is another ghost present: the ghost of Mackenzie King. In many ways, the sum of the discussions on Canadian foreign policy between east and west and beyond within a changed social, cultural and economic condition for Canada, and the world, is the idea, or the policy of limited liability. Functionalism at the core of Canadian internationalism is today, in many ways, consistent with King's policy of limited liability. It is the same limited liability that the Foreign Minister implied in his speech, and that the architects of Canada 21 argued. In fact, limited liability is deeply buried in the unconscious of the 1994 Defence White Paper and the recent Foreign Policy Review statements. Both are a reflection of a latent isolationism driven primarily by domestic politics, and buried deep not only in the Canadian, but also the American body politic.

One may conclude by returning to Richard III and the initial soliloquy,

> and lest to spy my shadow in the sun and descend on my own deformity, and therefore since I cannot prove a lover to entertain these farewell spoken days I am determined to prove a villain.

Of course for Canada, it would have to be reversed. For Canadian foreign policy it would read:

> I cannot prove a *villain* to entertain these gray poor spoken days, I am determined to prove a *lover*.

And when one thinks of the shadows in the sun and the deformity it speaks to, it is the deformity of Canada as a product of its geopolitical foundation, and how this foundation has effected Canada through immigration, economic change, politics, and society. A deformity that makes Canada unique on the world stage; a deformity that any nation would love to possess. And at the heart of this deformity, this uniqueness, resides the unrelenting dilemma of Canadian foreign policy between the Atlantic and the Pacific, if not the world.

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